420 Magazine Background

Religious Marijuana Is Now Legal On The Federal Level

Thread starter #1

SashaShiva

Active Member
I have an open Case in Dallas, so I am going to explain everything in this thread and I will post the updates here.

This thread explains the Pharmaceutical process
DEA Form 225

This thread explains the Religious Law
DEA Religious Exemption Process

This one explains the Temple
The Shaivite Temple of Colorado


Here are the videos from Oct 2017 when I sent in the Petition to the DEA






This Document is the one sent to them in the video
DEA-Petition .pdf - PDF Archive

This Document is the DEA's own Guidelines for this process
https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/pubs/rfra_exempt012209.pdf


The DEA did not make it easy to figure out this process. It took me almost 8 years total, and 2 years after finding most of the Case Law, but I am going to share my process with others as something like a "How To", so that from now on this is not so hard for everyone. But here is the complete detour the DEA put up to get to this. Look at how many people are walking into court rooms saying "Free Exercise" and no one tells them about this. Lawyers don't even know about this.

Ok, so around 2012 I learned about Gonzales V O Centro, but I only knew that it allowed the Santo Diame Church to use Ayahuasca. Then in 2015 I went back to Texas with my case, and I started doing more research before I went to court. And I had been doing research about the 18th and 21st Amendments, which are the Alcohol Prohibition Amendment and the Amendment that repealed it. And I started studying the Volstead Act, which enforced Prohibition, and found that it had Religious Exemptions. So I was wondering "How did an Amendment not overpower Religious Exercise, but a Law does?". And randomly I thought about Coca-Cola, and decided I wanted to know if Coca-Cola had been banned under the definition of "Intoxicating Liquors" in the Volstead Act. And I could not find anything about that, but I found that Stepan Company has been importing Cocaine from Peru since the 80s, extracting the Cocaine to sell for Medical use, and selling the Coca extract to Coca-Cola.

Then I found Normaco V DEA, where a court told the DEA that they had a Cocaine Monopoly.

Then I remembered the Federal Marijuana Patients, and started researching that. And I found that the University of Mississippi has been growing Marijuana for years, and by this time it was August 2016 and I found that the DEA had literally just opened up Registration for Marijuana Growing Companies in order to not have a Monopoly.

Then I filed that Federal Court Case in March, and the Federal Court is just sitting on it, because even they don't know what to do.

So then I decided to email the Marijuana Enforcement Agency this month, and set up an Appointment to get a Religious Exemption. Then I thought about it, and emailed the DEA explaining my whole situation, and I assume that they had to go ask a ton of people, but they sent me this Document explaining how to ask for an exemption. And it's not like Lawyers and the ACLU are out there advertising this Document. And I know that not everyone at the DEA is used to being asked about this stuff because I called today to ask who to send it to since Joe Rinnizzisi is gone, and they had no idea what I was talking about sending in, and then had to put me on hold to go ask people.

The Federal Court in Dallas Responded Feb 8th 2018, to a case filed in March 2017


Here is the Federal Court in Dallas' Response, they responded 1 day after I started filing again, which was about 1 year after the Case was actually filed, so it was improperly delayed and the Magistrate quickly responded after having forgotten about the case for a year
M:\User\Morrison\1983s_Bivens\Gallagher.R.17.734.L.Bivens.screen_FCR.wpd (document(16).pdf) - PDF Archive

This is the Initial Complaint that they took a year to respond to, and if you have PACER you can look at more Documents in the case
https://ia800803.us.archive.org/22/items/177110565437/177110565437.pdf

Here is the main Document that were filed that reinitiated the Case in 2018 if you or anyone that sees this later wants to read them
File not found! | pdf-archive.com - PDF Hosting


I will go ahead and open the Case about the DEA Petition I sent in, and their Failure to respond, and the Request for Review of their actions in light of the DEA RFRA Guidelines and Olsen v. DEA; then I will go to the 5th Circuit if the Dallas case is Denied and Request a Writ of Manadmus in the Dallas Federal Court, but I assume the Denver Federal Court will respond to this in like 2 Weeks. So it will be a lot easier to go ahead and start this part here, then I can cite my own Case against the DEA to move Forward in Dallas with the Case about the DEA Causing my Brother to die.

