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Unraveling An American Dilemma: The Demonization Of Marijuana - Part 2

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Chapter Four

The Immediate Repercussions of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937



This chapter deals with the immediate repercussions of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937.It is composed of an array of classified historical correspondence and reports held by the Drug Enforcement Agency.[232] This correspondence and these reports shed new light on the Federal Bureau of Narcotics’ true role in the prohibition of marihuana. By the end of this chapter it should be apparent that the Bureau had more than just a corollary interest in the new hemp industry.

After the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics expressed a very specific concern regarding the new hemp industry.Evidence of the Bureau’s anxiety can be witnessed in a Departmental memorandum which was circulated during the month of December, 1937.The basic premise for the memorandum was that the Bureau lacked a real understanding about marihuana as a drug and as a legitimate crop. Now, since the Bureau had been given jurisdiction over all facets of marihuana’s usage, both legal and illegal, it had become imperative for them to learn about the hemp plant. In principle, this new desire to learn about the hemp plant seems highly suspect, since Commissioner Anslinger was basically admitting to the Bureau’s general lack of knowledge regarding marihuana, even though they had previously serenaded the media and public with their self-acclaimed expert knowledge on the topic. The memorandum requested information on marihuana in six distinct areas: agricultural, chemical, pharmacological, sociological, economic, and industrial.Information from the last two phases of the inquiry pertained to the hemp industry. Among the topics of interest concerning Commissioner Anslinger were the commercial uses for the hurds and the cellulose products that could be made from the fiber. He also wanted to know the advantages of using hemp over other raw materials and the prospects for hemp’s use in the future.[233]

There was not a direct response to this memorandum; however, it appears to have been in the possession of Dr. H. J. Wollner, the Bureau’s consulting chemist, who presented another memorandum of the inquisitive sort back to Commissioner Anslinger on February 14, 1938. In this document, Dr. Wollner expressed some concern over the Bureau’s new task of regulating marihuana. Specifically, he discussed three topics. The first topic dealt with marihuana’s unknown drug properties and the fact that no one had developed a test which could accurately determine whether or not the active principle was present. Skipping to the third topic, Dr. Wollner noted that marihuana was a domestic plant unlike the drugs of foreign origin, such as opium and ******* with which the Bureau was familiar. Returning to the second topic, Dr. Wollner observed: “That the agriculture of the plant marihuana caters to a legitimate industry.” With regard to his second point, Dr. Wollner noted that there was good chance that the cultivation of hemp for various industrial purposes could be beneficial and that it could expand. He recommended that the Bureau proceed with research to discover whether or not a drug free hemp plant could be produced for industrial use.[234] There is no record of this research ever having been conducted.

Shortly after the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, the potential industrial advantages of cultivating hemp came to the attention of Henry Morgenthau, Jr., the Secretary of the Treasury, who promptly contacted Henry A. Wallace, the Secretary of Agriculture. Apparently, Secretary Morgenthau had become aware of the interest of certain unidentified paper manufacturers who were considering hemp as a potential raw material for the production paper. The Secretary mentioned some experimentation which the Treasury and Agricultural Departments had jointly conducted over the summer of 1937.These experiments revealed “that there was a tendency on the part of some of the Cannabis plants to be lower than others in narcotic content.”On the basis of this discovery, Secretary Morgenthau suggested that it might be possible to breed a strain of cannabis that was totally free of the drug. Such a project would be beneficial to agriculture and industry.In order to facilitate this avenue of research, the Secretary proposed that the Treasury Department and the Department of Agriculture should consider utilizing the appropriations that were available under the provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, Title 2, section 202. This law provided for four million dollars to be devoted to the development and use of national crops. He concluded by stating that hemp would cease to exist as an agricultural commodity unless action was taken to insure its legitimate industrial usage.[235]

Secretary Morgenthau received a reply from Secretary Wallace’s Department on May 3, 1938.It was not positive.Acting Secretary W. R. Gregg did not think that it was feasible to expend any of the money appropriated by the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, Title 2, Section 202, because the Act only allowed for the money to be spent on regular or seasonal crops in which there were surpluses.The Acting Secretary of Agriculture did express a degree of sympathy and agreed that the research which had already been started the previous summer should be continued, but there was one problem which promised to hold up the research.In 1938, the researchers were still searching for a satisfactory method of testing for the drug; therefore, further experimentation with respect to the production of a drug free variety of hemp would have to wait.Acting Secretary Gregg even went as far as to suggest that the Treasury Department take up the matter of developing a satisfactory method of testing for the drug. Despite the overall negativity of the response, Acting Secretary Gregg knew of research that was being conducted into the utilization of hemp hurds toward the production of cellulose at the Department of Agriculture’s by-products laboratory in Ames, Iowa.[236] The records of these experiments do not seem to exist anymore in the Department’s annual reports regarding these experimental projects.

Around the time of the previous correspondence further concern regarding the future of the hemp industry was expressed by Secretary Helen Moorehead.She interviewed Dr. M. A. McCall, Chief of the Bureau of Plant Industry, Dr. H. W. Barre, Principal Pathologist in Charge, Division of Cotton and Other Fiber Crops and Diseases, and Dr. Brittain B. Robinson, Agronomist, Division of Cotton and Other Fiber Crops and Diseases.Secretary Moorehead sought information pertaining to the research regarding a drug free strain of hemp.The Department of Agriculture’s men explained to her that the research could not proceed until Dr. H. J. Wollner, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics’ chief chemist, had perfected a method of detecting the drug.They also explained that the pressure from commercial interests to use hemp as a base for cellulose was impractical from an economic standpoint unless it could be produced for less than the present source, wood pulp, which sold for around three cents per pound.None of the men had seen any evidence that hemp could be used to produce cellulose competitively on the market against wood pulp. Furthermore, the men said that in the past their experience with hemp growers had been that they were promotional schemes designed to sell patents or stock.There was no evidence that this time around it would be any different. This opinion was no different from the one which the Bureau of Plant Industry had expressed in 1931, with regard to the initial efforts to promote the cultivation of hemp in 1930.In addition, the men also believed that the Tax Act would not interfere with the “honest growth of hemp.”According to Secretary Moorehead, all three men did express an interest in the matter and asked to be contacted if they could be of any further assistance.[237]

The next event of consequence toward defining the Federal Bureau of Narcotics’ marihuana policy occurred on December 5, 1938, when the Bureau convened the Marihuana Conference. Commissioner Anslinger and Dr. H. J. Wollner presided over the meeting of 23 government selected specialists. There was no one present from the various commercial interests. Instead, Commissioner Anslinger allowed Dr. Andrew H. Wright of the University of Wisconsin and Dr. Brittain B. Robinson from the Bureau of Plant Industry to represent the commercial interests in the discussions.[238] The meeting opened with Commissioner Anslinger submitting the agenda. He began with a brief update as to the proceedings of the 1938 SubCommittee on Cannabis, of the Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs of the League of Nations, which convened in Geneva, Switzerland.The majority of his synopsis dealt with foreign research into the health hazards and the identification of the active intoxicant principle. With regard to the commercial uses of hemp, the SubCommittee was severely lacking in data; however, he did report that there was a rumor about a variety of hemp which was grown in the Anatolian highlands of Turkey that had too low a resin content to be used for any type of illicit purposes. The Commissioner concluded by explaining that the SubCommittee had decided that the information which they had compiled was too incomplete for them to make any definite recommendation regarding the perceived problem with cannabis.[239]

