Busted

[Wingman420]

WOW bsemaj truly from the bottom of my heart! I have made and continue to make preparations for my children and belongings to be cared for in the event of a conviction and believe me this has taken a heavy toll. But I continue to believe that a chance at Justice exists through Jury Trial.
I would love to knpw more about your work towards establishing criteria in WA State for the Police to go by because MMJ Law in RI is ambiguous at best, is subject to interpretation by uneducated and undereducated Police. Any help could be useful.
Thanks again my friend and yes the wheels of Justice turn slowly.

 

[Wingman420]

my sympathies......there is the need for public education of a concept known as:

'jury nullification'



Jury nullification is a concept that not too many people are aware of, but it is a legally valid concept which has found some success.

The judges will not tell the jury about it, the attorneys are FORBIDDEN to talk about it, this is why it is crucial for everyone to spread the word.

Jury nullification is the right of the people and the only way to fight this crap.

Thanks Spice I appreciate your help. I have a question though if I am looking to a Jury for exoneration why would I want to nullify them? Maybe this is a stupid question as I know nothing about this, but can only imagine. If it is a walk in the park I would think every backwater barrister would be selling these "nullifications" like water. So please elaborate any information may help.

 

[bsemaj]

WOW bsemaj truly from the bottom of my heart! I have made and continue to make preparations for my children and belongings to be cared for in the event of a conviction and believe me this has taken a heavy toll. But I continue to believe that a chance at Justice exists through Jury Trial.
I would love to knpw more about your work towards establishing criteria in WA State for the Police to go by because MMJ Law in RI is ambiguous at best, is subject to interpretation by uneducated and undereducated Police. Any help could be useful.
Thanks again my friend and yes the wheels of Justice turn slowly.

Here ya go brother.. enjoy.

My second home when couch surfing Legal Citations (Page 1) - ASA Forum


Also I have filed $140 mil. in tort claims over the last year.. haven't filed any court suit YET over it but, I have plenty of time.

In 2006 on my oldest sons birthday they raided our home and took everything.. 72 plants and approx. 50 k in equipment most not being used but just being stored due to the fact most was hydro.

We had 3 carbon filters going in scrubb mode, and it was snowing when the cops claimed they smelled the grow .. 1 block away. LOL.

So this case is still on going but, stayed until our appeals are done with.. problem is as you will see in my motions.. they all have big problems with their case..

5 years now.. think we have used enough of the taxpayers money, due to judicial deception and federal quid-pro-quo' being filed...

So in doing some more research, I find out that each plant being they are "HYBRIDS" are worth in value $12,500 each.. WOW.. (when you get out of your case I will send you the how this is done).

But, on top of this here in wa. as in most states is the timber trespass laws which allow for 3 times the value awarded.. most timber claims are allowed full value.

72x12,500x3= and that is just plant value per the governments evidence and law. Since it was the drug task force whom did the dirty work..

Peace my brother and stand strong.. learn this stuff better than them and blow their doors.

Ambiguity requires lenity.. and only the legislature may pronounce punishment.. remember that.

I have never taken a deal when it comes to my "MEDICAL TREATMENT" <.. key words here.. *uck the drug stigma . flip their coin.

ps. I have both oregon and washington authorized medical treatment and to top it off, I have a SSDI order recognizing my use for medical treatment for my seizure disorder.. the ALJ was really interested in hearing how cannabis helped with such a debilitating condition.. I explained how when the seizure comes on how when I use cannabis they stop from going full grandmal. My attorney was happy when the judge recognized my neccessity for its use.. I also have issues not being able to take phama meds. They bring on my disorder when taken.

 

[bsemaj]

Chapter 21-28.6 - Index of Sections

Please point out why your having issues with this being "ambiguous" . I'm not sure I understand.

If your a "caregiver" you must go before a jury if you didn't have a registry card and your lawyer didn't file a motion to dismiss. Affirmative Defense is for a "caregiver" only without a registry card from what I am reading and anyone with a card is not subject to any court process if specific criteria is followed.. but, are if no card.

Does your state have a card system in place accepting patients ? If not it would seem that due process of law would require the same equivalent process given if it don't exist. meaning the protections should apply beings no rights or privileges are forfeited by ambiguity in the law.. wa. guv. vetoed ours because of the schedule 1 unregulated substance.. can't register schedule 1 drug use and have it not conflict with federal registration laws.. conflict preemption. If it was a schedule 2 by state law then no conflict exists like in oregon.

What I don't see, is plain lingo of the legislature defining the "crimes" .. the clear line.. it just says

§ 21-28.6-7 Scope of chapter. – (a) This chapter shall not permit: ..............

If what you did is not here, how is it a crime ?? obviously it was permitted right ?

Entrapment by Estoppel type defense comes to mind..

Now I see that this has been changed removing the affirmative defense and going strictly with one must register for protections.. just like oregon did some years back. reason being so the popo would leave patients alone.. and when they didn't, they got sued when a patient or caregiver bucked up with a card.. that settled things till just recently with da feds playing games of we are broke , so lets rob people..

What We Are Doing

The Department of Health's Medical Marijuana Program administers the provisions of the state's Medical Marijuana Act and related Regulations.

 

[bsemaj]

So I did some research today in regards to "medical marijuana in RI.. unfortunately, there isn't any such animal.. and I find that hard to believe since RI law has been on the books for almost 6 yrs.

So looking at a common saying.. winner winner chicken dinner..

So I had to use regular marijuana .. hee hee.

Now if you truly read my case in wa., you will understand why this is so damn important..


STATE v. STOREY---December 3, 2010.

The Basis for Probable Cause is the starting point in every case..

Based on the--> totality of the circumstances presented in the affidavit,<-- defendant argues that a finding of probable cause was not justified because: (1) the tip was anonymous, (2) the tip was stale, (3) the trash-pull evidence7 was insufficient to corroborate the tip, (4) his criminal-background information was irrelevant to the drug crime the police were investigating, and (5) Saleeba's residence at 52 Wannisett Avenue was not disclosed to the magistrate,--> which limited the magistrate's knowledge of material information and affected the inferences he made when determining the existence of probable cause.<--
[ 8 A.3d 461 ]

This Court's recent opinion, Byrne, 972 A.2d at 637-38, provides succinct guidelines for reviewing a search warrant's validity. As a threshold requirement, our first task is
-->> ensuring that the issued warrant was "based on a sworn affidavit by a police officer that was submitted to a neutral and detached judicial officer * * *." Id. at 637 (citing Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 6, of the Rhode Island Constitution).<-- Here, as there is no dispute about the submission of a sworn affidavit or the impartiality of the magistrate, we proceed to the next step in the review: determining whether the search warrant was based on probable cause. Id. at 637 (citing State v. Verrecchia, 880 A.2d 89, 94 (R.I.2005)); see also Rule 41(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In doing so, we examine whether there was "a substantial basis from which to discern probable cause" from the "totality of the circumstances" found within "the four corners of the affidavit prepared in support of the warrant." Byrne, 972 A.2d at 638 (quoting Correia, 707 A.2d at 1249 and citing State v. Joseph, 114 R.I. 596, 603, 337 A.2d 523, 527 (1975) and Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). Our review of the magistrate's determination permits that his assessment of probable cause may be based on facts contained in the affidavit, as well as on "the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts." Id. We also recognize that "affidavits are to be interpreted in a realistic fashion that is consistent with common sense, and not subject to rigorous and hypertechnical scrutiny." Id. (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 235-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317).

Applying all these principles, our ultimate inquiry asks whether the magistrate made a "practical, common-sense determination" that "there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317). [Practical Common Sense, medical cannabis is not contraband and having a card is not evidence of a crime]

Essentially, a magistrate is not required to assert with certainty that the search items will be found in that particular place, rather the magistrate "need only conclude that it would be reasonable to seek the evidence in the place indicated in the affidavit." Id. at 639 (quoting United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1315 (9th Cir. 1985)); see also State v. Pratt, 641 A.2d 732, 736 (R.I.1994) (stating that although the probable-cause standard requires "more than a mere suspicion," it demands "only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity") (quoting State v. Baldoni, 609 A.2d 219, 220 (R.I. 1992)). Finally, we firmly acknowledge the postulate that "the resolution of doubtful or marginal [probable-cause] cases * * * [is] largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants"8 Byrne, 972 A.2d at 639 (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965)).
1
Facts Disclosed in the Affidavit

At the outset, we note that defendant challenges individual portions of the affidavit, but fails to fully acknowledge that the probable cause, totality-of-the-circumstances
[ 8 A.3d 462 ]

test looks to the entire mosaic of presented information. "Although each piece of information may not alone be sufficient to establish probable cause and some of the information may have an innocent explanation, `probable cause is the sum total of layers of information and the synthesis of what the police have heard, what they know, and what they observed as trained officers.'" State v. Schmalz, 744 N.W.2d 734, 738 (N.D.2008) (quoting State v. Thieling, 611 N.W.2d 861, 863 (N.D. 2000)). Here, the affidavit presents not only an anonymous tip, twelve cut plastic baggies, the residue of cocaine, and prior non-drug-related criminal activity, but it also presents the confluence of all these information sources. Given the proper inferences a magistrate may make, the amalgamation of this information points to the "fair probability" that drugs and the indicia of drug distribution will be found at Storey's residence. We cannot disagree that the magistrate had a substantial basis from which to discern probable cause based on the totality of the instant facts.

 

[spice]

Jury nullification occurs in a trial when a jury reaches a verdict contrary to the judge's instructions as to the law.

A jury verdict contrary to the letter of the law pertains only to the particular case before it; however, if a pattern of acquittals develops in response to repeated attempts to prosecute a statutory offence, it can have the de facto effect of invalidating the statute. A pattern of jury nullification may indicate public opposition to an unwanted legislative enactment.

The jury system was established because it was felt that a panel of citizens, drawn at random from the community, and serving for too short a time to be corrupted, would be more likely to render a just verdict.

It was feared that a single judge or panel of government officials may be unduly influenced to follow established legal practice, even when that practice had drifted from its origins. However, in most modern Western legal systems, juries are often instructed to serve only as "finders of facts", whose role it is to determine the veracity of the evidence presented, and the weight accorded to the evidence,[1] but not the application of that evidence to the law. Similarly, juries are routinely cautioned by courts and some attorneys to not allow sympathy for a party or other affected persons to compromise the fair and dispassionate evaluation of evidence during the guilt phase of a trial. These instructions are criticized by advocates of jury nullification. Some commonly cited historical examples of jury nullification involve the refusal of American colonial juries to convict a defendant under English law.

Juries have also refused to convict due to the perceived injustice of a law in general,[3] or the perceived injustice of the way the law is applied in particular cases.[4] There have also been cases where the juries have refused to convict due to their own prejudices such as the race of one of the parties in the case.