And btw, when we get to Human Rights Court, these are the Standards, so I am really just trying to get Final Decisions, so I can get here:

The State may be responsible for violating human rights by:

Action (as a result of an act by the State or its agents),

Acquiescence (as a result of the tacit consent of the State or its agents), or

Omission (as a result of the State or its agents failing to take action when they should have done so).

Here is our Case number with the International Commission on Human Rights

P-2098-17

Organization of American States
17th Street and Constitution Ave., NW
Washington, D.C., 20006-4499
United States of America

Main Telephone: 1 (202) 370 5000



So now there is a Human Rights case for the Temple. Here is the process now, now they see if it is Admissible, Admissible means: Is one of the Parties a State/Nation? Is that Party a Signatory to the OAS? (Yes we are btw). On its face, is there a claim that said State has violated some Human Right Guaranteed Under International Treaty?

So it is Admissible.

From there, they go into the Merits phase. What part of this case is something they can handle, and what parts they can't really touch, and might need to be passed back to the State/Nation to be decided in Court. But at this time, any Claim that has Merit under the International Treaties, and has Evidence that "On it's Face" actually happened, can at that time be settled between the State/Nation (their Representative) and myself, or we can go to the actual Human Rights Court (this is all done by the Commission up until this point). Then the State/Nation has to stay in Contact with us, so that we can make sure that things like this don't happen anymore.

And currently I am only asking the IACHR to make a Statement about the UN Psychotropics Convention, and cause the DEA to follow their own Rules in whatever way they can. So I am not even asking for much, and no one should fight against this.
 
Thread starter #2

SashaShiva

Active Member
A lot of people wonder at some point at some time in their lives "What makes a Religion a Religion?" and this is what the Courts say:

One of the most important indicia of 'a religion' is that the particular collection of ideas and/or practices involves belief in the supernatural, that is to say, belief that reality extends beyond that which is capable of perception by the senses. If that be absent, it is unlikely that one has 'a religion'.

(1) Ultimate Ideas: Fundamental Questions about life, purpose and death

(2) Metaphysical Beliefs: Beliefs addressing a reality that transcends the physical and immediate apparent world

(3) Moral and Ethical System: Proscription of a particular manner of acting or a way of life that is moral or ethical

(4) Comprehensive Beliefs: An overarching array of beliefs that coalesce to provide the believer with answers to many of the problems and concerns that confront humans

(5) Accouterments of Religion: The presence of various external signs of Religion
 
Thread starter #3

SashaShiva

Active Member
Examples of Congressional ULTRA VIRES in US Law:
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); United States v. Alfonso D. Lopez, Jr., 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. _ (2012)
 
Thread starter #4

SashaShiva

Active Member
Someone from the Marines called me the other day and asked if I wanted to join, and I said I can't because my Religion Bars me from the Military. He asked me to explain, and I told him that when you tell a recruiter that your Religion involves Marijuana and that you will continue to use it when you get out, it Bars you. He said he had never heard of that, and wanted to know more. I told him that everyone thinks Shiva is a girl, but Shiva is a guy, and is the Lord of Marijuana. And he said he is going to go ask about this to see if it is right that they don't let people that practice my Religion in the Military.

I was going to sue them for this so that people in our Religion Could join, but I will wait until someone in the Church wants to join the Military after we have an exemption, then do it that way.

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/rights_of_military_mbrs.pdf

https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/03/23/scratext.pdf

50 U.S.C. - SOLDIERS’ AND SAILORS’ CIVIL RELIEF ACT OF 1918

U.S. Code: Title 38 - VETERANS’ BENEFITS | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute

38 U.S. Code Chapter 33 - POST–9/11 EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute

http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/defense_ethics/ethics_regulation/1344-10.html

http://www.dodig.mil/Portals/48/Documents/Policy/DoDD_7050_06.pdf

http://www.sirnosir.com/archives_and_resources/library/articles/top_secret_03.html

What are my Article 31, UCMJ Rights? - Military Court-Martial Lawyers

Uniform Code of Military Justice - UCMJ

18 U.S. Code SS 242 - Deprivation of rights under color of law | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute

10 U.S.C. § 774. Establishes limited right to wear conservative items of religious apparel while in uniform (For details on implementation, see DoD Directive 1300.l7).

10 U.S.C. § 1034. The Military Wistleblower Act - Protects right to complain to Congress and the Inspector General, and protects members from retaliation for filing complaints.