Following his summation, the Commissioner introduced Dr. Andrew H. Wright, who was to explain the agricultural aspects of the domestic hemp industry.The only point worth mentioning in Dr. Wright’s testimony was the humble grievance which he registered for the absent commercial interests. Specifically, he referred to the negative public opinion that had grown up with regard to the cultivation of hemp for whatever purpose, legal or illegal.In his own words, he stated, “What they are concerned about is the public position, that indefinite intangible thing, public feeling about growing hemp at all.” He continued and informed the committee members that some of these commercial interests had “already been subjected to some rather embarrassing situations.” Along the same line of thought he expressed further fear that this negative public opinion could lead to hemp being placed on the weed eradication list.Neither Dr. Wright nor the growers favored such a development. These perceived problems concerned Dr. Wright, who feared that they could adversely effect the legitimate cultivation of hemp in the future. Again, in his own words, he stated, “Those in the industry are naturally concerned. They have a stake in that they have what little they have invested in the business.”[240]

After Dr. Wright’s brief testimony, Dr. Brittain B. Robinson was called upon to discuss some more specific aspects pertaining to the domestic hemp industry.During his turn, Dr. Robinson spoke about the history of the hemp industry and pointed out the traditional usage of hemp.With regard to the recent developments in the industry, he expressed the same skeptical attitude which he had already voiced in an interview with Secretary Moorehead of the Foreign Policy Association.[241] Dr. Robinson’s opined that the commercial activity in Minnesota was of a promotional nature.He mentioned that similar activities had occurred before but he was not specific in his allegation.Aside from the activity in Minnesota, Dr. Robinson did not have any further information of relevance.[242]

Despite the skeptical conferences and adverse correspondence, there was still plenty of activity in the hemp industry as the original investors and promoters tried to salvage their dreams. For instance, on October 12, 1937, H. W. Bellrose, the President of the World Fibre Corporation, contacted Supervisor Bass because of his deep concern for the future of the hemp industry. His anxiety stemmed from the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act.In this letter he mentioned the efforts of a Dr. Paul (no first name was given) from California, who had lobbied before the state legislature of California stating “that there were no ill effects from the Hemp Plant where it was grown for Fibre, ‘before’ it went to flower.”Earlier, Frank Ridgway of the Chicago Tribune had described this stage of the hemp plant’s development to Supervisor Bass as its “unripened” state.According to Bellrose, the California legislature tested Dr. Paul’s hypothesis and found that hemp in its unripened state indeed contained nothing injurious to anyone.He continued and pleaded that the Bureau consider a letter he was drafting which would describe all the commercial advantages of hemp fibers and hemp hurds before they proceeded forward with prohibitive measures.[243]

In this second letter, Bellrose unveiled his grand scheme for the “rebirth” of the hemp and flax fiber industry. He began by explaining that this “rebirth” could only be accomplished through the means of mechanical decortication and that his company had just perfected a machine for this purpose. To bring the importance of this development to the attention of the Bureau, he compared the impact the World Fibre Decorticating Machine would have on the hemp industry to the effect the Eli Cotton Gin had on the cotton industry.It was to be nothing short of revolutionary.Looking to the dismal situation of the American farmer during the 1930s, Bellrose presented an argument reminiscent of the alternative source debate by stating that hemp was a crop for the industry, not for the human stomach and, therefore, it presented a solution to the agricultural problem of overproduction with regard to food crops, because industrial crops always had markets. After this point he began to list the market opportunities for the various raw materials of the hemp. He began with the bast fibers which he claimed could be manufactured into “some four thousand textile articles.” Then he moved on to describe the commercial possibilities for the by-product known as the hurds.These contained roughly 78% alpha-cellulose which made them an ideal raw material source for such products as paper, TNT, rayon silk, cellophane, and some 25,000 plastic products.Of these the paper pulp industry was the most promising because it was a billion dollar industry and the United States imported around 80 per cent of its paper and paper stock.[244]

The previous letter was the source for an article which appeared in the February 1938 edition of Popular Mechanics, titled “The New Billion Dollar Crop.”[245] In content, this article was practically identical to the letter Bellrose sent to the Bureau in late 1937, pleading for them to reconsider their prohibitive legislation. Interestingly, the “billion dollar” reference pertains to the newsprint market and it may be traced to a bulletin published by the Newsprint Institute. According to this bulletin, the annual earnings of the newsprint industry were one billion dollars.[246] Bellrose used this information to impress the Bureau and the public about the potential for the new hemp industry.

Continuing the previous letter, Bellrose’s restated his concern over the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937. His office was being flooded with inquires regarding the new law and how it would effect the industry. The primary stimulus for all the concern was not the actual passage of the law, which had occurred virtually unnoticed, but an article which was written by Frank Ridgway in the October 11, 1937 edition of the Chicago Tribune. This article spelled out the prospective complications that the new law would create and suggested that it might be more advisable to just burn the crops than to try to persevere through the regulatory measures.The main problem that Ridgway foresaw was the transfer tax.The regulations stated that in order for hemp to be exempted from the transfer tax it had to be free of any foliage that contained the drug. This requirement was totally impractical, since it would mean that the farmer would have to strip the hemp stalk of its foliage before he could transfer it tax free to the processor. In either situation the farmer was stuck without a profit; he would either be taxed or forced to pay for additional labor.[247]

After this last letter, Bellrose brought the problem to the attention of the Attorney General, who notified the Bureau. Acting Commissioner Will Wood responded to Bellrose on November 7, 1937.In his response, he expressed the Bureau’s lack of concern regarding the complications of the transfer tax.Acting Commissioner Wood simply stated, that the legislators had taken the trouble to exempt the mature stalks from the transfer tax, and, that it was the Bureau’s understanding that the foliage fell off during the retting process. His answer clearly demonstrates the Bureau’s ignorance regarding the cultivation of hemp, because the foliage did not completely separate from the stalks during retting. The reason for the Bureau’s insistence on maintaining the transfer tax is best stated in the words of Acting Commissioner Wood:

“I am sure that you would agree with me that the transfer of the entire plant could not be exempted from the operation of the act, because although the reputable manufacturers of hemp fiber would have no interest in the foliage of the plant, there are unscrupulous persons who would make use of such a loophole in the law, and under color of a legitimate transfer of fiber stalks, would be able to acquire and harvest all the resin containing foliage.”[248]



Before Bellrose abandoned his dream of establishing a hemp industry, he tried one last time to convince Frank Ridgway that the hemp they were cultivating did not contain any of the active drug ingredients. In January, 1938, Ridgway contacted Commissioner Anslinger and proposed that the government conduct an experiment to see if Bellrose’s contention was true.[249] Supervisor Elizabeth Bass wrote to Commissioner Anslinger on March 5, 1938.Since Ridgway’s letter in January, the Commissioner had responded and requested that Ridgway send several pounds of the hemp to be tested by governmental chemists.[250] Apparently, by March 10, no significant steps had been taken to analyze the marihuana samples and Ridgway was going to postpone any further cultivation until he met with Commissioner Anslinger. According to Supervisor Bass, Ridgway wanted to discuss some new developments regarding the hemp industry. In particular, he wanted to express the rapidly fading enthusiasm of the processors who were “fearing troubles with the government and small and not worthwhile profits.”[251] The records of this meeting and the results of the tests are unknown.