Other cases have revealed that some juries simply refuse to render a guilty verdict in the absence of overwhelming direct or scientific evidence to support such a judgment. With this type of jury impaneled for the trial of a case, even substantial and competently presented circumstantial evidence may be discounted or rendered inconsequential during the jury's deliberation.

Background
A nineteenth-century jury

Jury nullification is a de facto power of juries. Judges rarely inform juries of their nullification power. The power of jury nullification derives from an inherent quality of most modern common law systems—a general unwillingness to inquire into jurors' motivations during or after deliberations. A jury's ability to nullify the law is further supported by two common law precedents: the prohibition on punishing jury members for their verdict, and the prohibition (in some countries) on retrying defendants after an acquittal (see related topics res judicata and double jeopardy).

Jury nullification is the source of much debate. Some maintain that it is an important safeguard of last resort against wrongful imprisonment and government tyranny.[6][7] Others view it as a violation of the right to a jury trial that undermines the law.[7] Some view it as a violation of the oath sworn to by jurors. In the United States, some view the requirement that jurors take an oath to be unlawful in itself, while still others view the oath's reference to "deliverance" to require nullification of unjust law: "will well and truly try and a true deliverance make between the United States and the defendant at the bar, and a true verdict render according to the evidence, so help [me] God." United States v. Green, 556 F.2d 71 (D.C. Cir. 1977). [8] Some fear that nullification could be used to permit violence against socially unpopular factions.[9] They point to the danger that a jury may choose to convict a defendant who has not broken the letter of the law. However, judges retain the rights both to decide sentences and to disregard juries' guilty verdicts, acting as a check against malicious juries. Jury nullification may also occur in civil suits, in which the distinction between acquittal and conviction is irrelevant.[10]

Nevertheless, there is little doubt as to the ability of a jury to nullify the law. Today, there are several issues raised by jury nullification.

First, whether juries can or should be instructed or informed of their power to nullify.
Second, whether a judge may remove jurors "for cause" when they refuse to apply the law as instructed.
Third, whether a judge may punish a juror for exercising their power of jury nullification.
Fourth, whether all legal arguments, except perhaps on motions in limine to exclude evidence, should be made in the presence of the jury.

In some cases in the United States, a stealth juror will attempt to get on a jury in order to nullify the law.[11] Some lawyers use a shadow defense to get information entered into the record that would otherwise be inadmissible hoping that evidence will trigger a jury nullification.[12][13] A notable contemporary example of this tactic is the claim by the defense in the currently (as of 2011-12) ongoing Roger Clemens perjury trial to have the charges against Clemens dismissed due to "prosecutorial misconduct", i.e. that the prosecution intentionally introduced video evidence which Judge Reggie Walton had ruled inadmissible, for the purposes of getting, in the words of the defense, "a second bite at the apple", due to the prosecution's alleged poor performance. The introduction of the tainted evidence caused a mistrial after only two days. The judge denied the defense's motion but noted his strong displeasure with the prosecution. [2], [3], [4]
[edit] Common law precedent
Even prior to Bushell's Case, Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, a Protestant dissident, was acquitted by a jury, despite the hostility of the judges.

The early history of juries supports the recognition of the de facto power of nullification. By the 12th century, common law courts in England began using juries for more than administrative duties. Juries were composed primarily of "laymen" from the local community. They provided a somewhat efficient means of dispute resolution with the benefit of supplying legitimacy.

The general power of juries to decide on verdicts was recognised in the English Magna Carta [14] of 1215, which put into words existing practices:

No free man shall be captured, and or imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, and or of his liberties, or of his free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or in any way destroyed, nor will we proceed against him by force or proceed against him by arms, but by the lawful judgment of his peers, and or by the law of the land

For a trivial offence, a free man shall be fined only in proportion to the degree of his offence, and for a serious offence correspondingly, but not so heavily as to deprive him of his livelihood. In the same way, a merchant shall be spared his merchandise, and a husbandman the implements of his husbandry, if they fall upon the mercy of a royal court. None of these fines shall be imposed except by the assessment on oath of reputable men of the neighbourhood

Largely, the earliest juries returned verdicts in accordance with the judge or the crown. This was achieved either by "packing the jury" or by "writ of attaint". Juries were packed by hand-selecting or by bribing the jury so as to return the desired verdict. This was a common tactic in cases involving treason or sedition. In addition, the writ of attaint allowed a judge to retry the case in front of a second jury when the judge believed the first jury returned a "false verdict". If the second jury returned a different verdict, that verdict was imposed and the first jury was imprisoned or fined.

This history, however, is marked by a number of notable exceptions. In 1554, a jury acquitted Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, but was severely punished by the court. Almost a century later in 1649, in the first known attempt to argue for jury nullification, a jury likewise acquitted John Lilburne for his part in inciting a rebellion against the Cromwell regime. The theoretician and politician Eduard Bernstein wrote of Lilburne's trial:

His contention that the constitution of the Court was contrary to the fundamental laws of the country was unheeded, and his claim that the jury was legally entitled to judge not only as to matters of fact but also as to the application of the law itself, as the Judges represented only 'Norman intruders', whom the jury might here ignore in reaching a verdict, was described by an enraged judge as 'damnable, blasphemous heresy.' This view was not shared by the jury, which, after three days’ hearing, acquitted Lilburne — who had defended himself as skilfully as any lawyer could have done — to the great horror of the Judges and the chagrin of the majority of the Council of State. The Judges were so astonished at the verdict of the jury that they had to repeat their question before they would believe their ears, but the public which crowded the judgment hall, on the announcement of the verdict, broke out into cheers so loud and long as, according to the unanimous testimony of contemporary reporters, had never before been heard in the Guildhall. The cheering and waving of caps continued for over half an hour, while the Judges sat, turning white and red in turns, and spread thence to the masses in London and the suburbs. At night bonfires were lighted, and even during the following days the event was the occasion of joyful demonstrations.[15]

In 1653 Lilburne was on trial again and asked the jury to acquit him if it found the death penalty "unconscionably severe" in proportion to the crime he committed. The jury found Lilburne "Not guilty of any crime worthy of death".[citation needed]

By the late 17th century, the court's ability to punish juries was removed in Bushell's Case[16] involving a juror on the case against William Penn. Penn and William Mead had been arrested in 1670 for illegally preaching a Quaker sermon and disturbing the peace, but four jurors, led by Edward Bushell refused to find them guilty. Instead of dismissing the jury, the judge sent them back for further deliberations. Despite the judge demanding a guilty verdict, the jury this time unanimously found Penn guilty of preaching but acquitted him on the charge of disturbing the peace and acquitted Mead of all charges. The jury was then subsequently kept for three days without "meat, drink, fire and tobacco" to force them to bring in a guilty verdict and when they failed to do so the judge ended the trial. As punishment the judge ordered the jurors imprisoned until they paid a fine to the court. Four jurors refused to pay the fine and after several months, Edward Bushell sought a writ of habeas corpus. Chief Justice Vaughan, sitting on the Court of Common Pleas, discharged the writ, released them, called the power to punish a jury "absurd", and forbade judges from punishing jurors for returning a verdict the judge disagreed with.[17]

In 1681, a grand jury refused to indict the Earl of Shaftesbury. Then in 1688, a jury acquitted the Archbishop of Canterbury and six other Anglican bishops of seditious libel. Juries continued, even in non-criminal cases, to act in defiance of the crown. In 1763 and 1765, juries awarded £4,000 and £300 to John Wilkes and John Entick, respectively, in separate suits for trespass against the crown's messengers. In both cases, messengers were sent by Lord Halifax to seize allegedly libelous papers.[citation needed]

In Scotland jury nullification had the profound effect of introducing (or as others believed, reviving) the verdict of "not guilty". It was in 1728 that one Carnegie of Finhaven accidentally killed the Scottish Earl of Strathmore. As the defendant had undoubtedly killed the Earl, the law (as it stood) required the jury merely to look at the facts and pass a verdict of "proven" or "not proven" depending on whether they believed the facts proved the defendant had killed the Earl.[citation needed] However, if the jury brought in a "proven" verdict they would in effect cause this innocent man to die. To avert this injustice, the jury decided to assert what it believed to be their "ancient right" to judge the whole case and not just the facts, rendering the verdict of "not guilty" which remains in Scotland to this day. Over time, however, juries have tended to favour the "not guilty" verdict over "not proven" and with this the interpretation has changed. Now the "not guilty" verdict has become the normal verdict when a jury is convinced of innocence and the "not proven" verdict is only used when the jury is not certain of innocence or guilt.[citation needed]

Standard jury trial practice in the United States during the Founding Era and for several decades afterward was to argue all issues of law in the presence of the jury, so that the jury heard the same arguments the bench did in reaching his rulings on motions. This is evidenced by such decisions as the 1839 case Stettinius v. U.S., in which it was held that "The defense can argue law to the jury before the court gives instructions."[18] Later, judges began to demand the parties submit motions in writing, often before the jury was empaneled, to be argued and decided without the jury being present. This transition began with motions in limine, to exclude evidence, on which it was felt the jury should not hear the argument because they would be informed of the evidence to be excluded. Later that was expanded to include all legal argument, so that today, that earlier practice of arguing law before the jury has been largely forgotten, and judges even declare mistrials or overturn verdicts if legal argument is made to the jury.[citation needed]
[edit] Specific jurisdictions
[edit] Canada

Although extremely rare, jury nullification does occur in Canada. The power is subject to greater than usual scrutiny, as the prosecution has powers to appeal the resulting acquittal. In addition, judges tend to be very much against nullification; in R. v. Latimer, 2001 SCC 1,[19] it was stated that "The trial did not become unfair simply because the trial judge undermined the jury’s de facto power to nullify. In most if not all cases, jury nullification will not be a valid factor in analyzing trial fairness for the accused. Guarding against jury nullification is a desirable and legitimate exercise for a trial judge; in fact a judge is required to take steps to ensure that the jury will apply the law properly."

However, a few famous examples of nullification have occurred in Canada. In the 1988 Supreme Court case, R. v. Morgentaler, 1988 SCR 30,[20] a nullification was appealed all the way to the country's highest court, which struck down the law in question. In obiter dicta, Chief Justice Dickson wrote:

The contrary principle contended for by Mr. Manning, that a jury may be encouraged to ignore a law it does not like, could lead to gross inequities. One accused could be convicted by a jury who supported the existing law, while another person indicted for the same offence could be acquitted by a jury who, with reformist zeal, wished to express disapproval of the same law. Moreover, a jury could decide that although the law pointed to a conviction, the jury would simply refuse to apply the law to an accused for whom it had sympathy. Alternatively, a jury who feels antipathy towards an accused might convict despite a law which points to acquittal. To give a harsh but I think telling example, a jury fueled by the passions of racism could be told that they need not apply the law against murder to a white man who had killed a black man. Such a possibility need only be stated to reveal the potentially frightening implications of Mr. Manning's assertions. [...]