UCMJ Art. 138. Establishes the right to complain to a higher officer when wronged by your commanding officer.
 
Thread starter #5

SashaShiva

Active Member
i. To get the Court quickly up to date on Case Law, I cite Olsen V DEA 878 F.2d 1458 279 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 58 USLW 2023 as well as Gonzales v. O Centro EspÃ-rita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). Olsen did not have the benefit of the 2016 Federal Registration (Catalent, etc), and did not have a Human Rights Case open.

ii. Article XVIII, Amendment 64, Section 2 of the Colorado State Constitution, states in the explanation of Definitions “Unless the Context otherwise Requires” in explanation of all definitions, yet the Marijuana Enforcement Agency claims that they only exist to review Applications for Recreational and Medical Marijuana, not “Unless the Context otherwise Requires”, see USC Title 42 Chapters 21B and 21C. Amendment 64 can be found in Exhibit S.

iii. Article XVIII, Amendment 64, Section 1 of the Colorado State Constitution, states in the explanation of the law itself, that “Marijuana shall be taxed like Alcohol”. The Colorado State Alcohol Code, Article 47, Title 12 CRS, Part I General Provisions, 12-14-106, Exemptions, Section 1, states “The provisions of this Article shall not apply to the sale or Distribution of Sacramental wines sold and used for Religious Purposes”, see Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York 397 U.S. 664 (1970). Colorado Alcohol Code can be found in Exhibit S.

iv. For Guidance in this case, I ask the Court to review the DEA RFRA Exemption Process.
DEA Processing Guidelines
RFRA Exemption Guidelines
https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/pubs/rfra_exempt012209.pdf
D. Processing Timeframes
It is important to act expeditiously on applications for Schedule I research. The timeframes for DEAÂ’s and FDAÂ’s processing of Schedule I research applications are specified in the regulations. DEA forwards complete Schedule I research protocols to the FDA within seven days of receipt; FDA notifies DEA of its determination regarding the merits of the protocol within 30 days; and DEA issues a certificate within 10 days of receiving the FDAÂ’s notice. 21 C.F.R. 1301.32(c). It should be noted that although many clinical researchers may be subject to a standardized protocol, thereby streamlining the process, some researchers must also meet institutional and State requirements prior to approval. DEA works closely with researchers to assist with the expeditious completion of their protocol submission and registration application.

v. The 1st amendment was incorporated into the States, and is basically a "person" for legal purposes. So the 1st amendment is a separate plaintiff from myself Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)

vi. The DEA is inhibiting Liberty; “The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments of this Union rest excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.” Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)

vii. I would like to point out that the Law itself actually does provide a route for keeping the Government and Religion unentangled, the DEA just has to follow their own rules. What they are SUPPOSED to be doing right now is not judging if our Religion Conflicts with their Goals, they are simply supposed to be determining if our Religion is (1) Sincere (2) a Religious Belief (3) and is Burdened by the Controlled Substances Act. And if those 3 Conditions are met, they are supposed to grant Exemption.

viii. From there, Petitions can be submitted to solve the Entanglement Problem, as per #6 in the DEA RFRA Guidelines
6. Applicability of DEA Regulations.
A Petitioner whose petition for Religious Exemption from the Controlled Substances Act is granted remains bound by all applicable laws and Controlled Substances Act regulations governing registration, labeling and packaging, quotas, recordkeeping and reporting, security and storage, and periodic inspections, among other things. See 21 C.F.R. Sections 1300-1316. A Petitioner who seeks exemption from applicable CSA regulations (as opposed to the CSA itself) may petition under C.F.R. Section 1307.03. Such petition must separately address each regulation from which the petitioner seeks exemption and provide a statement of the reasons for each exemption sought.