Commercial activity continued in Minnesota as well. On October 11, 1937, Frank Holton contacted the Bureau regarding the new legislation and his company’s operations. He informed the Commissioner that his company had contracted farmers in Southern Minnesota to grow hemp during 1934 and 1935.According to Holton, they had experienced some difficulty at first since hemp was a new crop with which they had not been totally familiar.Now, though, they were proceeding with plans to utilize the seed, fiber, and hurd to produce oil, textiles, and cellulose. Recently, they had become aware of the marihuana problem because of the publicity it had received in the media and, as a consequence, they had learned of the new Tax Act regulating the growth of hemp. Specifically, Holton requested any information the Commissioner could provide him with about this new development.[252]The Commissioner’s response was to send Holton a copy of Regulations No. 1.[253]

During 1936, Holton’s main problem had been the hemp crops of 1934 and 1935, which were still lying in the farmers’ fields. The farmers were quickly losing their patience with Holton, when Chempco, Inc. and the Central Fibre Corporation had offered to purchase from their crops. Needless to say, the sale was welcomed by both Holton and the farmers who actually sold it for less than the contracted $15 per ton. After these deals, they still had a significant quantify of hemp on hand, which continued to be a bone of contention among the farmers.As a result of the situation Holton found himself in, he decided to reorganize his company.The new firm of Cannabis, Incorporated, was formed on April, 9, 1937, in order to “manufacture and prepare hemp and other fibre from raw material sources, etc., etc.” Holton moved the new firm to Winona, Minnesota where he occupied an old woolen mill. Over the course of the spring and summer months of 1937, he conducted experimentation in adapting the woolen mill machinery for the manufacture of hemp products.This endeavor achieved very little success, and, in the end, Holton settled upon producing mops.[254]

In 1938, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics estimated that a total of 11,000 tons of hemp remained in storage on farms and at decorticating plants throughout southern Minnesota.[255] The Bureau sent an agent to inquire into this situation and report back. Specifically, this agent was to ascertain whether or not the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was being violated. According to the report produced by Field Supervisor H. T. Nugent, the regulations had been violated in three basic ways. First there was the problem of registering.The commercial interests applied as Class 3, “dealers of mature stalks without foliage.” This classification was wrong according to Supervisor Nugent because the foliage was never removed from the stalks and thus they should have registered as Class 1. Second there was the issue of the transfer tax. The regulations allowed for the tax free transfer of stalks that did not have any of the drug carrying foliage. As with the first problem, Supervisor Nugent observed that the stalks were never free of foliage; therefore they were taxable, but the tax was never paid in many instances. Finally, he noted that the crops still in the fields had not been properly safeguarded, which was another violation.[256]

In conclusion, Supervisor Nugent pointed to the dilemma the Bureau faced with the remaining stacks of hemp. There were two parties involved in this issue, the farmers who physically possessed the crops and Holton who legally controlled the crops. According to Supervisor Nugent, Holton’s company was in no position to purchase and decorticate the remaining hemp, even though, he was planning to transfer it to Mississippi, where he intended to use it for a textile blend with cotton. Holton’s plans evidently did not impress Supervisor Nugent and the only solution seemed to be for the farmers to take Holton to court in order to gain legal control of the hemp.Supervisor Nugent noted that a committee had been formed by the farmers in the Lake Lillian area and that they had elected Ojai A. Lende, Attorney at Law, to represent their interest in the matter. Supervisor Nugent’s opined that the just solution was to compensate the farmers and to remove the hemp as soon as possible because of the threat of pilfering.[257]

The earliest record regarding the legal action of the farmers in the Lake Lillian area occurred in a letter from Lende to Senator Henrik Shipstead of Minnesota, dated, January 27, 1938. In this letter, Lende informed the Senator that hemp crops had been raised under contract during the 1934, 1935, and 1936 seasons in Yellow Medicine County, Minnesota.The growing had been contracted by the Northwest Hemp Corporation which had since experienced financial difficulties that had kept it from fulfilling its contractual obligations.As a result, there were now 3000 tons of hemp being stored on the farms throughout the county waiting for a market.This hemp has since been identified as marihuana and federal legislation has been passed to control the traffic of the plant. The law abiding farmers had duly applied for licenses to sell their hemp as was stipulated in the new Tax Act, but they had never received their licenses.In the meantime, the farmers had found a buyer, Chempco, Inc., and they were anxious to sell their hemp. Since Lende was their legal representative, he was contacting the Senator with the hope of getting the matter of licensing speedily resolved for the farmers.[258]

Still, by March 23, 1938, the issue had not been resolved. In another letter, this time addressed to the Bureau, Lende again asked for the necessary authorization to sell the crops.Apparently, all the Bureau had done was send Lende information regarding the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937. From this information, Lende learned that if the hemp was free of foliage it was legally transferable and he expressed the belief that the hemp in question was certainly free of foliage.[259] The Bureau insisted on inspecting the hemp before proceeding with authorization.The inspection showed that there was still foliage, and, based on this observation, the Bureau decided to test it for the drug principle. Late in April, Lende was still awaiting an answer from the Bureau and he proposed that if there was any drug content that the Bureau supervise the shipment of the hemp.[260] May and June passed and still no action had been taken by the Bureau. In July, Lende pleaded for some sort of decision to be made, stating that the depression “fell severely upon the farmers of Yellow Medicine County.”[261] After this letter, Commissioner Anslinger personally responded and informed Lende that the Bureau was investigating the matter.[262]

Supervisor Nugent carried out the investigation and presented a report on the matter on August 26, 1938. In the report, he conferred with Lende, and explained that the Bureau would entertain the notion of a government supervised transfer of the hemp, but that first he needed to gather information about the purchaser, Chempco, Inc. Supervisor Nugent discovered that the company was in serious financial difficulty and that it was no longer in the position to make the purchase. The lost opportunity can probably be attributed to the fact that the sale between the farmers and Chempco, Inc. had been proposed over a year prior to this investigation. Given the lapse of time, the market for the crops had been lost and the hemp remained stacked in the fields. There was a degree of sympathy evident in Supervisor Nugent’s report toward the farmers’ situation and he expressed the intent to find a solution.He also noted that something had to be done because the farmers were violating the provisions of the Tax Act because they had not reregistered, but is that really any wonder, considering the lack of concern the Bureau had displayed toward their predicament.[263]

The situation had not changed by December 1938, when Lende wrote to Commissioner Anslinger to notify him of legal action which he was taking in behalf of many of the farmers to release them from the contractual obligations.[264] Two months later, Lende informed the Commissioner of his successful litigation and stated that he had released a total of 5400 acres from the contract obligations.He also noted that there were another 3000 acres of hemp which remained under the contracts. This acreage belonged to farmers around the Mankato and Winnebago areas who had expressed the desire to continue working with Frank Holton.After divulging this information, Lende dropped a bomb in the lap of the Commissioner, which is apparent from the question mark enumerating the disclosure in the margin of the document.In essence, Lende stated that he was proceeding with plans to seek an adjustment from Congress for the damages that his clients had suffered in the hemp venture.[265] The Commissioner was a bit confused by this abrupt development and he made note of his confusion in a reply to Lende in which he stated, “I cannot understand on what basis it is expected that the Federal Government should pay for these harvested crops of hemp...”[266]