It is no doubt true that juries have a de facto power to disregard the law as stated to the jury by the judge. We cannot enter the jury room. The jury is never called upon to explain the reasons which lie behind a verdict. It may even be true that in some limited circumstances the private decision of a jury to refuse to apply the law will constitute, in the words of a Law Reform Commission of Canada working paper, "the citizen's ultimate protection against oppressive laws and the oppressive enforcement of the law" (Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper 27, The Jury in Criminal Trials (1980)). But recognizing this reality is a far cry from suggesting that counsel may encourage a jury to ignore a law they do not support or to tell a jury that it has a right to do so.

The Supreme Court more recently issued a decision, R. v. Krieger 2006 SCC 47,[21] which confirmed that juries in Canada have the power to refuse to apply the law when their consciences require that they do so. Within this decision, it is stated that "juries are not entitled as a matter of right to refuse to apply the law — but they do have the power to do so when their consciences permit of no other course."[21]
[edit] England

In the 1670 "Hay-market case", William Penn was accused of the crime of 'preaching Quakerism to an unlawful assembly' and while he freely admitted his guilt, he challenged the righteousness of such a law. The jury, recognizing that William Penn clearly had been preaching in public, but refusing to find him guilty of speaking to an unlawful assembly, attempted to find Penn guilty of "speaking in Gracechurch-street". The judge, unsatisfied with this decision, withheld food, water, and toilet facilities from the jurors for three days. The jurors finally decided to return a not guilty verdict overall, and while the decision was accepted, the jurors were fined. One of the jurors appealed this fine, and Chief Justice Sir John Vaughn issued an historically important ruling: that jurors could not be punished for their verdicts. This case is considered a significant milestone in the history of jury nullification.[22] The particular case is celebrated in a plaque displayed in the Central Criminal Court (The Old bailey) in London.

In a criminal libel case, R. v. Shipley (1784), 4 Dougl. 73, 99 E.R. 774, at p. 824, Lord Mansfield disparaged the practice of jury nullification:

So the jury who usurp the judicature of law, though they happen to be right, are themselves wrong, because they are right by chance only, and have not taken the constitutional way of deciding the question. It is the duty of the Judge, in all cases of general justice, to tell the jury how to do right, though they have it in their power to do wrong, which is a matter entirely between God and their own consciences.
To be free is to live under a government by law [...]. Miserable is the condition of individuals, dangerous is the condition of the State, if there is no certain law, or, which is the same thing, no certain administration of law, to protect individuals, or to guard the State.

[...]

In opposition to this, what is contended for? -- That the law shall be, in every particular cause, what any twelve men, who shall happen to be the jury, shall be inclined to think; liable to no review, and subject to no control, under all the prejudices of the popular cry of the day, and under all the bias of interest in this town, where thousands, more or less, are concerned in the publication of newspapers, paragraphs, and pamphlets. Under such an administration of law, no man could tell, no counsel could advise, whether a paper was or was not punishable.

In 1982, during the Falklands War, the British Royal Navy sank an Argentine Cruiser – the "ARA General Belgrano". A civil servant (government employee) named Clive Ponting leaked two government documents concerning the sinking of the cruiser to a Member of Parliament (Tam Dalyell) and was subsequently charged with breaching section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911. The prosecution in the case demanded that the jury convict Ponting as he had clearly contravened the Act by leaking official information about the sinking of the Belgrano during the Falklands War. His main defence, that it was in the public interest that this information be made available, was rejected on the grounds that "the public interest is what the government of the day says it is", but the jury nevertheless acquitted him, much to the consternation of the Government. He had argued that he had acted out of 'his duty to the interests of the state'; the judge had argued that civil servants owed their duty to the government.[citation needed]
[edit] United States
Main article: Jury nullification in the United States

In the United States, jury nullification first appeared in the pre-Civil War era when juries sometimes refused to convict for violations of the Fugitive Slave Act. Later, during Prohibition, juries often nullified alcohol control laws,[23] possibly as often as 60% of the time.[24] This resistance may have contributed to the adoption of the Twenty-first amendment repealing Prohibition, the Eighteenth amendment.

In a well known example of jury nullification, at the end of James Hickok's trial for the manslaughter of Davis Tutt in 1865, Judge Sempronius Boyd gave the jury two instructions. He first instructed the jury that a conviction was its only option under the law, he then instructed them that they could apply the unwritten law of the "fair fight" and acquit. Hickok was acquitted, a verdict that was not popular with the public.[25][26]
[edit] Fugitive Slave Law

"Jury nullification" was practiced in the 1850s to protest the federal Fugitive Slave Act, which was part of the Compromise of 1850. The Act had been passed to mollify the slave owners from the South, who were otherwise threatening to secede from the Union. Across the North, local juries acquitted men accused of violating the law. Secretary of State Daniel Webster was a key supporter of the law as expressed in his famous "Seventh of March" speech. He wanted high profile convictions. The jury nullifications ruined his presidential aspirations and his last-ditch efforts to find a compromise between North and South. Webster led the prosecution when defendants were accused of rescuing Shadrach Minkins in 1851 from Boston officials who intended to return Minkins to his owner; the juries convicted none of the men. Webster tried to enforce a law that was extremely unpopular in the North, and his Whig Party passed over him again when they chose a presidential nominee in 1852.[27]
[edit] 21st century

In the 21st century, many discussions of jury nullification center around drug laws that some consider unjust either in principle or because they are seen to discriminate[verification needed] against certain groups. A jury nullification advocacy group estimates that 3–4% of all jury trials involve nullification,[28] and a recent rise in hung juries is seen by some as being indirect evidence that juries have begun to consider the validity or fairness of the laws themselves.[29]
[edit] Judicial opinion in the U.S.

The 1895 decision in Sparf v. U.S. written by Justice John Marshall Harlan held 5 to 4 that a trial judge has no responsibility to inform the jury of the right to nullify laws. This decision, often cited, has led to a common practice by United States judges to penalize anyone who attempts to present a nullification argument to jurors and to declare a mistrial if such argument has been presented to them. In some states, jurors are likely to be struck from the panel during voir dire if they will not agree to accept as correct the rulings and instructions of the law as provided by the judge.[30]

Recent court rulings have contributed to the prevention of informing juries of their right and duty to nullify. A 1969 Fourth Circuit decision, U.S. v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir.1969), affirmed the right of jury nullification, but also upheld the power of the court to refuse to permit an instruction to the jury to this effect.[31] In 1972, in United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued a ruling similar to Moylan that affirmed the de facto power of a jury to nullify the law but upheld the denial of the defense's chance to instruct the jury about the power to nullify.[32] In 1988, the Sixth Circuit upheld a jury instruction that "There is no such thing as valid jury nullification." however one of the dissenting judges pointed out that in United States v. Wilson, 629 F. 2d 439 - Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit 1980 that the panel had unanimously decided "In criminal cases, a jury is entitled to acquit the defendant because it has no sympathy for the government's position."[33] In 1997, the Second Circuit ruled that jurors can be removed if there is evidence that they intend to nullify the law, under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 23(b).[34] The Supreme Court has not recently confronted the issue of jury nullification. Further, as officers of the court, attorneys have sworn an oath to uphold the law, and are considered by bar associations to be ethically prohibited from directly advocating for jury nullification.[35]
[edit] Controversy

The main deontic issue involved in jury nullification is the tension between democratic self-government and integrity.[36] The argument has been raised that prosecutors are not allowed to seek jury nullification, and therefore defendants should not be allowed to seek it either.[37]

Jury nullification - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

[mrflamboynt]

i thought they (prosecution) was going to try and put up a fight.... but it looks to me like dismissal is coming... hardly justice if you ask me.... not that i wish for anyone be put on trial for a crime they did not commit. but atleast given the opportunity to face your accusers, and OWNING THEIR ASSES! not to mention blowing the whistle on clear cases of discrimination of MMJ patients.... reading all of these encounters with "law enforcement" and watching all of the videos has literally blown my mind! (and ruined my dinner)
how the hell did D.S.H.S. get a patent for medical marijuana? like they invented it? LOL government constantly contradicting themselves, from obvious indirect statements like "its good. no its the worst. hey we really need the $$ from its illegal sale". picking on the infirm, for greed. the whole thing reeks of evil.....

bro, i have been trying to reach the end of this topic for last 8 hours, including all of the links included in this thread. i am now sick, and my wife is pissed (at me).... i knew we had puppets for presidents, but i didnt think it was that bad... 10 trillion dollars gone!!?? WTF, and one of the first things Obama said he was going to do when in office was pay the Native Americans 3.4 billion for the wrong-doings that the government doesnt actually admit to.... anyway, you think we got any money? screwed by the government once again! natives are used to it though.... uuughhh... i have pretty much lost all faith in govt, but not in my countrymen... still proud to be american, especially if i can do what is required of me to remain a "FREE" american!

bsemaj, can you drive to OR to get meds, and drive them back to WA? if not, what is the benefit of owning 2 cards (or 3 if including CA)?

 

[bsemaj]

Mr. flamboynt, If I am in oregon and want to medicate without being subjected to law enforcement.. I had better have a card correct ? If I am wanting to medicate in any state I am in, I had better follow the laws, correct ?

That's why I have 2 lawful documents allowing me to have medical treatment any place I happen to be.. as I live close to the state line..

HEADS UP..

WA State Licensing: License Query Search

THCF IS NOT LICENSED ANYMORE IN WA. ..LMFAO. Big Grin, at least as of today their not.. maybe under a different name now.. BUT THEY DON'T EXIST WITH PAUL STANFORD RUNNING IT AS SOLE SHAREHOLDER ANYMORE.. i GUESS HE DECIDED TO FINALLY LISTEN TO ME.. SINCE IT IS UP ON APPEAL NOW WITH A HIGHER COURT WHICH WILL RULE HIS BUSINESS WAS RENDERING UNLAWFUL SERVICES ..

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[mrflamboynt]

so you still cannot transport across state lines? even with multiple cards?

 

[bsemaj]

so you still cannot transport across state lines? even with multiple cards?

As a "fundamental" right to medical treatment ? Case law says no.

Case law says you have a fundamental right to treatment in each state.. hence, why one would need a medical autorization to treat in each jurisdiction except.. a couple of states have reciprocity.. 1 states authorization to medical treatment is all you need.

kiss is a must here.

Transport ??

How does one "transport" medical treatment ?

Now the flip side of that same coin is air-travel with ones meds.. across state lines in the air.. plenty of news articles about this practice.. so far so good..

Is ground driving on a road different ??

Interesting legal concept I guess I should research a bit...

I don't think a state would have any issues but, da feds would surely have an issue one would surmise from their recent attacks.

 

[Big dog]

Jury nullification occurs in a trial when a jury reaches a verdict contrary to the judge's instructions as to the law.

A jury verdict contrary to the letter of the law pertains only to the particular case before it; however, if a pattern of acquittals develops in response to repeated attempts to prosecute a statutory offence, it can have the de facto effect of invalidating the statute. A pattern of jury nullification may indicate public opposition to an unwanted legislative enactment.