ix. We are growing "Low THC" Marijuana, for THCv content, not for THC content. And I am breeding strains for their THCv Content. Meaning that we are growing "Hemp" and we are making "Industrial Hemp", with High THCv and Low or No THC.
(2) Industrial hemp
The term “industrial hemp” means the plant Cannabis sativa L. and any part of such plant, whether growing or not, with a delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol concentration of not more than 0.3 percent on a dry weight basis

x. 'it is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.' Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892)

xi. "The global need to prevent chemical warfare does not require the Federal Government to reach into the kitchen cupboard, or to treat a local assault with a chemical irritant as the deployment of a chemical weapon." Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. ___ (2014)

xii. "We do not want the government deciding what is political truth — for fear that the government might persecute those who criticize it. Instead, in a democracy, the voters should decide." Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. ___ (2014)

xiii. Sincere Religious Belief; and
All Religions deserve exemptions
(via Wisconsin v. Yoder U.S. 205 (1972))
"Within that phrase would come all sincere religious beliefs which are based upon a power or being, or upon a faith to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent. The test might be stated in these words: a sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory definition. This construction avoids imputing to Congress an intent to classify different religious beliefs, exempting some and excluding others, and is in accord with the well established congressional policy of equal treatment for those whose opposition to service is grounded in their religious tenets."

xiv. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
a) The statute must have a secular legislative purpose. (Also known as the Purpose Prong)
b) The principal or primary effect of the statute must not advance nor inhibit religion. (Also known as the Effect Prong)
c) The statute must not result in an "excessive government entanglement" with religion. (Also known as the Entanglement Prong)
 
Thread starter #6
Thread starter #7

SashaShiva

Active Member
Department of Justice, Memo on Drug Monopolies
>Memorandum Of The Antitrust Division Of The United States Department Of Justice As Amicus Curiae In Support Of The Application Of Johnson Matthey, Inc. | ATR | Department of Justice

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

In the Matter of

JOHNSON MATTHEY, INC.

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Docket Number 99-27

MEMORANDUM OF THE ANTITRUST DIVISION OF THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT
OF THE APPLICATION OF JOHNSON MATTHEY, INC.

Competition is a rough, often inelegant process by which winners and losers -- whether products, firms, or technologies -- are chosen by decisions made in the marketplace. In that process, economic actors are constantly challenged to improve on price, cost, and technology -- or exit. The end result is economic efficiency and increased technological innovation. Properly understood, the various challenges to the application of Johnson Matthey, Inc. ("Johnson Matthey") raised by Mallinckrodt, Inc. ("Mallinckrodt") and Noramco of Delaware, Inc. ("Noramco") rest on one ground: their fervid desire to avoid such competition and the challenges it would pose to them. Should their efforts to block Johnson Matthey's entry into the market succeed, the result will almost certainly be a less efficient and less innovative market and, ultimately, higher prices for consumers.

For that reason, assuming that the DEA can appropriately regulate Johnson Matthey's facilities to avoid illegal diversion, the Antitrust Division (the "Division") supports this application for registration.(1) More importantly, the Division strongly recommends that the DEA avail itself of this opportunity to clarify yet again its commitment to competition by lowering the regulatory barriers to entry consistent with the need to prevent unlawful diversion. As discussed below, where a market cannot sustain numerous participants -- whether because of production requirements, economies of scale, or government regulation -- its competitiveness depends significantly on facilitating the potential for entry. By clearly articulating the appropriate standard to be used in these proceedings, and by placing the burden of proof where it properly belongs, the DEA will be able to discourage the continuing use of its procedures by those who seek to hinder the development of competition.
 
Thread starter #8

SashaShiva

Active Member
The Psychotropics Convention
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1971_en.pdf

The Law of Treaties
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf

Model of Regulation in the Americas
http://www.cicad.oas.org/Main/About...f Cannabis Regulation in the Americas-ENG.pdf

1. If a Party or the World Health Organization has information relating to a substance not yet under international control which in its opinion may require the addition of that substance to any of the Schedules of this Convention, it shall notify the Secretary-General and furnish him with the information in support of that notification. The foregoing procedure shall also apply when a Party or the World Health Organization has information justifying the transfer of a substance from one Schedule to another among those Schedules, or the deletion of a substance from the Schedules.

2. The Secretary-General shall transmit such notification, and any information which he considers relevant, to the Parties, to the Commission and, when the notification is made by a Party, to the World Health Organization.

3. If the information transmitted with such a notification indicates that the substance is suitable for inclusion in Schedule I or Schedule II pursuant to paragraph 4, the Parties shall examine, in the light of all information available to them, the possibility of the provisional application to the substance of all measures of control applicable to substances in Schedule I or Schedule II, as appropriate.