Commissioner Anslinger received an answer to his query indirectly through Senator Shipstead, who was similarly broadsided with this development.In a letter addressed to the Senator, Lende began to explain the rationale behind his decision to sue the government in the following words, “You remember that I stated to you that there was a market for this hemp in processed form but the passage of the Tax Act completely destroyed the market and virtually confiscated this hemp for the growers.”Based on this assessment, Lende and his clients felt that Congress should compensate them for the “actual out of pocket money which the growers have sustained in the production of this hemp.”Lende informed the Senator that he had contacted Congressman August H. Andersen, Congressman Elmer J. Ryan, and Congressman Harold Knutson, all from Minnesota, about bringing up the matter of compensation during the next session of Congress. Furthermore, he stated that the Bureau of Narcotics possessed the data regarding acreages grown by individual farmers which was necessary to carry out the appropriations.[267]

Senator Shipstead promptly contacted Commissioner Anslinger and requested his opinion regardingboth the matter of compensating the farmers as well as regarding their right to sell the hemp they still had on hand.[268] In his reply, Commissioner Anslinger candidly explained that there was no basis for the federal government to compensate the farmers of Minnesota for the damages they had sustained and he also stated that the farmers were free to apply under the provisions of the Tax Act for permits to sell their crop of hemp, “provided that it is substantially free of flowering tops and leaves.” At the same time, though, the Commissioner failed to inform the Senator that Lende had already attempted to procure the necessary licensing, and that the Bureau had denied him.[269] As a result, the farmers represented by Lende lost a market for their crops of hemp. Furthermore, the delay probably caused the prospective purchaser, Chempco, Inc., to lose $25,000, and cease operations.

Lende received a reply from Senator Shipstead, who informed him that the Bureau was going to investigate the matter further, but in a letter from Lende to the Senator it is apparent that the Bureau had taken no steps toward such an investigation.In fact, Lende was beginning to become irate with Bureau’s lack of concern and he asked for information as to whether or not there might be other districts in the country which were facing similar difficulties.[270] The Senator passed this letter on to the Commissioner, requesting the information which Lende asked for regarding other hemp growing areas.[271]

The Commissioner promptly sent the Senator the information he had requested on March 6, 1939.Without being specific, he informed the Senator that there were approximately 371 producers of hemp registered under the Marihuana Tax Act. He also stated that problems had only arisen in Minnesota with respect to the application of the Tax Act and to the availability of markets to sell the crop.[272] The Senator relayed this information on to Lende, who requested specifics about the locations and names of the individuals involved in the operations cited by the Commissioner.[273] This request was passed on to the Commissioner, who discovered that he may have created a problem by divulging this information. Apparently, the area which the Commissioner had referred to was Wisconsin, where hemp was raised for its fiber. The problem was that the Bureau was never informed as to whether or not the hemp had been free of foliage when it had been transferred from the field to the mill.This situation presented an embarrassing dilemma for the Bureau since they had given the farmers in Minnesota so many difficulties on this point.[274] Regardless of this situation, the Commissioner released the names and locations of the three major commercial interests in Wisconsin: Atlas Hemp Mills in Juneau, Badger Fibre Company in Beaver Dam, and the Matt Rens Hemp Company in Brandon.He also explained that hemp was raised in Kentucky on a small scale for the production of seed.[275]

In his next letter, Lende displayed a certain degree of antipathy toward the Bureau’s handling of the matter, and, in particular, he directed his displeasure toward the Commissioner. Quoting from previous correspondence on February 7, Lende noted the Commissioner’s opinion absolving the government of any responsibility for the failure of the hemp industry:

“This hemp may be sold under the provisions of the Marihuana Tax Act provided that it is substantially free of flowering tops and leaves without respect to the transfer of the act.Accordingly, the passage of the Marihuana Act of 1937 did not destroy the market for hemp.”



He continued and explained that the Bureau had found that the foliage of the hemp stacked in Minnesota did contain the drug principle. Despite this discovery, Lende continued to petition the Commissioner for permission to sell the hemp.He was denied and in the meantime there was no change in the situation. The hemp remained in the fields where it was left unguarded and open for looters. From the context of the letter it was apparent that Lende was becoming impatient.He had never received the information regarding the other producers and manufacturers and no progress had been made toward obtaining permission to sell the crops. Expressing his anger, Lende stated:

“If I can find a market for the hemp I have in mind to dispose of that hemp and tell Mr. Anslinger that he can go to the region below and let him present the country with a spectacle of arresting half a thousand farmers in Minnesota for selling an agricultural crop grown off from their farms which were grown long before Congress ever thought of the Marihuana Act.”[276]



In another letter, Lende cited an article about a marihuana arrest which had been recorded in the Minneapolis Journal of April 5, 1939. According to Lende, there was a possibility that this marihuana had been obtained from the hemp stacked the fields of Minnesota.Based upon this assumption, Lende proposed that the Congress should consider the hemp a risk to the public health and that they should confiscate it.[277] The Senator passed this letter and the previous one along to the Bureau.[278] Commissioner Anslinger replied on April 12, 1939. He notified the Senator that he had given Lende the names of three companies in Wisconsin in a previous letter. In defense of the Tax Act, the Commissioner explained that the crops in Minnesota had been harvested prior to the passage of the Act and, therefore, the Act could not have killed the hemp industry.This excuse was extremely naïve.The Commissioner understood the difficulties of establishing a new industry and knew that it was first necessary to have the hemp grown before any further work could be done. Specifically, the industry needed additional time to experiment and perfect the technology to produce cellulose pulp from the hemp.Such an endeavor required investment capital.Commissioner Anslinger was aware of this necessity and used the Tax Act to stop it from occurring.

Finally, with regard to Lende’s desire to sell the remaining crops, the Commissioner insisted that Lende provide him with information on any prospective purchaser.Upon the delivery of such information the Commissioner promised to consider the transfer of the crops.[279] This transfer eventually occurred during the Second World War, when the British Government contracted with a new venture, Hemlax Fibre & Company, of Sacred Heart, Minnesota, to cultivate hemp for naval cordage.[280]

In Illinois a slightly different situation developed, but, in the end, the result was the same as it had been in Minnesota. Like the commercial concerns in Minnesota, the Amhempco Corporation of Danville, Illinois, intended to produce fiber for textiles and hurds for paper and alpha-cellulose products.[281] This project is of particular interest because one of the buildings on the land purchased by the Amhempco Corporation was used for the production of paper from cornstalks by a previous venture.The former company, the Cornstalks Products Company, had not survived, but while it was in operation it had been involved in an effort to adapt alternative sources, other than wood, for use in the production of paper.[282] Ironically, this company had also been involved in the previously described conspiracy to suppress alternative source legislation in 1929, which would have appropriated government aid for the development of farm waste industries.[283]

Considering the fact that Amhempco Corporation purchased the site of the original operation, its organizers probably had a similar purpose in mind.However, when the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was passed, the principal financial backers of the company filed for bankruptcy leaving about 300 creditors.[284] Closer inspection reveals that the Amhempco Corporation, like its predecessor, the Cornstalks Products Company, was formed as a stock selling racket and as a device to secure a piece of the new market if one developed.Furthermore, both operations were financially connected to the investment banking house of J. P. Morgan & Company.[285] Apparently, the most powerful banking house in the nation also thought that hemp might be commercially cultivated for its cellulose.