The jury system was established because it was felt that a panel of citizens, drawn at random from the community, and serving for too short a time to be corrupted, would be more likely to render a just verdict.

It was feared that a single judge or panel of government officials may be unduly influenced to follow established legal practice, even when that practice had drifted from its origins. However, in most modern Western legal systems, juries are often instructed to serve only as "finders of facts", whose role it is to determine the veracity of the evidence presented, and the weight accorded to the evidence,[1] but not the application of that evidence to the law. Similarly, juries are routinely cautioned by courts and some attorneys to not allow sympathy for a party or other affected persons to compromise the fair and dispassionate evaluation of evidence during the guilt phase of a trial. These instructions are criticized by advocates of jury nullification. Some commonly cited historical examples of jury nullification involve the refusal of American colonial juries to convict a defendant under English law.

Juries have also refused to convict due to the perceived injustice of a law in general,[3] or the perceived injustice of the way the law is applied in particular cases.[4] There have also been cases where the juries have refused to convict due to their own prejudices such as the race of one of the parties in the case.

Other cases have revealed that some juries simply refuse to render a guilty verdict in the absence of overwhelming direct or scientific evidence to support such a judgment. With this type of jury impaneled for the trial of a case, even substantial and competently presented circumstantial evidence may be discounted or rendered inconsequential during the jury's deliberation.

Background
A nineteenth-century jury

Jury nullification is a de facto power of juries. Judges rarely inform juries of their nullification power. The power of jury nullification derives from an inherent quality of most modern common law systems—a general unwillingness to inquire into jurors' motivations during or after deliberations. A jury's ability to nullify the law is further supported by two common law precedents: the prohibition on punishing jury members for their verdict, and the prohibition (in some countries) on retrying defendants after an acquittal (see related topics res judicata and double jeopardy).

Jury nullification is the source of much debate. Some maintain that it is an important safeguard of last resort against wrongful imprisonment and government tyranny.[6][7] Others view it as a violation of the right to a jury trial that undermines the law.[7] Some view it as a violation of the oath sworn to by jurors. In the United States, some view the requirement that jurors take an oath to be unlawful in itself, while still others view the oath's reference to "deliverance" to require nullification of unjust law: "will well and truly try and a true deliverance make between the United States and the defendant at the bar, and a true verdict render according to the evidence, so help [me] God." United States v. Green, 556 F.2d 71 (D.C. Cir. 1977). [8] Some fear that nullification could be used to permit violence against socially unpopular factions.[9] They point to the danger that a jury may choose to convict a defendant who has not broken the letter of the law. However, judges retain the rights both to decide sentences and to disregard juries' guilty verdicts, acting as a check against malicious juries. Jury nullification may also occur in civil suits, in which the distinction between acquittal and conviction is irrelevant.[10]

Nevertheless, there is little doubt as to the ability of a jury to nullify the law. Today, there are several issues raised by jury nullification.

First, whether juries can or should be instructed or informed of their power to nullify.
Second, whether a judge may remove jurors "for cause" when they refuse to apply the law as instructed.
Third, whether a judge may punish a juror for exercising their power of jury nullification.
Fourth, whether all legal arguments, except perhaps on motions in limine to exclude evidence, should be made in the presence of the jury.

In some cases in the United States, a stealth juror will attempt to get on a jury in order to nullify the law.[11] Some lawyers use a shadow defense to get information entered into the record that would otherwise be inadmissible hoping that evidence will trigger a jury nullification.[12][13] A notable contemporary example of this tactic is the claim by the defense in the currently (as of 2011-12) ongoing Roger Clemens perjury trial to have the charges against Clemens dismissed due to "prosecutorial misconduct", i.e. that the prosecution intentionally introduced video evidence which Judge Reggie Walton had ruled inadmissible, for the purposes of getting, in the words of the defense, "a second bite at the apple", due to the prosecution's alleged poor performance. The introduction of the tainted evidence caused a mistrial after only two days. The judge denied the defense's motion but noted his strong displeasure with the prosecution. [2], [3], [4]
[edit] Common law precedent
Even prior to Bushell's Case, Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, a Protestant dissident, was acquitted by a jury, despite the hostility of the judges.

The early history of juries supports the recognition of the de facto power of nullification. By the 12th century, common law courts in England began using juries for more than administrative duties. Juries were composed primarily of "laymen" from the local community. They provided a somewhat efficient means of dispute resolution with the benefit of supplying legitimacy.

The general power of juries to decide on verdicts was recognised in the English Magna Carta [14] of 1215, which put into words existing practices:

No free man shall be captured, and or imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, and or of his liberties, or of his free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or in any way destroyed, nor will we proceed against him by force or proceed against him by arms, but by the lawful judgment of his peers, and or by the law of the land

For a trivial offence, a free man shall be fined only in proportion to the degree of his offence, and for a serious offence correspondingly, but not so heavily as to deprive him of his livelihood. In the same way, a merchant shall be spared his merchandise, and a husbandman the implements of his husbandry, if they fall upon the mercy of a royal court. None of these fines shall be imposed except by the assessment on oath of reputable men of the neighbourhood

Largely, the earliest juries returned verdicts in accordance with the judge or the crown. This was achieved either by "packing the jury" or by "writ of attaint". Juries were packed by hand-selecting or by bribing the jury so as to return the desired verdict. This was a common tactic in cases involving treason or sedition. In addition, the writ of attaint allowed a judge to retry the case in front of a second jury when the judge believed the first jury returned a "false verdict". If the second jury returned a different verdict, that verdict was imposed and the first jury was imprisoned or fined.

This history, however, is marked by a number of notable exceptions. In 1554, a jury acquitted Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, but was severely punished by the court. Almost a century later in 1649, in the first known attempt to argue for jury nullification, a jury likewise acquitted John Lilburne for his part in inciting a rebellion against the Cromwell regime. The theoretician and politician Eduard Bernstein wrote of Lilburne's trial:

His contention that the constitution of the Court was contrary to the fundamental laws of the country was unheeded, and his claim that the jury was legally entitled to judge not only as to matters of fact but also as to the application of the law itself, as the Judges represented only 'Norman intruders', whom the jury might here ignore in reaching a verdict, was described by an enraged judge as 'damnable, blasphemous heresy.' This view was not shared by the jury, which, after three days’ hearing, acquitted Lilburne — who had defended himself as skilfully as any lawyer could have done — to the great horror of the Judges and the chagrin of the majority of the Council of State. The Judges were so astonished at the verdict of the jury that they had to repeat their question before they would believe their ears, but the public which crowded the judgment hall, on the announcement of the verdict, broke out into cheers so loud and long as, according to the unanimous testimony of contemporary reporters, had never before been heard in the Guildhall. The cheering and waving of caps continued for over half an hour, while the Judges sat, turning white and red in turns, and spread thence to the masses in London and the suburbs. At night bonfires were lighted, and even during the following days the event was the occasion of joyful demonstrations.[15]

In 1653 Lilburne was on trial again and asked the jury to acquit him if it found the death penalty "unconscionably severe" in proportion to the crime he committed. The jury found Lilburne "Not guilty of any crime worthy of death".[citation needed]

By the late 17th century, the court's ability to punish juries was removed in Bushell's Case[16] involving a juror on the case against William Penn. Penn and William Mead had been arrested in 1670 for illegally preaching a Quaker sermon and disturbing the peace, but four jurors, led by Edward Bushell refused to find them guilty. Instead of dismissing the jury, the judge sent them back for further deliberations. Despite the judge demanding a guilty verdict, the jury this time unanimously found Penn guilty of preaching but acquitted him on the charge of disturbing the peace and acquitted Mead of all charges. The jury was then subsequently kept for three days without "meat, drink, fire and tobacco" to force them to bring in a guilty verdict and when they failed to do so the judge ended the trial. As punishment the judge ordered the jurors imprisoned until they paid a fine to the court. Four jurors refused to pay the fine and after several months, Edward Bushell sought a writ of habeas corpus. Chief Justice Vaughan, sitting on the Court of Common Pleas, discharged the writ, released them, called the power to punish a jury "absurd", and forbade judges from punishing jurors for returning a verdict the judge disagreed with.[17]

In 1681, a grand jury refused to indict the Earl of Shaftesbury. Then in 1688, a jury acquitted the Archbishop of Canterbury and six other Anglican bishops of seditious libel. Juries continued, even in non-criminal cases, to act in defiance of the crown. In 1763 and 1765, juries awarded £4,000 and £300 to John Wilkes and John Entick, respectively, in separate suits for trespass against the crown's messengers. In both cases, messengers were sent by Lord Halifax to seize allegedly libelous papers.[citation needed]

In Scotland jury nullification had the profound effect of introducing (or as others believed, reviving) the verdict of "not guilty". It was in 1728 that one Carnegie of Finhaven accidentally killed the Scottish Earl of Strathmore. As the defendant had undoubtedly killed the Earl, the law (as it stood) required the jury merely to look at the facts and pass a verdict of "proven" or "not proven" depending on whether they believed the facts proved the defendant had killed the Earl.[citation needed] However, if the jury brought in a "proven" verdict they would in effect cause this innocent man to die. To avert this injustice, the jury decided to assert what it believed to be their "ancient right" to judge the whole case and not just the facts, rendering the verdict of "not guilty" which remains in Scotland to this day. Over time, however, juries have tended to favour the "not guilty" verdict over "not proven" and with this the interpretation has changed. Now the "not guilty" verdict has become the normal verdict when a jury is convinced of innocence and the "not proven" verdict is only used when the jury is not certain of innocence or guilt.[citation needed]

Standard jury trial practice in the United States during the Founding Era and for several decades afterward was to argue all issues of law in the presence of the jury, so that the jury heard the same arguments the bench did in reaching his rulings on motions. This is evidenced by such decisions as the 1839 case Stettinius v. U.S., in which it was held that "The defense can argue law to the jury before the court gives instructions."[18] Later, judges began to demand the parties submit motions in writing, often before the jury was empaneled, to be argued and decided without the jury being present. This transition began with motions in limine, to exclude evidence, on which it was felt the jury should not hear the argument because they would be informed of the evidence to be excluded. Later that was expanded to include all legal argument, so that today, that earlier practice of arguing law before the jury has been largely forgotten, and judges even declare mistrials or overturn verdicts if legal argument is made to the jury.[citation needed]
[edit] Specific jurisdictions
[edit] Canada

Although extremely rare, jury nullification does occur in Canada. The power is subject to greater than usual scrutiny, as the prosecution has powers to appeal the resulting acquittal. In addition, judges tend to be very much against nullification; in R. v. Latimer, 2001 SCC 1,[19] it was stated that "The trial did not become unfair simply because the trial judge undermined the jury’s de facto power to nullify. In most if not all cases, jury nullification will not be a valid factor in analyzing trial fairness for the accused. Guarding against jury nullification is a desirable and legitimate exercise for a trial judge; in fact a judge is required to take steps to ensure that the jury will apply the law properly."