4. If the World Health Organization finds:

a) That the substance has the capacity to produce

i) 1) A state of dependence, and

2) Central nervous system stimulation or depression, resulting in hallucinations or disturbances in motor function or thinking or behaviour or perception or mood, or

ii) Similar abuse and similar ill effects as a substance in Schedule I, II, III or IV, and

b) That there is sufficient evidence that the substance is being or is likely to be abused so as to constitute a public health and social problem warranting the placing of the substance under international control, the World Health Organization shall communicate to the Commission an assessment of the substance, including the extent or likelihood of abuse, the degree of seriousness of the public health and social problem and the degree of usefulness of the substance in medical therapy, together with recommendations on control measures, if any, that would be appropriate in the light of its assessment.

5. The Commission, taking into account the communication from the World Health Organization, whose assessments shall be determinative as to medical and scientific matters, and bearing in mind the economic, social, legal, administrative and other factors it may consider relevant, may add the substance to Schedule I, II, III or IV. The Commission may seek further information from the World Health Organization or from other appropriate sources.

6. If a notification under paragraph 1 relates to a substance already listed in one of the Schedules, the World Health Organization shall communicate to the Commission its new findings, any new assessment of the substance it may make in accordance with paragraph 4 and any new recommendations on control measures it may find appropriate in the light of that assessment. The Commission, taking into account the communication from the World Health Organization as under paragraph 5 and bearing in mind the factors referred to in that paragraph, may decide to transfer the substance from one Schedule to another or to delete it from the Schedules.

7. Any decision of the Commission taken pursuant to this article shall be communicated by the Secretary-General to all States Members of the United Nations, to non-member States Parties to this Convention, to the World Health Organization and to the Board. Such decision shall become fully effective with respect to each Party 180 days after the date of such communication, except for any Party which, within that period, in respect of a decision adding a substance to a Schedule, has transmitted to the Secretary-General a written notice that, in view of exceptional circumstances, it is not in a position to give effect with respect to that substance to all of the provisions of the Convention applicable to substances in that Schedule. Such notice shall state the reasons for this exceptional action. Notwithstanding its notice, each Party shall apply, as a minimum, the control measures listed below:

a) A Party having given such notice with respect to a previously uncontrolled substance added to Schedule I shall take into account, as far as possible, the special control measures enumerated in article 7 and, with respect to that substance, shall:

i) Require licences for manufacture, trade and distribution as provided in article 8 for substances in Schedule II;

ii) Require medical prescriptions for supply or dispensing as provided in article 9 for substances in Schedule II;

iii) Comply with the obligations relating to export and import provided in article 12, except in respect to another Party having given such notice for the substance in question;

iv) Comply with the obligations provided in article 13 for substances in Schedule II in regard to prohibition of and restrictions on export and import;

v) Furnish statistical reports to the Board in accordance with paragraph 4 a) of article 16; and

vi) Adopt measures in accordance with article 22 for the repression of acts contrary to laws or regulations adopted pursuant to the foregoing obligations.

b) A Party having given such notice with regard to a previously uncontrolled substance added to Schedule II shall, with respect to that substance:

i) Require licences for manufacture, trade and distribution in accordance with article 8;

ii) Require medical prescriptions for supply or dispensing in accordance with article 9;

iii) Comply with the obligations relating to export and import provided in Article 12, except in respect to another Party having given such notice for the substance in question;

iv) Comply with the obligations of article 13 in regard to prohibition of and restrictions on export and import;

v) Furnish statistical reports to the Board in accordance with paragraphs 4 a), c) and d) of article 16; and

vi) Adopt measures in accordance with article 22 for the repression of acts contrary to laws or regulations adopted pursuant to the foregoing obligations.

c) A Party having given such notice with regard to a previously uncontrolled substance added to Schedule III shall, with respect to that substance:

i) Require licences for manufacture, trade and distribution in accordance with article 8;

ii) Require medical prescriptions for supply or dispensing in accordance with article 9;

iii) Comply with the obligations relating to export provided in article 12, except in respect to another Party having given such notice for the substance in question;

iv) Comply with the obligations of article 13 in regard to prohibition of and restrictions on export and import; and

v) Adopt measures in accordance with article 22 for the repression of acts contrary to laws or regulations adopted pursuant to the foregoing obligations.

d) A Party having given such notice with regard to a previously uncontrolled substance added to Schedule IV shall, with respect to that substance:

i) Require licences for manufacture, trade and distribution in accordance with article 8;

ii) Comply with the obligations of article 13 in regard to prohibition of and restrictions on export and import; and

iii) Adopt measures in accordance with article 22 for the repression of acts contrary to laws or regulations adopted pursuant to the foregoing obligations.

e) A Party having given such notice with regard to a substance transferred to a Schedule providing stricter controls and obligations shall apply as a minimum all of the provisions of this Convention applicable to the Schedule from which it was transferred.