After the passage of the Tax Act, the Bureau, in conjunction with the Treasury Department, made a visit to Danville, in order to observe and discuss the operations of Amhempco Corporation with the company manager, M. G. Moksnes.During a meeting, Moksnes explained that Amhempco Corporation had been formed for the production of fiber, which would be shipped to the Massilon Company and used along with wool and hair for the production of rugs. The Amhempco Corporation also intended to utilize the hemp hurds for the production of cellulose, which could be used in the manufacture of plastics and paper.[286]

No further correspondence between the Bureau and Amhempco Corporation occurred during 1937.Then, on February 7, 1938, Moksnes informed the Bureau that the Amhempco Corporation had ceased to do business.Continuing, he informed Hester that he intended to reorganize the business and that he needed to be advised as to the proper procedure of licensing under the Tax Act.In particular, he wanted to know if the growers of the 1937 crop were required to be licensed because they had harvested their crop prior to the enactment of the law. Along with these questions, he informed the Bureau that he intended to produce fiber for the cordage trade, textiles, and the paper industry.[287] There was no record of any reply and the correspondence ceased again for approximately a year and eight months.

The story of Amhempco Corporation starts again in the fall of 1939.A memorandum left by A. L. Tennyson, Chief of the Bureau’s Legal Section, recorded the events of a meeting between himself and Arthur S. Nestor, who represented Fibrous Industries, Inc., of Chicago, Illinois.This meeting took place on the afternoon of September 22, 1939. Nestor stated that his company licensed the rights to use a hemp decorticating machine and contemplated licensing this machine to the Illinois Hemp Company of Moline, Illinois, which had been formed for the purpose of buying and decorticating hemp and selling the fiber and hurd on the market.The problem that Nestor wanted to bring to the Bureau’s attention involved the matter of a contract that the Illinois Hemp Company had entered into for the purchase of 18,000 tons of hemp which was being held by the Trustees in Bankruptcy for the Amhempco Corporation.He also informed Tennyson that the Illinois Hemp Company planned on continuing its operations once this stock of hemp had been decorticated by entering into grower’s contracts with farmers for future crops of hemp.[288]

Nestor stated that he had already discussed these plans with Dr. Brittain B. Robinson of the Bureau of Plant Industry, who had suggested that he present the matter to the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Responding, Tennyson explained the provisions of the Marihuana Tax Act to Nestor, taking special care to stress the clause referring to the transfer tax, which stated that the tax was applicable to all transfers of hemp that still had foliage attached to it. He continued and described the problems that the Bureau had experienced with the hemp grown in Minnesota. This reference naturally led Tennyson to inquire about the nature of the hemp that the Illinois Hemp Company wished to purchase from the Amhempco Corporation. If the hemp in question still retained foliage, Tennyson informed Nestor that the approval of the Commissioner would be necessary before the transfer could be legally conducted according to the stipulations of the Tax Act. Tennyson further explained that Commissioner Anslinger would require specifics regarding all facets of the proposed business deal and that any additional growing of hemp would require the same type of approval.[289]

At the conclusion of their discussion, Nestor expressed his desire to comply with all existing regulations. He then proceeded to inform Tennyson that the hemp industry had great potential to benefit the American farmer. To support his contentions, Nestor produced letters addressed to the Illinois Hemp Company from the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, the Ford Motor Company, and companies manufacturing rope and paper.[290] After displaying these letters, Nestor expressed the belief that the foliage could probably be removed from the hemp at little additional cost to the company and that he would discuss this matter with his engineer once he returned to Chicago.In closing, Tennyson suggested that Nestor should not proceed with any transfers of hemp until the Bureau had been able to conduct a thorough investigation of his proposed plans.[291]

Commissioner Anslinger passed Tennyson’s memorandum on to James Biggins, the District Supervisor of Illinois, and requested that he investigate the Illinois Hemp Company and Fibrous Industries, Inc. Evidently, the situation that had occurred in Minnesota was still fresh in the Commissioner’s mind because he advised Supervisor Biggins to “carefully inquire” into the identity of the individuals involved in these companies.[292] Supervisor Biggins assigned Narcotic Agent Cornelius J. Kelly to the investigation and Agent Kelly submitted his report on October 6, 1939. In the report, Agent Kelly stated that Nestor accompanied him to Tilton, Illinois, which was in the vicinity of Danville, where the Illinois Hemp Corporation’s plant was located. According to Agent Kelly, the old stocks of hemp were stored inside a fenced off enclosure and the total amount was estimated to be 10,000 tons.He also noted that this hemp was not totally denuded of foliage. Agent Kelly emphasized the previous statement to Nestor and to an engineer that had accompanied Nestor. The two men explained to Agent Kelly that another 6000 tons of hemp existed on farms throughout the area and that the foliage most likely also remained attached to this hemp. Nestor expressed his desire to comply with the provisions of the Tax Act and began to confer with his engineer about methods of removing the foliage, to which Agent Kelly responded, that these matters would best be brought up with the Commissioner.[293]

Following his visit to the plant, Agent Kelly conducted a study of the Fibrous Industries, Inc.From Agent Kelly’s investigation, the Bureau learned that the Fibrous Industries, Inc., had been chartered on April 19, 1939, as a holding company. Surprisingly, Nestor’s name did not appear in relation to this company.Agent Kelly contacted Nestor to ask about this situation. In an attempt to explain his absence, Nestor informed Agent Kelly that he had acquired the exclusive patent rights to the Selvig Decorticating Machine.Nestor continued and stated that the Fibrous Industries Inc. was created after he had secured these rights and that he had assigned the rights to license this decorticating machine to the company.At the moment, Nestor stated that he was not connected to the company except for his role as general manager, however, he informed Agent Kelly that he planned on becoming the president and increasing the capital once he settled some business matters. Nestor then proceeded to inform Agent Kelly that several dummy officers with nominal shares in the company had been listed as the company’s management.[294]

After discussing the business of the Fibrous Industries, Inc., Agent Kelly investigated the Illinois Hemp Corporation. He discovered that the Illinois Hemp Corporation had been chartered on January 14, 1939. In addition to this disclosure, Agent Kelly learned that the firm’s attorney was Elmer Johnson, a member of the Iowa State Legislature and a prosperous and reputable businessman. Agent Kelly interviewed the Vice-President of the Illinois Hemp Corporation, Wilbur E. Wright, who oversaw the operations of the company’s plant in Tilton.According to Wright, the Illinois Hemp Corporation had paid Fibrous Industries, Inc. $6500 for the rights to use the decorticating machine and that his company also contracted to pay a royalty of one half cent per pound on all finished hemp products to the Fibrous Industries, Inc.[295]