However, a few famous examples of nullification have occurred in Canada. In the 1988 Supreme Court case, R. v. Morgentaler, 1988 SCR 30,[20] a nullification was appealed all the way to the country's highest court, which struck down the law in question. In obiter dicta, Chief Justice Dickson wrote:

The contrary principle contended for by Mr. Manning, that a jury may be encouraged to ignore a law it does not like, could lead to gross inequities. One accused could be convicted by a jury who supported the existing law, while another person indicted for the same offence could be acquitted by a jury who, with reformist zeal, wished to express disapproval of the same law. Moreover, a jury could decide that although the law pointed to a conviction, the jury would simply refuse to apply the law to an accused for whom it had sympathy. Alternatively, a jury who feels antipathy towards an accused might convict despite a law which points to acquittal. To give a harsh but I think telling example, a jury fueled by the passions of racism could be told that they need not apply the law against murder to a white man who had killed a black man. Such a possibility need only be stated to reveal the potentially frightening implications of Mr. Manning's assertions. [...]

It is no doubt true that juries have a de facto power to disregard the law as stated to the jury by the judge. We cannot enter the jury room. The jury is never called upon to explain the reasons which lie behind a verdict. It may even be true that in some limited circumstances the private decision of a jury to refuse to apply the law will constitute, in the words of a Law Reform Commission of Canada working paper, "the citizen's ultimate protection against oppressive laws and the oppressive enforcement of the law" (Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper 27, The Jury in Criminal Trials (1980)). But recognizing this reality is a far cry from suggesting that counsel may encourage a jury to ignore a law they do not support or to tell a jury that it has a right to do so.

The Supreme Court more recently issued a decision, R. v. Krieger 2006 SCC 47,[21] which confirmed that juries in Canada have the power to refuse to apply the law when their consciences require that they do so. Within this decision, it is stated that "juries are not entitled as a matter of right to refuse to apply the law — but they do have the power to do so when their consciences permit of no other course."[21]
[edit] England

In the 1670 "Hay-market case", William Penn was accused of the crime of 'preaching Quakerism to an unlawful assembly' and while he freely admitted his guilt, he challenged the righteousness of such a law. The jury, recognizing that William Penn clearly had been preaching in public, but refusing to find him guilty of speaking to an unlawful assembly, attempted to find Penn guilty of "speaking in Gracechurch-street". The judge, unsatisfied with this decision, withheld food, water, and toilet facilities from the jurors for three days. The jurors finally decided to return a not guilty verdict overall, and while the decision was accepted, the jurors were fined. One of the jurors appealed this fine, and Chief Justice Sir John Vaughn issued an historically important ruling: that jurors could not be punished for their verdicts. This case is considered a significant milestone in the history of jury nullification.[22] The particular case is celebrated in a plaque displayed in the Central Criminal Court (The Old bailey) in London.

In a criminal libel case, R. v. Shipley (1784), 4 Dougl. 73, 99 E.R. 774, at p. 824, Lord Mansfield disparaged the practice of jury nullification:

So the jury who usurp the judicature of law, though they happen to be right, are themselves wrong, because they are right by chance only, and have not taken the constitutional way of deciding the question. It is the duty of the Judge, in all cases of general justice, to tell the jury how to do right, though they have it in their power to do wrong, which is a matter entirely between God and their own consciences.
To be free is to live under a government by law [...]. Miserable is the condition of individuals, dangerous is the condition of the State, if there is no certain law, or, which is the same thing, no certain administration of law, to protect individuals, or to guard the State.

[...]

In opposition to this, what is contended for? -- That the law shall be, in every particular cause, what any twelve men, who shall happen to be the jury, shall be inclined to think; liable to no review, and subject to no control, under all the prejudices of the popular cry of the day, and under all the bias of interest in this town, where thousands, more or less, are concerned in the publication of newspapers, paragraphs, and pamphlets. Under such an administration of law, no man could tell, no counsel could advise, whether a paper was or was not punishable.

In 1982, during the Falklands War, the British Royal Navy sank an Argentine Cruiser – the "ARA General Belgrano". A civil servant (government employee) named Clive Ponting leaked two government documents concerning the sinking of the cruiser to a Member of Parliament (Tam Dalyell) and was subsequently charged with breaching section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911. The prosecution in the case demanded that the jury convict Ponting as he had clearly contravened the Act by leaking official information about the sinking of the Belgrano during the Falklands War. His main defence, that it was in the public interest that this information be made available, was rejected on the grounds that "the public interest is what the government of the day says it is", but the jury nevertheless acquitted him, much to the consternation of the Government. He had argued that he had acted out of 'his duty to the interests of the state'; the judge had argued that civil servants owed their duty to the government.[citation needed]
[edit] United States
Main article: Jury nullification in the United States

In the United States, jury nullification first appeared in the pre-Civil War era when juries sometimes refused to convict for violations of the Fugitive Slave Act. Later, during Prohibition, juries often nullified alcohol control laws,[23] possibly as often as 60% of the time.[24] This resistance may have contributed to the adoption of the Twenty-first amendment repealing Prohibition, the Eighteenth amendment.

In a well known example of jury nullification, at the end of James Hickok's trial for the manslaughter of Davis Tutt in 1865, Judge Sempronius Boyd gave the jury two instructions. He first instructed the jury that a conviction was its only option under the law, he then instructed them that they could apply the unwritten law of the "fair fight" and acquit. Hickok was acquitted, a verdict that was not popular with the public.[25][26]
[edit] Fugitive Slave Law

"Jury nullification" was practiced in the 1850s to protest the federal Fugitive Slave Act, which was part of the Compromise of 1850. The Act had been passed to mollify the slave owners from the South, who were otherwise threatening to secede from the Union. Across the North, local juries acquitted men accused of violating the law. Secretary of State Daniel Webster was a key supporter of the law as expressed in his famous "Seventh of March" speech. He wanted high profile convictions. The jury nullifications ruined his presidential aspirations and his last-ditch efforts to find a compromise between North and South. Webster led the prosecution when defendants were accused of rescuing Shadrach Minkins in 1851 from Boston officials who intended to return Minkins to his owner; the juries convicted none of the men. Webster tried to enforce a law that was extremely unpopular in the North, and his Whig Party passed over him again when they chose a presidential nominee in 1852.[27]
[edit] 21st century

In the 21st century, many discussions of jury nullification center around drug laws that some consider unjust either in principle or because they are seen to discriminate[verification needed] against certain groups. A jury nullification advocacy group estimates that 3–4% of all jury trials involve nullification,[28] and a recent rise in hung juries is seen by some as being indirect evidence that juries have begun to consider the validity or fairness of the laws themselves.[29]
[edit] Judicial opinion in the U.S.

The 1895 decision in Sparf v. U.S. written by Justice John Marshall Harlan held 5 to 4 that a trial judge has no responsibility to inform the jury of the right to nullify laws. This decision, often cited, has led to a common practice by United States judges to penalize anyone who attempts to present a nullification argument to jurors and to declare a mistrial if such argument has been presented to them. In some states, jurors are likely to be struck from the panel during voir dire if they will not agree to accept as correct the rulings and instructions of the law as provided by the judge.[30]

Recent court rulings have contributed to the prevention of informing juries of their right and duty to nullify. A 1969 Fourth Circuit decision, U.S. v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir.1969), affirmed the right of jury nullification, but also upheld the power of the court to refuse to permit an instruction to the jury to this effect.[31] In 1972, in United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued a ruling similar to Moylan that affirmed the de facto power of a jury to nullify the law but upheld the denial of the defense's chance to instruct the jury about the power to nullify.[32] In 1988, the Sixth Circuit upheld a jury instruction that "There is no such thing as valid jury nullification." however one of the dissenting judges pointed out that in United States v. Wilson, 629 F. 2d 439 - Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit 1980 that the panel had unanimously decided "In criminal cases, a jury is entitled to acquit the defendant because it has no sympathy for the government's position."[33] In 1997, the Second Circuit ruled that jurors can be removed if there is evidence that they intend to nullify the law, under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 23(b).[34] The Supreme Court has not recently confronted the issue of jury nullification. Further, as officers of the court, attorneys have sworn an oath to uphold the law, and are considered by bar associations to be ethically prohibited from directly advocating for jury nullification.[35]
[edit] Controversy

The main deontic issue involved in jury nullification is the tension between democratic self-government and integrity.[36] The argument has been raised that prosecutors are not allowed to seek jury nullification, and therefore defendants should not be allowed to seek it either.[37]

Jury nullification - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

I am an attorney. I appreciate your post. Very well done!

 

[bsemaj]

@Wingman,

Our day is coming. Read the petition.

Gov. Gregoire files petition to reclassify marijuana

How long after I posted here did this take to happen ??

Which Governors signed the petition ?

 

[bsemaj]

Correction: thcf is still listed active with the state.

The state of wa. is streamlining their data banks and have purged some webites of info and located them with other agencies.

Here is the correct link for checking wa. businesses and other licensing requirements Search Business Licenses they even added the section on the right side of the page :

Other resources

* Professional Licenses (DOL)
* Contractor, Electrician or Plumber (L&I)
* Business Records (DOR)
* Corporations Registration Data (SOS)
* Health Care Provider Credential (DOH)
* Worker's Comp Premium Status (L&I)
* Suspect Fraud (DOR)

Just trying to keep things honest and straight..

Wingman,

I hope your following along here.. I know your governor is..

 

[ElusiveQuark]

I do not undesatnd the particular culpable conduct you are being accused of. You are a legal grower? What do they say you have done? Burden is on the state to convince entire jury your guilty beyond reasonable doubt. I am betting on directed verdict at the least.

 

[bsemaj]

When Jury Nullification enters the picture in the 21 century.. this is bound to occur.

Was it the free speech or tampering which is most reasonable ??

Touchy subject matter obviously , as it is an elderly person this is about.. someone with sauce.

Jury Nullification and Free Speech | Cato @ Liberty

Jury Nullification and Free Speech

Posted by Tim Lynch

Federal prosecutors are pressing their case against Julian Heicklen, Prosecution Explains Jury Tampering Charge (Published 2011) the elderly man who distributed pamphlets about jury nullification. A lot of things are said about jury nullification and much of it is inaccurate. But whatever one’s view happens to be on that subject, I would have thought that the idea of talking about (and that includes advocating) jury nullification would be a fairly simple matter of free speech. We now know that the feds see the matter very differently. (FWIW, my own view is that in criminal cases jury nullification is part and parcel of what a jury trial is all about.)

In response to Julian Heicklen’s motion to dismiss his indictment on First Amendment grounds, federal attorneys have filed a response with the court. Here is the federal government’s position: “[T]he defendant’s advocacy of jury nullification, directed as it is to jurors, would be both criminal and without Constitutional protections no matter where it occurred” [emphasis added]. This is really astonishing. A talk radio host is subject to arrest for saying something like, “Let me tell you all what I think. Jurors should vote their conscience!” Newspaper columnists and bloggers subject to arrest too?