8. a) The decisions of the Commission taken under this article shall be subject to review by the Council upon the request of any Party filed within 180 days from receipt of notification of the decision. The request for review shall be sent to the Secretary-General together with all relevant information upon which the request for review is based.

b) The Secretary-General shall transmit copies of the request for review and the relevant information to the Commission, to the World Health Organization and to all the Parties, inviting them to submit comments within ninety days. All comments received shall be submitted to the Council for consideration.

c) The Council may confirm, alter or reverse the decision of the Commission. Notification of the Council's decision shall be transmitted to all States Members of the United Nations, to non-member States Parties to this Convention, to the Commission, to the World Health Organization and to the Board.

d) During pendency of the review, the original decision of the Commission shall, subject to paragraph 7, remain in effect.

9. The Parties shall use their best endeavours to apply to substances which do not fall under this Convention, but which may be used in the illicit manufacture of psychotropic substances, such measures of supervision as may be practicable.
 
Thread starter #9
Thread starter #10
“[T]he ‘exercise of religion’ often involves not only belief and profession but the performance of … physical acts [such as] assembling with others for a worship service [or] participating in sacramental use of bread and wine … .” Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore.v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877.

Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine
Doctrine of Commanding Precedent
Overbreadth Doctrine
Exhaustion of Remedies Doctrine
Presumption of Innocence
Reasonable Doubt
Standard of Review
Supremacy Clause
Due Process Clause
Assistance of Counsel Clause
Impartial Jury Clause
Compulsory Clause
Compulsory Process Clause
Vesting Clauses
Case or Controversy Clause
Benefit of Assumption
Burden of Proof

“The Constitution of the United States was ordained by the people, and, when duly ratified, it became the Constitution of the people of the United States.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 17 U. S. 402.

Rights rooted in the Bill of Rights, offered and championed in the Congress by James Madison, who told the Congress that the "independent" federal courts would be the "guardians of those rights." Chapman v. California 386 U.S. 18 (1967)

Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States 143 U.S. 457 (1892) It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers. This has been often asserted, and the reports are full of cases illustrating its application. This is not the substitution of the will of the judge for that of the legislator, for frequently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a consideration of the whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such broad meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to include the particular act.

"[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly [377 U.S. 288, 308] achieved." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488. For other cases elaborating this principle, see Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 ; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 , 165; Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 -149; Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 ; American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 ; Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 294 -295; Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 .

"religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection." Thomas v.Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)

"to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either [the church or the state] into the precincts of the other." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).

Indeed, it was "historical instances of religious persecution and intolerance that gave concern to those who drafted the Free Exercise Clause." Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986) (opinion of Burger, C. J.). See J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §§ 991-992 (abridged ed. 1833) (reprint 1987); T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 467 (1868) (reprint 1972); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 464,and n. 2 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.); Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 179 (1943) (Jackson, J., concurring in result); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).

[We] find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence." Id. at 684 (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1952)).

The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303. Government may neither compel affirmation of a repugnant belief, Torcaso v. Watkins,367 U.S. 488; nor penalize or discriminate against individuals or groups because they hold religious views abhorrent to the authorities, Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67; nor employ the taxing power to inhibit the dissemination of particular religious views,Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105; Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573; cf. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233.

There is no proof whatever to warrant such fears of malingering or deceit as those which the respondents now advance. Even if consideration of such evidence is not foreclosed by the prohibition against judicial inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious beliefs, United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78

Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333, it is no business of courts to say that what is a religious practice or activity for one group is not religion under the protection of the First Amendment.

Cruz v. Beto 405 U.S. 319 (1972) If Cruz was a Buddhist and if he was denied a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts, then there was palpable discrimination by the State against the Buddhist religion, established 600 B. C., long before the Christian era.