During this period of time, the decorticating plant and the hemp had remained in the possession of the creditors of Amhempco. These creditors had come together on April 1, 1938, and hired R. D. Acton to act as the trustee for their possessions. After this action, Acton became the owner of the hemp located at the plant in Tilton and on the surrounding farms. According to Agent Kelly, there was approximately 16,000 tons of hemp in Acton’s possession, which he had contracted to sell to the Illinois Hemp Corporation in January of 1939. He also stated that the Illinois Hemp Corporation had been permitted to use approximately 7500 square feet of the plant and parts of certain buildings to place and operate their decorticating machinery and conduct their business. Agent Kelly then reported that no payment was to be made for the hemp until it had been processed and that operations were slated to begin on October 15, 1939.Following this disclosure, Agent Kelly took it upon himself to ask Wright, the Vice-President of the Illinois Hemp Corporation, whether or not his company had registered under the provisions of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937. Wright replied that he had not and that he would confer with Elmer Johnson, his company’s attorney, about registering before they commenced operations.[296]

About a month after Agent Kelly’s report had been submitted, Nestor wrote to Commissioner Anslinger. In his letter, Nestor explained that he had conferred with two engineers and traveled to Wisconsin and Danville for the purpose of discussing the problem presented by the foliage on the hemp. As a result of his inquiries he formulated the following conclusions:

1. That the men interested in the handling of hemp in Illinois and Wisconsin are of too high a type to ever remotely be party to selling, or giving away any parts of the hemp plant that could be used for marihuana.

2. That they can be depended upon to do all things needed to prevent any persons from obtaining, from their plants, any of the leaves, flowers or seeds of the plant.

3. That they universally hold the opinion that the real danger of supply does not lie from the production of licensed growers, or operators, but from unlicensed small growers and from roadside growth.

4. That the law is not interpreted alike by any two of them.One understanding that the law allows him to do things a certain way and another construes the law as nearly opposite.

5. That some operators claim that at the time of the hearing by the Committee a meeting was held at which were present representatives of the Treasury Department and the Bureau of Narcotics, also several processors of hemp.That an understanding was arrived at as to the matter of handling the plant—and they contend that they have been following such plan since that time.

6. That there are several individual opinions as to how the foliage problem could or should be handled.

7. That the conditions in Wisconsin are different than the conditions in Illinois, - and Illinois is unlike the conditions in Minnesota or Kentucky. Kentucky, however, for the time being, presents no problem.

8. That they are of a unit in their desire to carry out the intention of the law and to cooperate with the Bureau.[297]



In connection with his conclusions, Nestor mentioned that he had contacted Elmer Johnson, the attorney of the Illinois Hemp Corporation, who had suggested that a meeting be convened between the Bureau and the members of the hemp industry to discuss the matters of handling of growth, transportation, possession and disposal of certain parts of the hemp plant.Nestor also stated that he had mentioned Johnson’s suggestion to several other parties and to Dr. Andrew H. Wright of the University of Wisconsin, claiming that they all expressed an interest in the proposal of a meeting.[298]

Commissioner Anslinger promptly acknowledged Nestor’s letter and stated that he agreed that the matter seemed to justify the convening of a meeting.However, the Commissioner was of the opinion that the meeting should take place in Washington, D.C., where government experts from the Department of Agriculture and the chemical section of the Bureau would be available for questioning. In addition to this suggestion, the Commissioner requested that Nestor grant him some time to gather information regarding the current situation confronting the hemp industry.[299] Simply put, the Commissioner was stalling.

Meanwhile, on December 5, 1939, Commissioner Anslinger contacted District Supervisor James J. Biggins, requesting that he investigate the operations of the Matt Rens Hemp Company of Wisconsin in an effort to discover how they handled their hemp.The Commissioner requested this information for the meeting which had been proposed by Nestor.Apparently, the Commissioner was fearful that the Matt Rens Company was transferring their hemp from the farms to the mill without paying the transfer tax, which would create an embarrassing dilemma for the Bureau for obvious reasons.[300] Once the report was delivered, Commissioner Anslinger informed Nestor that he would arrange for a meeting in Washington, D.C., provided that a sufficient number of commercial concerns were interested in such a meeting.[301] After this communication there is no further discussion of the proposed meeting, the reason being that Nestor had been unable to secure a market for the hemp fiber which he had begun to produce back in October of 1939.[302] No doubt the delays and the hindrance of regulations stifled the original enthusiasm for the venture.

Later in 1939, Dr. Andrew H. Wright of the University of Wisconsin contacted the Bureau and discussed the matter of convening a conference. Dr. Wright claimed that certain promotional people interested in the decortication of hemp from a purely promotional standpoint were responsible for proposing the conference.[303] In connection with this communication, he also sent a letter to Agent Kelly, describing the matter in more detail. Dr. Wright stated that, at present, the regulations and application of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 were satisfactory. To date, the enforcement of the law had not inhibited the legitimate commercial production of hemp fiber and it had also served its purpose to protect the public from the illicit use of marihuana. The current pressure for a conference was being created by individuals who were involved with the hemp industry from a promotional standpoint.In his own words, Dr. Wright expressed the following concern, “I seriously question the need for giving consideration to a request from any individual or individuals who have a promotional interest.”[304]

The real reasons for Dr. Wright’s behavior are apparent in the fact that he was employed by the Matt Rens Hemp Company of Wisconsin. This company was the oldest of the surviving hemp concerns, having been established in 1916. Its operations were conducted on a much smaller scale than the hemp ventures in Minnesota and Illinois. During its history, the Matt Rens Hemp Company had contracted to sell its processed fiber to the United States Navy for cordage and caulking.[305] Dr. Wright represented the interests of the Matt Rens Hemp Company when he was critical and sarcastic in his descriptions of the other commercial concerns, claiming that they were promotional, and, therefore, that they should be ignored.Furthermore, when he stated that the Tax Act had not hindered the commercial cultivation of hemp, he was partially right, because the Bureau never enforced the provisions of the Tax Act in Wisconsin.[306]

Ironically, the Wisconsin concerns were allowed to violate the stipulations of the transfer tax while the Minnesota and Illinois ventures were forced to strictly comply by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Why was the Bureau inconsistent? First, the three concerns located in Wisconsin never seriously mobilized to develop hemp as a cash crop for the production of cellulose products like the ventures in Minnesota and Illinois.In addition, the U.S. Navy was the main client of the Wisconsin concerns. If the Bureau had given the Wisconsin industries trouble like they had in Minnesota and Illinois, then they might have faced the indignation of the Navy.On the basis of these two rationale, the Bureau chose to ignore the hemp industry in Wisconsin.

Reviewing the history of the immediate repercussions of the Marihuana Tax Act, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics displayed several alarming discrepancies in its handling of the new hemp industry after the passage of the legislation.First, it stalled on research for the benefit of the hemp industry. Then, the Bureau hampered the conduct of legitimate business by strictly enforcing the stipulations of the transfer tax. And finally, the Bureau displayed a propensity to be selective in its enforcement of the provisions of the Tax Act. Taken as a whole, these dealings effectively put an end to the new hemp industry.

Conclusion

The Aftermath of the Prohibition of Marihuana



Following the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, the prohibition of marihuana became a cultural reality. The aftermath of this prohibition is replete with the same irony which pervaded the original demonization of marihuana during the 1930s. Throughout this thesis, the main argument has centered on the hypothesis that the Bureau responded to events occurring in the hemp industry rather than to a real problem. Coincidentally, the preponderance of evidence suggests that there was not a problem with marihuana. Instead, the Bureau seems to have demonized marihuana in order to protect government and private investment in the Southern wood pulp industry.Since the passage of the Tax Act in 1937, the Bureau has been forced to continuously defend its economically inspired propositions and promote further dubious rhetoric to ensure that marihuana remained illegal.Throughout this era of persecution and prohibition, commercial concerns have continued to express a desire to utilize hemp as a source of raw cellulose for the production of paper.