If Heicklen had been distributing flyers that said, “I Love Prosecutors. Criminals Have No Rights!” there would not have been any “investigation” and tape recording from an undercover agent. Any complaint lodged by a public defender would have been scoffed at.

First Amendment experts will know more than I about the significance of the “plaza” outside the courthouse and whether or not that’s a public forum under Supreme Court precedents. The feds make much of the fact that the plaza is government property. Well, so is the Washington mall, but protesters have been seen there from time to time. The plaza, however, is not the key issue. Activists like Heicklen would simply move 10-20 yards further away (whatever the situation may be) and the prosecutors seem determined to harass them all the way back into their homes, and even there if they blog, send an email, post a comment on a web site, text, tweet, or use a phone to communicate with others. After all, so many people are potential jurors.

Judges and prosecutors already take steps to exclude persons who know about jury nullification from actual service. And the standard set of jury instructions says that jurors must “apply the law in the case whether they like it or not.” But the prosecution of Heicklen shows that the government wants to expand its power far beyond the courthouse and outlaw pamphleteering and speech on a controversial subject. Once again the government is trying to go over, around, and right through the Constitution.

For previous coverage and additional info, go here, here, and here.

 

[headybudd69]

Need some advice guys. I am a 20yr old Boulder, CO resident who was recently charged with DUI. I have never had any convictions and have no record what so ever. I recently applied for an MMJ card. I am most likely facing probation time and community service and am wondering as to the laws regarding my card and probation. Can I medicate legally and freely without being worried about potential jail time or problems from my probation officer?

 

[mrflamboynt]

for DUI, i am not sure how that might affect your mmj application, it should be easy to check the rules in CO.

but when at home, remember this;

i have seen someone advise not to open the door for cops when they knock.... instead shout through a door or window (if you wish to make your presence known), tell them to call you if they want to talk, if its something serious like a dangerous person in the area they will let you know even if you dont open the door. opening the door allows all kinds of tricks that could take place. if they knock, you can choose not to open the door, because they dont have enough evidence for a warrant, an open door creates the opportunity for probable cause to then start a search (warranted or not)... if they have a narcotics search warrant they just kick the door down, no knock. pretty simple, but sounds kinda dumb at the same time, but its not the first time i've been in the wrong place at the wrong time when it comes to cops who are "just doing their jobs". but they dont tell you their training includes lying through their teeth, and various other immoral acts just to secure convictions.... and everyone knows that luck favors the prepared....

 

[1234a5678b]

Need some advice guys. I am a 20yr old Boulder, CO resident who was recently charged with DUI. I have never had any convictions and have no record what so ever. I recently applied for an MMJ card. I am most likely facing probation time and community service and am wondering as to the laws regarding my card and probation. Can I medicate legally and freely without being worried about potential jail time or problems from my probation officer?

If you are on alcohol and drug testing as a conditon of probation, I wouldn't reccomend it. Even if your offense was alcohol related, once they have the sample- it's up to them.

Just my $0.02

 

[Wingman420]

for DUI, i am not sure how that might affect your mmj application, it should be easy to check the rules in CO.

but when at home, remember this;

i have seen someone advise not to open the door for cops when they knock.... instead shout through a door or window (if you wish to make your presence known), tell them to call you if they want to talk, if its something serious like a dangerous person in the area they will let you know even if you dont open the door. opening the door allows all kinds of tricks that could take place. if they knock, you can choose not to open the door, because they dont have enough evidence for a warrant, an open door creates the opportunity for probable cause to then start a search (warranted or not)... if they have a narcotics search warrant they just kick the door down, no knock. pretty simple, but sounds kinda dumb at the same time, but its not the first time i've been in the wrong place at the wrong time when it comes to cops who are "just doing their jobs". but they dont tell you their training includes lying through their teeth, and various other immoral acts just to secure convictions.... and everyone knows that luck favors the prepared....

I would NEVER have been Busted if I did not think it was my kids returning and opened the door. You are quite right about Police lying and falsifying reports to attain arrests and convictions I will never open the door again for a cop now I just go lay down and they have been back knocking. FUCK THEM. Great Advice
+Rep

 

[Wingman420]

So I did some research today in regards to "medical marijuana in RI.. unfortunately, there isn't any such animal.. and I find that hard to believe since RI law has been on the books for almost 6 yrs.

So looking at a common saying.. winner winner chicken dinner..

So I had to use regular marijuana .. hee hee.

Now if you truly read my case in wa., you will understand why this is so damn important..

STATE v. STOREY---December 3, 2010.

The Basis for Probable Cause is the starting point in every case..

Based on the--> totality of the circumstances presented in the affidavit,<-- defendant argues that a finding of probable cause was not justified because: (1) the tip was anonymous, (2) the tip was stale, (3) the trash-pull evidence7 was insufficient to corroborate the tip, (4) his criminal-background information was irrelevant to the drug crime the police were investigating, and (5) Saleeba's residence at 52 Wannisett Avenue was not disclosed to the magistrate,--> which limited the magistrate's knowledge of material information and affected the inferences he made when determining the existence of probable cause.<--
[ 8 A.3d 461 ]

This Court's recent opinion, Byrne, 972 A.2d at 637-38, provides succinct guidelines for reviewing a search warrant's validity. As a threshold requirement, our first task is
-->> ensuring that the issued warrant was "based on a sworn affidavit by a police officer that was submitted to a neutral and detached judicial officer * * *." Id. at 637 (citing Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 6, of the Rhode Island Constitution).<-- Here, as there is no dispute about the submission of a sworn affidavit or the impartiality of the magistrate, we proceed to the next step in the review: determining whether the search warrant was based on probable cause. Id. at 637 (citing State v. Verrecchia, 880 A.2d 89, 94 (R.I.2005)); see also Rule 41(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In doing so, we examine whether there was "a substantial basis from which to discern probable cause" from the "totality of the circumstances" found within "the four corners of the affidavit prepared in support of the warrant." Byrne, 972 A.2d at 638 (quoting Correia, 707 A.2d at 1249 and citing State v. Joseph, 114 R.I. 596, 603, 337 A.2d 523, 527 (1975) and Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). Our review of the magistrate's determination permits that his assessment of probable cause may be based on facts contained in the affidavit, as well as on "the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts." Id. We also recognize that "affidavits are to be interpreted in a realistic fashion that is consistent with common sense, and not subject to rigorous and hypertechnical scrutiny." Id. (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 235-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317).

Applying all these principles, our ultimate inquiry asks whether the magistrate made a "practical, common-sense determination" that "there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317). [Practical Common Sense, medical cannabis is not contraband and having a card is not evidence of a crime]

Essentially, a magistrate is not required to assert with certainty that the search items will be found in that particular place, rather the magistrate "need only conclude that it would be reasonable to seek the evidence in the place indicated in the affidavit." Id. at 639 (quoting United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1315 (9th Cir. 1985)); see also State v. Pratt, 641 A.2d 732, 736 (R.I.1994) (stating that although the probable-cause standard requires "more than a mere suspicion," it demands "only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity") (quoting State v. Baldoni, 609 A.2d 219, 220 (R.I. 1992)). Finally, we firmly acknowledge the postulate that "the resolution of doubtful or marginal [probable-cause] cases * * * [is] largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants"8 Byrne, 972 A.2d at 639 (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965)).
1
Facts Disclosed in the Affidavit

At the outset, we note that defendant challenges individual portions of the affidavit, but fails to fully acknowledge that the probable cause, totality-of-the-circumstances
[ 8 A.3d 462 ]

test looks to the entire mosaic of presented information. "Although each piece of information may not alone be sufficient to establish probable cause and some of the information may have an innocent explanation, `probable cause is the sum total of layers of information and the synthesis of what the police have heard, what they know, and what they observed as trained officers.'" State v. Schmalz, 744 N.W.2d 734, 738 (N.D.2008) (quoting State v. Thieling, 611 N.W.2d 861, 863 (N.D. 2000)). Here, the affidavit presents not only an anonymous tip, twelve cut plastic baggies, the residue of cocaine, and prior non-drug-related criminal activity, but it also presents the confluence of all these information sources. Given the proper inferences a magistrate may make, the amalgamation of this information points to the "fair probability" that drugs and the indicia of drug distribution will be found at Storey's residence. We cannot disagree that the magistrate had a substantial basis from which to discern probable cause based on the totality of the instant facts.

Thanks bsemaj but the cops had NO warrant, NO controlled buy, and the only complaining person was my ex wife who had not been in the home in years. I really appreciate the help. I am also interested in the plant value under the timber act you said? I have the AG who is trying the people who robbed my home last Christmas of all presents and 24 Flowering Plants (10th week of flower) and 12 Mothers plus various seedlings. The AG says the Victims crime fund will not pay for my stolen Marijuana. I informed him when asked the value of said plants "I will be happy with what the Police or DEA saus they are worth which used to be $1000 per plant. he balked. I am very interested in this for both cases.

Chapter 21-28.6 - Index of Sections

Please point out why your having issues with this being "ambiguous" . I'm not sure I understand.

If your a "caregiver" you must go before a jury if you didn't have a registry card and your lawyer didn't file a motion to dismiss. Affirmative Defense is for a "caregiver" only without a registry card from what I am reading and anyone with a card is not subject to any court process if specific criteria is followed.. but, are if no card.

Does your state have a card system in place accepting patients ? If not it would seem that due process of law would require the same equivalent process given if it don't exist. meaning the protections should apply beings no rights or privileges are forfeited by ambiguity in the law.. wa. guv. vetoed ours because of the schedule 1 unregulated substance.. can't register schedule 1 drug use and have it not conflict with federal registration laws.. conflict preemption. If it was a schedule 2 by state law then no conflict exists like in oregon.

What I don't see, is plain lingo of the legislature defining the "crimes" .. the clear line.. it just says

§ 21-28.6-7 Scope of chapter. — (a) This chapter shall not permit: ..............

If what you did is not here, how is it a crime ?? obviously it was permitted right ?

Entrapment by Estoppel type defense comes to mind..

Now I see that this has been changed removing the affirmative defense and going strictly with one must register for protections.. just like oregon did some years back. reason being so the popo would leave patients alone.. and when they didn't, they got sued when a patient or caregiver bucked up with a card.. that settled things till just recently with da feds playing games of we are broke , so lets rob people..