"I do not believe that it can be too often repeated that the freedoms of speech, press, petition and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to the ideas we cherish." Communist Party v. SACB, 367 U.S. 1, 137 (1961)

“Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech.” The hallmark of the protection of free speech is to allow “free trade in ideas”–even ideas that the overwhelming majority of people might find distasteful or discomforting. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)

The First Amendment affords protection to symbolic or expressive conduct as well as to actual speech. See, e.g., R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S., at 382; Texas v. Johnson, supra, at 405—406; United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376—377 (1968); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist.,393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969).

It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege. [n6] American [p405] Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 390; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191-192; Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 155-156. For example, in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611

"cannot be deemed bizarre or incredible."Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Security, 489 U.S. 829, 834, n. 2 (1989).

In our Establishment Clause cases we have often stated the principle that the First Amendment forbids an official purpose to disapprove of a particular religion or of religion in general. See, e. g., Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990) (plurality opinion); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985); Epperson v. Arkansas,393 U.S. 97, 106-107 (1968); School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963); Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).

See also Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272-273 (1951). Cf.Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (state statute that treated some religious denominations more favorably than others violated the Establishment Clause).

The Free Exercise Clause, like the Establishment Clause, extends beyond facial discrimination. The Clause "forbids subtle departures from neutrality," Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971), and "covert suppression of particular religious beliefs," Bowen v. Roy, supra, at 703 (opinion of Burger, C. J.). Official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality. The Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental hostility which is masked, as well as overt. "The Court must survey meticulously the circumstances of governmental categories to eliminate, as it were, religious gerrymanders." Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).

"[n]eutrality in its application requires an equal protection mode of analysis." Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City, 397 U. S., at 696

"We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." Zorach v. Clauson, supra, at 313.

Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church 393 U.S. 440 (1969) “a very small minority, without any officers of the church among them, might be found to be the only faithful supporters of the religious dogmas of the founders of the church. “

Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952), stated that religious freedom encompasses the [426 U.S. 696, 722] "power [of religious bodies] to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine."
Sherbert v. Verner 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 573 U.S. ___ (2014)
Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal 546 U.S. 418 (2006)
Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No 12 V City of Newark 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999)
Cutter v. Wilkinson 544 U.S. 709 (2005)
Native American Church of Navajo Land, inc. v. Arizona corp. 405 U.S. 901 (1972)
Watson v. Jones 80 U.S. 679 (1871)
Yick Wo v. Hopkins 118 U.S. 356 (1886)
Cantwell v. Connecticut 310 U.S. 296 (1940)
Sossamon v. Texas 563 U.S. ___ (2011)
Lynch v. Donnelly 465 U.S. 668 (1984)
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
Mayfield v. TX Dept Cr Justice, et al, No. 06-50490 (5th Cir. 2008)
Church of the Holy Light of the Queen V Mukasey 615 F.Supp.2d 1210 (2009)
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105.
Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333, 133 U. S. 342
Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich 426 U.S. 696 (1976)
Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church 393 U.S. 440 (1969)
Ponce v. Roman Catholic Church 210 U.S. 296 (1908)

42 U.S. Code Chapter 21B - RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION
42 U.S. Code Chapter 21C - PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISE IN LAND USE AND BY INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS
 
Thread starter #11
The reason we are in the situation we are now with the courts can be found in the Supreme Court case Bounds v. Smith 430 U.S. 817 (1977), which is part of the reason Public Defenders exist:

"Even the most dedicated trial judges are bound to overlook meritorious cases without the benefit of an adversary presentation. Cf. Gardner v. California, 393 U. S. 367, 393 U. S. 369-370 (1969)."

I have won a Religious Marijuana case, a Religious Molecular Substance case (after a full blown Narcotics Investigation), 2 cases about Driving on the wrong side of the road, and I am suing the DEA now to overturn the Controlled Substances Act. I have also helped with Credit Card Fraud Cases, an Involuntary Manslaughter Case and an Organized Retail theft case. And what I have seen, while going through the court and watching other people's cases while I wait for the judge to call me up, and while talking to people about their own cases, is that about 99% of cases have the Trial Waived meaning people give up their rights. Then within the remaining 1%, about 75%+ of those cases are determined based on the history of your Lawyer or how good they are at saying things like "I have to pick my wife up at the Hospital, can we please get this done quickly" and the final remaining 25% may present case law, but are usually determined by technicalities, for example, if any witnesses show up.