Within a year after the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Fiorello La Guardia, the mayor of New York City, commissioned a team of distinguished scientist to study the effects of the usage of marihuana. His concern stemmed from the abundance of sensationalistic newspaper accounts that New York’s youth was “teetering on the brink of an orgy of marihuana-induced crime and sex.”[307] To the great dismay of Commissioner Anslinger, the findings of the La Guardia Commission contradicted the arguments which the Bureau had presented during its final assault against marihuana. Specifically, the report stated that:

Marihuana is used extensively in the Borough of Manhanttan but the problem is not as acute as it is reported to be in other sections of the United States.

The distribution and use of marihuana is centered in Harlem.

The majority of marihuana smokers are Negroes and Latin Americans.

The practice of smoking marihuana does not lead to addiction in the medical sense of the word.

The sale and distribution of marihuana is not under the control of any single organized group.

The use of marihuana does not lead to morphine or ****** or ******* addiction and no effort is made to create a market for these narcotics by stimulating the practice of marihuana smoking.

Marihuana is not the determining factor in the commission of major crimes.

Marihuana smoking is not widespread among school children.

Juvenile delinquency is not associated with the practice of smoking marihuana.

The publicity concerning the catastrophic effects of marihuana smoking in New York City is unfounded.[308]



Not surprisingly, Commissioner Anslinger attacked the conclusions of the La Guardia Commission, claiming that they were not credible.[309] In addition, he produced another biased foreign study, which described the use of cannabis drugs in India.[310] But above and beyond any of its previous acts, the Bureau blackmailed the American Medical Association into conducting research to support its position against marihuana.[311] In order to coerce the AMA, the Bureau prosecuted doctors for unwarranted prescriptions.[312] The Commissioner’s scathing denunciations, the prejudiced findings of the foreign study, and the AMA’s bogus study helped to offset the impact of the La Guardia Report.

During this same period of time, further activity occurred in the hemp industry.It began in 1942, after the United States had entered the Second World War. One of the first results of the war was that the United States Navy’s source of fiber for rope had been lost when the Japanese overran the Philippines and the Indian Ocean.This development effectively stopped the importation of Manila hemp and jute into the United States.Over time, Manila hemp and jute had gradually replaced native grown hemp in the production of Naval and Army ropes because of their cheaper cost. At the outset of America’s involvement in the Second World War both of these raw material sources were lost due to the Japanese offensive. As a result the government initiated a campaign to raise hemp in America for the military.[313]

Toward this purpose, the United States government set up the War Hemp Industries Board as a branch of the Commodity Credit Corporation. This new board was authorized to promote and oversee the cultivation of hemp, as well as the production of fiber. During 1942, the Department of Agriculture purchased and distributed 3000 bushels of hemp seed for the purpose of cultivating 350,000 acres of hemp.In addition, the Department of Agriculture created a film titled, Hemp for Victory, which they instructed farmers to watch and they also distributed an agricultural manual in January, 1943, titled, Hemp, Farmers’ Bulletin No. 1935.These promotional tactics were combined with the expenditure of $25,000,000 on harvesting and decorticating machinery, all of which was placed under the supervision of the War Hemp Industries Board, which oversaw the contracting of growers, the distribution of seed, and the production of fiber.[314]

With the advent of governmental control, the private hemp industry seems to have disappeared except for a few scattered business operations. During its brief period of activity, the government raised 168,000 acres in 1943, and then diminished its cultivation to 60,000 acres in 1944.By 1945, there was no longer a need to continue with operations because of the war’s end, so the government exited as quickly as they had entered into the business. However, with the end of governmental control of hemp production, several private commercial concerns attempted to continue with projects of their own. Ironically, these new companies appear to have been interested in the possibility of producing paper.

One of the commercial concerns was located in Washington, Iowa.Deputy Commissioner Will Wood became aware of this private project in August of 1944, at which time he wrote to District Supervisor Allyn B. Crisler of Minneapolis, Minnesota, and requested that the Supervisor should proceed with an investigation of the matter.Toward this end, District Supervisor Crisler sent Narcotic Inspector Paul G. Brigham to Washington, Iowa, to gather information about the hemp project. In a report submitted on August 11, 1944, Inspector Brigham discovered that the decorticating facility, in Washington, Iowa, was owned by Walter T. Ostjen.Next, the Inspector revealed that Ostjen was legally represented by Elmer Johnson, who had been involved with the Illinois Hemp Corporation. Furthermore, the Inspector learned that the Governor of Iowa, Bourke B. Kiskenlooper, had been instrumental in establishing the decorticating facility at Washington.[315] One other point Ostjen mentioned was that the company intended to try to market both the fiber and the hurd.[316] The history of the hemp project in Washington, Iowa ends after this report.

Another case arose in Minnesota, when the Northwest Flax Industries, Inc., contacted the Bureau in December, 1944. This company asked whether it would be possible for them to purchase stocks of unused hemp held by the War Hemp Industries, Inc., of Minnesota. According to their letter, they were interested in using this hemp for the production of paper.With the intent to begin operations, the Northwest Flax Industries, Inc., requested information regarding the licensing and regulations that would apply to their proposed business.[317] After this letter the correspondence ends.

Curiously, a War Hemp Industries’ mill located in St. Paul, Minnesota, was taken private by several entrepreneurs. During the early 1950s, the Bureau effectively used the stipulations of the transfer tax to bring the mill’s operation to a standstill for over a year forcing the company into insolvency.[318] Based on the sequence of interest and action, it seems plausible to suggest that the Northwest Flax Industries, Inc., may have been associated with the privately operated War Hemp Industries mill.If the two hemp concerns were associated, then the Bureau would have exhibited its peculiar bias for utilizing the stipulations of the transfer tax to smother yet another industrial enterprise interested in developing hemp for paper.

By the end of the 1950s, hemp was no longer commercially cultivated in the United States.[319] Not only was it too difficult to comply with the onerous regulations of the Marihuana Tax Act, but other prohibitive measures had also been enacted which hindered the growth of the nascent hemp industry. First, the Bureau had supported the movement to have marihuana classified as a noxious weed.[320] Needless to say, this negative association caused irreparable damage to the agricultural status of hemp. Secondly, during the final assault, the Bureau had continued to press for the adoption of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act. By 1940, almost every state had enacted this legislation including the marihuana clause.And finally, as a result of the Bureau’s intense demonization of marihuana, most states had passed laws by 1940, which totally prohibited the cultivation of marihuana for whatever purpose.[321]

Meanwhile, during the years following the Second World War, the Bureau continued to lobby for stricter laws against marihuana on the federal level.Their main argument remained focused on the unsubstantiated claim that marihuana posed a grave danger to the youth of America.Specifically, the Bureau argued that the use of marihuana was a stepping stone to the use of ******.In 1951, Commissioner Anslinger stated that: “Over 50 percent of those young addicts started on marihuana smoking.They started there and graduated to ******; they took the needle when the thrill of marihuana was gone.”[322] On the basis of the stepping stone theory, the Bureau was able to impress Congress enough to pass two new anti-narcotic bills, the Boggs Act of 1951 and the Narcotic Control Act of 1956. Both pieces of legislation included marihuana within their purview. Furthermore, these laws made the possession of marihuana a felony.[323]

During the 1950s and early 1960s, marihuana legislation had very little impact on the vast majority of the American public, who continued to be ignorant of any drug related problem. However, by the mid-1960s, the use of marihuana became a widespread phenomenon on college campuses throughout the nation. No longer was the use of marihuana confined to minority groups such as the African-Americans and Mexicans. Instead, white middle- and upper-class American youths were indulging in the drug.Commenting on the new marihuana craze, a writer from the New York Times stated:

“Nobody cared when it was a ghetto problem.Marihuana - well, it was used by jazz musicians in the lower class, so you didn’t care if they got 2- to 20 years.But when a nice, middle-class girl or boy in college gets busted for the same thing, then the whole country sits up and takes notice.”[324]



As a result of this new concern the marihuana laws were reexamined.