What We Are Doing

The Department of Health's Medical Marijuana Program administers the provisions of the state's Medical Marijuana Act and related Regulations. Medical Marijuana: Rhode Island Department of Health

Yes I have one Patient Card and 5 Caregiver Cards. As for the ambiguity nobody is clear on may things because there is NO case law and what signified a Plant? Under the law sticks, seeds, and stems are unusable and you are allowed a reasonable amount unusable Marijuana like seedling starts. And the Stoppel Defense sounds Ok I will run all this by my Atty. Thank you very much and good luck in your case!

i thought they (prosecution) was going to try and put up a fight.... but it looks to me like dismissal is coming... hardly justice if you ask me.... not that i wish for anyone be put on trial for a crime they did not commit. but atleast given the opportunity to face your accusers, and OWNING THEIR ASSES! not to mention blowing the whistle on clear cases of discrimination of MMJ patients.... reading all of these encounters with "law enforcement" and watching all of the videos has literally blown my mind! (and ruined my dinner)
how the hell did D.S.H.S. get a patent for medical marijuana? like they invented it? LOL government constantly contradicting themselves, from obvious indirect statements like "its good. no its the worst. hey we really need the $$ from its illegal sale". picking on the infirm, for greed. the whole thing reeks of evil.....

bro, i have been trying to reach the end of this topic for last 8 hours, including all of the links included in this thread. i am now sick, and my wife is pissed (at me).... i knew we had puppets for presidents, but i didnt think it was that bad... 10 trillion dollars gone!!?? WTF, and one of the first things Obama said he was going to do when in office was pay the Native Americans 3.4 billion for the wrong-doings that the government doesnt actually admit to.... anyway, you think we got any money? screwed by the government once again! natives are used to it though.... uuughhh... i have pretty much lost all faith in govt, but not in my countrymen... still proud to be american, especially if i can do what is required of me to remain a "FREE" american!

bsemaj, can you drive to OR to get meds, and drive them back to WA? if not, what is the benefit of owning 2 cards (or 3 if including CA)?

Thanks brother!
I would not cross State lines as this triggers Federal enforcement.

Jury nullification occurs in a trial when a jury reaches a verdict contrary to the judge's instructions as to the law.

A jury verdict contrary to the letter of the law pertains only to the particular case before it; however, if a pattern of acquittals develops in response to repeated attempts to prosecute a statutory offence, it can have the de facto effect of invalidating the statute. A pattern of jury nullification may indicate public opposition to an unwanted legislative enactment.

The jury system was established because it was felt that a panel of citizens, drawn at random from the community, and serving for too short a time to be corrupted, would be more likely to render a just verdict.

It was feared that a single judge or panel of government officials may be unduly influenced to follow established legal practice, even when that practice had drifted from its origins. However, in most modern Western legal systems, juries are often instructed to serve only as "finders of facts", whose role it is to determine the veracity of the evidence presented, and the weight accorded to the evidence,[1] but not the application of that evidence to the law. Similarly, juries are routinely cautioned by courts and some attorneys to not allow sympathy for a party or other affected persons to compromise the fair and dispassionate evaluation of evidence during the guilt phase of a trial. These instructions are criticized by advocates of jury nullification. Some commonly cited historical examples of jury nullification involve the refusal of American colonial juries to convict a defendant under English law.

Juries have also refused to convict due to the perceived injustice of a law in general,[3] or the perceived injustice of the way the law is applied in particular cases.[4] There have also been cases where the juries have refused to convict due to their own prejudices such as the race of one of the parties in the case.

Other cases have revealed that some juries simply refuse to render a guilty verdict in the absence of overwhelming direct or scientific evidence to support such a judgment. With this type of jury impaneled for the trial of a case, even substantial and competently presented circumstantial evidence may be discounted or rendered inconsequential during the jury's deliberation.

Background
A nineteenth-century jury

Jury nullification is a de facto power of juries. Judges rarely inform juries of their nullification power. The power of jury nullification derives from an inherent quality of most modern common law systems–a general unwillingness to inquire into jurors' motivations during or after deliberations. A jury's ability to nullify the law is further supported by two common law precedents: the prohibition on punishing jury members for their verdict, and the prohibition (in some countries) on retrying defendants after an acquittal (see related topics res judicata and double jeopardy).

Jury nullification is the source of much debate. Some maintain that it is an important safeguard of last resort against wrongful imprisonment and government tyranny.[6][7] Others view it as a violation of the right to a jury trial that undermines the law.[7] Some view it as a violation of the oath sworn to by jurors. In the United States, some view the requirement that jurors take an oath to be unlawful in itself, while still others view the oath's reference to "deliverance" to require nullification of unjust law: "will well and truly try and a true deliverance make between the United States and the defendant at the bar, and a true verdict render according to the evidence, so help [me] God." United States v. Green, 556 F.2d 71 (D.C. Cir. 1977). [8] Some fear that nullification could be used to permit violence against socially unpopular factions.[9] They point to the danger that a jury may choose to convict a defendant who has not broken the letter of the law. However, judges retain the rights both to decide sentences and to disregard juries' guilty verdicts, acting as a check against malicious juries. Jury nullification may also occur in civil suits, in which the distinction between acquittal and conviction is irrelevant.[10]

Nevertheless, there is little doubt as to the ability of a jury to nullify the law. Today, there are several issues raised by jury nullification.

First, whether juries can or should be instructed or informed of their power to nullify.
Second, whether a judge may remove jurors "for cause" when they refuse to apply the law as instructed.
Third, whether a judge may punish a juror for exercising their power of jury nullification.
Fourth, whether all legal arguments, except perhaps on motions in limine to exclude evidence, should be made in the presence of the jury.

In some cases in the United States, a stealth juror will attempt to get on a jury in order to nullify the law.[11] Some lawyers use a shadow defense to get information entered into the record that would otherwise be inadmissible hoping that evidence will trigger a jury nullification.[12][13] A notable contemporary example of this tactic is the claim by the defense in the currently (as of 2011-12) ongoing Roger Clemens perjury trial to have the charges against Clemens dismissed due to "prosecutorial misconduct", i.e. that the prosecution intentionally introduced video evidence which Judge Reggie Walton had ruled inadmissible, for the purposes of getting, in the words of the defense, "a second bite at the apple", due to the prosecution's alleged poor performance. The introduction of the tainted evidence caused a mistrial after only two days. The judge denied the defense's motion but noted his strong displeasure with the prosecution. [2], [3], [4]
[edit] Common law precedent
Even prior to Bushell's Case, Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, a Protestant dissident, was acquitted by a jury, despite the hostility of the judges.

The early history of juries supports the recognition of the de facto power of nullification. By the 12th century, common law courts in England began using juries for more than administrative duties. Juries were composed primarily of "laymen" from the local community. They provided a somewhat efficient means of dispute resolution with the benefit of supplying legitimacy.

The general power of juries to decide on verdicts was recognised in the English Magna Carta [14] of 1215, which put into words existing practices:

No free man shall be captured, and or imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, and or of his liberties, or of his free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or in any way destroyed, nor will we proceed against him by force or proceed against him by arms, but by the lawful judgment of his peers, and or by the law of the land

For a trivial offence, a free man shall be fined only in proportion to the degree of his offence, and for a serious offence correspondingly, but not so heavily as to deprive him of his livelihood. In the same way, a merchant shall be spared his merchandise, and a husbandman the implements of his husbandry, if they fall upon the mercy of a royal court. None of these fines shall be imposed except by the assessment on oath of reputable men of the neighbourhood

Largely, the earliest juries returned verdicts in accordance with the judge or the crown. This was achieved either by "packing the jury" or by "writ of attaint". Juries were packed by hand-selecting or by bribing the jury so as to return the desired verdict. This was a common tactic in cases involving treason or sedition. In addition, the writ of attaint allowed a judge to retry the case in front of a second jury when the judge believed the first jury returned a "false verdict". If the second jury returned a different verdict, that verdict was imposed and the first jury was imprisoned or fined.

This history, however, is marked by a number of notable exceptions. In 1554, a jury acquitted Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, but was severely punished by the court. Almost a century later in 1649, in the first known attempt to argue for jury nullification, a jury likewise acquitted John Lilburne for his part in inciting a rebellion against the Cromwell regime. The theoretician and politician Eduard Bernstein wrote of Lilburne's trial:

His contention that the constitution of the Court was contrary to the fundamental laws of the country was unheeded, and his claim that the jury was legally entitled to judge not only as to matters of fact but also as to the application of the law itself, as the Judges represented only 'Norman intruders', whom the jury might here ignore in reaching a verdict, was described by an enraged judge as 'damnable, blasphemous heresy.' This view was not shared by the jury, which, after three days' hearing, acquitted Lilburne – who had defended himself as skilfully as any lawyer could have done – to the great horror of the Judges and the chagrin of the majority of the Council of State. The Judges were so astonished at the verdict of the jury that they had to repeat their question before they would believe their ears, but the public which crowded the judgment hall, on the announcement of the verdict, broke out into cheers so loud and long as, according to the unanimous testimony of contemporary reporters, had never before been heard in the Guildhall. The cheering and waving of caps continued for over half an hour, while the Judges sat, turning white and red in turns, and spread thence to the masses in London and the suburbs. At night bonfires were lighted, and even during the following days the event was the occasion of joyful demonstrations.[15]

In 1653 Lilburne was on trial again and asked the jury to acquit him if it found the death penalty "unconscionably severe" in proportion to the crime he committed. The jury found Lilburne "Not guilty of any crime worthy of death".[citation needed]

By the late 17th century, the court's ability to punish juries was removed in Bushell's Case[16] involving a juror on the case against William Penn. Penn and William Mead had been arrested in 1670 for illegally preaching a Quaker sermon and disturbing the peace, but four jurors, led by Edward Bushell refused to find them guilty. Instead of dismissing the jury, the judge sent them back for further deliberations. Despite the judge demanding a guilty verdict, the jury this time unanimously found Penn guilty of preaching but acquitted him on the charge of disturbing the peace and acquitted Mead of all charges. The jury was then subsequently kept for three days without "meat, drink, fire and tobacco" to force them to bring in a guilty verdict and when they failed to do so the judge ended the trial. As punishment the judge ordered the jurors imprisoned until they paid a fine to the court. Four jurors refused to pay the fine and after several months, Edward Bushell sought a writ of habeas corpus. Chief Justice Vaughan, sitting on the Court of Common Pleas, discharged the writ, released them, called the power to punish a jury "absurd", and forbade judges from punishing jurors for returning a verdict the judge disagreed with.[17]

In 1681, a grand jury refused to indict the Earl of Shaftesbury. Then in 1688, a jury acquitted the Archbishop of Canterbury and six other Anglican bishops of seditious libel. Juries continued, even in non-criminal cases, to act in defiance of the crown. In 1763 and 1765, juries awarded £4,000 and £300 to John Wilkes and John Entick, respectively, in separate suits for trespass against the crown's messengers. In both cases, messengers were sent by Lord Halifax to seize allegedly libelous papers.[citation needed]