So maybe .5% of cases in America even have a single piece of Case Law presented. And as stated in Bounds V Smith, again:

"Even the most dedicated trial judges are bound to overlook meritorious cases without the benefit of an adversary presentation. Cf. Gardner v. California, 393 U. S. 367, 393 U. S. 369-370 (1969)."
 
Thread starter #13
Btw, about the 2 Cases where I was driving on the wrong side of the road and both times got the Charges Dropped, someone misunderstood and it made me realize other people may have misunderstood, I didn't "get away with" driving on the wrong side of the Road. I was Driving on the Wrong side of the Road Legally, and the Cop falsely charged me with Driving on the Wrong side of the Road. Go read the Texas Traffic Code. I was Driving on the wrong side of the Road the Proper way. That is why I "got away with it".

Know the Law.
 
Thread starter #15
The DEA likes to say "We can't let Religions do things because of the Public Interest" and no Lawyer has figured this out yet, but this is how you respond to that, you say "Then let's use the same Standards you use for Pharmaceutical Companies, and the Public Interest".

No Lawyers know to do that, that is what I am changing.

https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/06-1105/06-1105a-2011-03-24.pdf?ts=1411133235

https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/06-1270/06-1270a-2011-03-24.pdf?ts=1411133167

https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/09-1220/09-1220-2013-04-15.pdf?ts=1410913687
 
Thread starter #16
So because I have gotten the Federal Court to start Responding to this Case, and have sent it out to Thousands of people on Twitter, and have gotten Thousands of Views on this Case, now Congress has written a Bill to Federally Legalize Marijuana. It probably won't get through, because the more Conservative Congress people are probably going to be in support of the Courts Federally Legalizing Religious use alongside Pharmaceutical Importing and "Investigational New Drug" research, instead of full blown Medical or Recreational Legalization. So I assume that the Conservative Congress people would rather it go my way than the Democrats way.

And even if they somehow to get it through, our Case will still unentangle Religion from State in this regard, as well as solidify that they can not collect taxes on Religious Substances, otherwise they could tax Individual Temples out of Existence.

And I put out a bunch of FOIAs to ask a bunch of Federal Agency's Policies, and to find all Government Records on Sadhus.
 
Thread starter #17
Everyone should start putting FOIA Requests out to these Emails about Marijuana, and posting Results here in this thread. Tell them that you want Records by Email, but then give them an address they can send it to also. And try to think of Specific Questions. Like stuff about Hemp, or specific things like the Federal Marijuana Patients Program or Investigational New Drug Program, etc. And post the information you get here.
FOIA.gov - Freedom of Information Act: Where to Make a FOIA request
 
Thread starter #18
I'm about to start Challenging the Constitutionality of Drug Laws and Surveillance Laws in Federal Court in Denver, starting with those 2 Judicial Reviews on the DEA and NSA, from there I will start Challenging Laws with Motions and Serving Notice on the US Attorney General:

Rule 5.1. Constitutional Challenge to a Statute

(a) Notice by a Party. A party that files a pleading, written motion, or other paper drawing into question the constitutionality of a federal or state statute must promptly:

(1) file a notice of constitutional question stating the question and identifying the paper that raises it, if:

(A) a federal statute is questioned and the parties do not include the United States, one of its agencies, or one of its officers or employees in an official capacity; or

(B) a state statute is questioned and the parties do not include the state, one of its agencies, or one of its officers or employees in an official capacity; and

(2) serve the notice and paper on the Attorney General of the United States if a federal statute is questioned—or on the state attorney general if a state statute is questioned—either by certified or registered mail or by sending it to an electronic address designated by the attorney general for this purpose.

(b) Certification by the Court. The court must, under 28 U.S.C. §2403, certify to the appropriate attorney general that a statute has been questioned.

(c) Intervention; Final Decision on the Merits. Unless the court sets a later time, the attorney general may intervene within 60 days after the notice is filed or after the court certifies the challenge, whichever is earlier. Before the time to intervene expires, the court may reject the constitutional challenge, but may not enter a final judgment holding the statute unconstitutional.

(d) No Forfeiture. A party's failure to file and serve the notice, or the court's failure to certify, does not forfeit a constitutional claim or defense that is otherwise timely asserted.