In Scotland jury nullification had the profound effect of introducing (or as others believed, reviving) the verdict of "not guilty". It was in 1728 that one Carnegie of Finhaven accidentally killed the Scottish Earl of Strathmore. As the defendant had undoubtedly killed the Earl, the law (as it stood) required the jury merely to look at the facts and pass a verdict of "proven" or "not proven" depending on whether they believed the facts proved the defendant had killed the Earl.[citation needed] However, if the jury brought in a "proven" verdict they would in effect cause this innocent man to die. To avert this injustice, the jury decided to assert what it believed to be their "ancient right" to judge the whole case and not just the facts, rendering the verdict of "not guilty" which remains in Scotland to this day. Over time, however, juries have tended to favour the "not guilty" verdict over "not proven" and with this the interpretation has changed. Now the "not guilty" verdict has become the normal verdict when a jury is convinced of innocence and the "not proven" verdict is only used when the jury is not certain of innocence or guilt.[citation needed]

Standard jury trial practice in the United States during the Founding Era and for several decades afterward was to argue all issues of law in the presence of the jury, so that the jury heard the same arguments the bench did in reaching his rulings on motions. This is evidenced by such decisions as the 1839 case Stettinius v. U.S., in which it was held that "The defense can argue law to the jury before the court gives instructions."[18] Later, judges began to demand the parties submit motions in writing, often before the jury was empaneled, to be argued and decided without the jury being present. This transition began with motions in limine, to exclude evidence, on which it was felt the jury should not hear the argument because they would be informed of the evidence to be excluded. Later that was expanded to include all legal argument, so that today, that earlier practice of arguing law before the jury has been largely forgotten, and judges even declare mistrials or overturn verdicts if legal argument is made to the jury.[citation needed]
[edit] Specific jurisdictions
[edit] Canada

Although extremely rare, jury nullification does occur in Canada. The power is subject to greater than usual scrutiny, as the prosecution has powers to appeal the resulting acquittal. In addition, judges tend to be very much against nullification; in R. v. Latimer, 2001 SCC 1,[19] it was stated that "The trial did not become unfair simply because the trial judge undermined the jury's de facto power to nullify. In most if not all cases, jury nullification will not be a valid factor in analyzing trial fairness for the accused. Guarding against jury nullification is a desirable and legitimate exercise for a trial judge; in fact a judge is required to take steps to ensure that the jury will apply the law properly."

However, a few famous examples of nullification have occurred in Canada. In the 1988 Supreme Court case, R. v. Morgentaler, 1988 SCR 30,[20] a nullification was appealed all the way to the country's highest court, which struck down the law in question. In obiter dicta, Chief Justice Dickson wrote:

The contrary principle contended for by Mr. Manning, that a jury may be encouraged to ignore a law it does not like, could lead to gross inequities. One accused could be convicted by a jury who supported the existing law, while another person indicted for the same offence could be acquitted by a jury who, with reformist zeal, wished to express disapproval of the same law. Moreover, a jury could decide that although the law pointed to a conviction, the jury would simply refuse to apply the law to an accused for whom it had sympathy. Alternatively, a jury who feels antipathy towards an accused might convict despite a law which points to acquittal. To give a harsh but I think telling example, a jury fueled by the passions of racism could be told that they need not apply the law against murder to a white man who had killed a black man. Such a possibility need only be stated to reveal the potentially frightening implications of Mr. Manning's assertions. [...]

It is no doubt true that juries have a de facto power to disregard the law as stated to the jury by the judge. We cannot enter the jury room. The jury is never called upon to explain the reasons which lie behind a verdict. It may even be true that in some limited circumstances the private decision of a jury to refuse to apply the law will constitute, in the words of a Law Reform Commission of Canada working paper, "the citizen's ultimate protection against oppressive laws and the oppressive enforcement of the law" (Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper 27, The Jury in Criminal Trials (1980)). But recognizing this reality is a far cry from suggesting that counsel may encourage a jury to ignore a law they do not support or to tell a jury that it has a right to do so.

The Supreme Court more recently issued a decision, R. v. Krieger 2006 SCC 47,[21] which confirmed that juries in Canada have the power to refuse to apply the law when their consciences require that they do so. Within this decision, it is stated that "juries are not entitled as a matter of right to refuse to apply the law – but they do have the power to do so when their consciences permit of no other course."[21]
[edit] England

In the 1670 "Hay-market case", William Penn was accused of the crime of 'preaching Quakerism to an unlawful assembly' and while he freely admitted his guilt, he challenged the righteousness of such a law. The jury, recognizing that William Penn clearly had been preaching in public, but refusing to find him guilty of speaking to an unlawful assembly, attempted to find Penn guilty of "speaking in Gracechurch-street". The judge, unsatisfied with this decision, withheld food, water, and toilet facilities from the jurors for three days. The jurors finally decided to return a not guilty verdict overall, and while the decision was accepted, the jurors were fined. One of the jurors appealed this fine, and Chief Justice Sir John Vaughn issued an historically important ruling: that jurors could not be punished for their verdicts. This case is considered a significant milestone in the history of jury nullification.[22] The particular case is celebrated in a plaque displayed in the Central Criminal Court (The Old bailey) in London.

In a criminal libel case, R. v. Shipley (1784), 4 Dougl. 73, 99 E.R. 774, at p. 824, Lord Mansfield disparaged the practice of jury nullification:

So the jury who usurp the judicature of law, though they happen to be right, are themselves wrong, because they are right by chance only, and have not taken the constitutional way of deciding the question. It is the duty of the Judge, in all cases of general justice, to tell the jury how to do right, though they have it in their power to do wrong, which is a matter entirely between God and their own consciences.
To be free is to live under a government by law [...]. Miserable is the condition of individuals, dangerous is the condition of the State, if there is no certain law, or, which is the same thing, no certain administration of law, to protect individuals, or to guard the State.

[...]

In opposition to this, what is contended for? -- That the law shall be, in every particular cause, what any twelve men, who shall happen to be the jury, shall be inclined to think; liable to no review, and subject to no control, under all the prejudices of the popular cry of the day, and under all the bias of interest in this town, where thousands, more or less, are concerned in the publication of newspapers, paragraphs, and pamphlets. Under such an administration of law, no man could tell, no counsel could advise, whether a paper was or was not punishable.

In 1982, during the Falklands War, the British Royal Navy sank an Argentine Cruiser — the "ARA General Belgrano". A civil servant (government employee) named Clive Ponting leaked two government documents concerning the sinking of the cruiser to a Member of Parliament (Tam Dalyell) and was subsequently charged with breaching section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911. The prosecution in the case demanded that the jury convict Ponting as he had clearly contravened the Act by leaking official information about the sinking of the Belgrano during the Falklands War. His main defence, that it was in the public interest that this information be made available, was rejected on the grounds that "the public interest is what the government of the day says it is", but the jury nevertheless acquitted him, much to the consternation of the Government. He had argued that he had acted out of 'his duty to the interests of the state'; the judge had argued that civil servants owed their duty to the government.[citation needed]
[edit] United States
Main article: Jury nullification in the United States

In the United States, jury nullification first appeared in the pre-Civil War era when juries sometimes refused to convict for violations of the Fugitive Slave Act. Later, during Prohibition, juries often nullified alcohol control laws,[23] possibly as often as 60% of the time.[24] This resistance may have contributed to the adoption of the Twenty-first amendment repealing Prohibition, the Eighteenth amendment.

In a well known example of jury nullification, at the end of James Hickok's trial for the manslaughter of Davis Tutt in 1865, Judge Sempronius Boyd gave the jury two instructions. He first instructed the jury that a conviction was its only option under the law, he then instructed them that they could apply the unwritten law of the "fair fight" and acquit. Hickok was acquitted, a verdict that was not popular with the public.[25][26]
[edit] Fugitive Slave Law

"Jury nullification" was practiced in the 1850s to protest the federal Fugitive Slave Act, which was part of the Compromise of 1850. The Act had been passed to mollify the slave owners from the South, who were otherwise threatening to secede from the Union. Across the North, local juries acquitted men accused of violating the law. Secretary of State Daniel Webster was a key supporter of the law as expressed in his famous "Seventh of March" speech. He wanted high profile convictions. The jury nullifications ruined his presidential aspirations and his last-ditch efforts to find a compromise between North and South. Webster led the prosecution when defendants were accused of rescuing Shadrach Minkins in 1851 from Boston officials who intended to return Minkins to his owner; the juries convicted none of the men. Webster tried to enforce a law that was extremely unpopular in the North, and his Whig Party passed over him again when they chose a presidential nominee in 1852.[27]
[edit] 21st century

In the 21st century, many discussions of jury nullification center around drug laws that some consider unjust either in principle or because they are seen to discriminate[verification needed] against certain groups. A jury nullification advocacy group estimates that 3—4% of all jury trials involve nullification,[28] and a recent rise in hung juries is seen by some as being indirect evidence that juries have begun to consider the validity or fairness of the laws themselves.[29]
[edit] Judicial opinion in the U.S.

The 1895 decision in Sparf v. U.S. written by Justice John Marshall Harlan held 5 to 4 that a trial judge has no responsibility to inform the jury of the right to nullify laws. This decision, often cited, has led to a common practice by United States judges to penalize anyone who attempts to present a nullification argument to jurors and to declare a mistrial if such argument has been presented to them. In some states, jurors are likely to be struck from the panel during voir dire if they will not agree to accept as correct the rulings and instructions of the law as provided by the judge.[30]

Recent court rulings have contributed to the prevention of informing juries of their right and duty to nullify. A 1969 Fourth Circuit decision, U.S. v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir.1969), affirmed the right of jury nullification, but also upheld the power of the court to refuse to permit an instruction to the jury to this effect.[31] In 1972, in United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued a ruling similar to Moylan that affirmed the de facto power of a jury to nullify the law but upheld the denial of the defense's chance to instruct the jury about the power to nullify.[32] In 1988, the Sixth Circuit upheld a jury instruction that "There is no such thing as valid jury nullification." however one of the dissenting judges pointed out that in United States v. Wilson, 629 F. 2d 439 - Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit 1980 that the panel had unanimously decided "In criminal cases, a jury is entitled to acquit the defendant because it has no sympathy for the government's position."[33] In 1997, the Second Circuit ruled that jurors can be removed if there is evidence that they intend to nullify the law, under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 23(b).[34] The Supreme Court has not recently confronted the issue of jury nullification. Further, as officers of the court, attorneys have sworn an oath to uphold the law, and are considered by bar associations to be ethically prohibited from directly advocating for jury nullification.[35]
[edit] Controversy

The main deontic issue involved in jury nullification is the tension between democratic self-government and integrity.[36] The argument has been raised that prosecutors are not allowed to seek jury nullification, and therefore defendants should not be allowed to seek it either.[37]

Jury nullification - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Thanks very informative I knew nothing of this!

@Wingman,

Our day is coming. Read the petition.

Gov. Gregoire files petition to reclassify marijuana

How long after I posted here did this take to happen ??

Which Governors signed the petition ?

I know WA, RI, and now NJ, have signed on while NV has said no.