Starting in 1962, before the marihuana phenomenon fully emerged, Presidential commissions began to question the validity of the Bureau’s position on marihuana.[325] The findings of these commissions basically reaffirmed the truth about marihuana: that it was not addictive; that it did not cause crime; and that it was not a stepping stone to the use of ******.By the early 1970s, independent scholars began to examine the historical and scientific basis for anti-marihuana legislation.[326] This academic inquiry gradually revealed that the federal prohibition of marihuana had not occurred because of a true problem with the drug. Instead, these scholars discovered that, during the first quarter of the twentieth century, marihuana had been classified as a narcotic by overzealous Progressives, who had reacted out of xenophobic fear rather than rational scientific observation. These scholars also found that, when the Federal Bureau of Narcotics was created in 1930, the new agency had merely adopted the xenophobic attitudes of the Progressives. In addition, they further noted that the Bureau had failed to produce any evidence of a true problem with marihuana. The research of these scholars and the advice of Presidential commissions helped to justify the movement to decriminalize marihuana during the 1970s.

Another interesting development occurred during this same period of time.In 1974, Jack Frazier published an article titled Hemp Paper Reconsidered.[327] This study effectively reawakened Americans to the economic potential of hemp. In particular, Frazier reintroduced the public to the 1916 Department of Agriculture Bulletin No. 404, Hemp Hurds As Paper-Making Material. This publication had stated that hemp was ideal for the production of paper. Furthermore, Frazier rediscovered the 1938 Popular Mechanics article “The New Billion Dollar Crop,” which specifically focused on the industrial potential of manufacturing paper from hemp.Since the publication of Frazier’s article many movements have evolved with the single purpose in mind of developing hemp for the production of paper. Recently, the June, 1991, edition of Pulp & Paper, a technical trade journal, featured an article titled “It’s Time to Reconsider Hemp.” In the article it was stated that hemp still presented an ideal solution “... to meet pending shortages of fiber, energy, and environmental quality.”[328] Less than two year ago, in the July, 1993, edition of Pulp & Paper, another significant article was printed, which described government sponsored research regarding the production of paper from hemp in the Netherlands.The author noted that, “As a relatively low-input crop that can be grown at a wide range of latitudes, hemp seems very suitable for mass production of nonwood cellulose.”[329]Finally, within the last few years the hemp industry has begun to re-emerge in America.A company from Portland, Oregon, is presently manufacturing paper from hemp. However, because strict regulations governing the cultivation of marihuana are still enforced in America this company has been forced to import its hemp from China.[330]

Ironically, during the period of time between the decriminalization movement of the early 1970s and the present, the Presidential Administrations of Ronald Reagan and George Bush initiated what society commonly refers to as the war on drugs, and, of course, marihuana was a prime target.The battle plan entailed the proliferation of bureaucratically-self-serving scientific studies and politically-inspired moralistic admonitions.

For instance, during the mid-1970s, at Tulane University, government sanctioned researchers claimed that the use of marihuana caused the death of brain cells.Their conclusion was based on the analysis of the brain cells of Rhesus monkeys which had been subjected to marihuana smoke and then compared to the brain cells of a control group of monkeys which were drug free. The findings of the Tulane project have been one of the main weapons of the Drug Enforcement Agency in its post-decriminalization propaganda campaigns against marihuana.[331] Needless to say, the general public found this information extremely troubling.

Following the disturbing revelations from Tulane, the National Organization for the Reform of Marihuana Laws (NORML) and Playboy requested an accurate accounting of the research procedures.Initially, the requesters were denied but after six years of suing the government for this information they final received the material.What they discovered was one of the most horrendous examples of scientific deception ever concocted:

“... Rhesus monkeys had been strapped into a chair and pumped the equivalent of 63 Colombian strength joints in ‘five minutes through gas masks,’ losing no smoke

The monkeys were suffocating! Three to five minutes of oxygen deprivation causes brain damage - ‘dead brain cells.’

The Heath Monkey study was actually a study in animal asphyxiation and carbon monoxide poisoning.”[332]



Similarly flawed research projects, like Dr. Gabriel Nahas’s studies, which tried to link the use of marihuana with chromosonal damage, have consistently received the support of the government.[333] Through the 1970s and 1980s, and now into the 1990s, the government has continued to expend billions of tax-payers’ dollars to basically misinform the public about the effects of marihuana in order to ensure that the drug remains illegal.

All the while, reputable scientists have presented credible evidence to the contrary.[334] The most recent research shows that the “...active ingredients of cannabis are used-up in the first or second pass through the liver. The leftover THC metabolites then attach themselves, in a very normal way, to fatty deposits, for the body to dispose of later, which is a safe and perfectly natural process.”[335]Furthermore, researchers have shown that the psychoactive chemicals in marihuana have natural receptors in the human brain.[336] How did such an evolutionary development occur without some unique symbiotic relationship having been shared between humanity and hemp?Considering the truth, the current attempts to overwhelm the public with misinformation about marihuana is quite deplorable.

Until the marihuana laws are repealed, the economic potential of hemp will not be realized in the United States. The tragedy of this situation seems to rest on the untimely demonization of marihuana by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics between 1935 and 1937.If the Bureau had not proceeded with this action, then there was a very good chance that the hemp industry of the 1930s would have established itself and prospered. In light of this tragedy, the following question was posed: Why was marihuana demonized during the 1930s? Throughout this thesis reasonable doubt has been raised regarding the Bureau’s true motives for demonizing marihuana. Specifically, the main contention of this thesis has remained true to the hypothesis that the Federal Bureau of Narcotics demonized marihuana during the 1930s in order to protect the wood pulp industry.

On the basis of the present research, the guiding impetus for the demonization of marihuana rested on the economic control of a vital raw material—cellulose.At the time, when the new hemp industry was emerging, the production of cellulose was monopolized by the wood pulp industry. Responsibility for the demise of the hemp industry during the 1930s would seem to reside with the upper echelon of management in the several dominant banks and corporations, as well as with officials in the federal government, all of whom were associated with the wood pulp industry. Prior to and during the 1930s, the wood pulp industry demonstrated hostile behavior whenever its fiscal domain was threatened by economic changes.If hemp became established as an alternate source for the manufacture of paper and other cellulose based products, such as building materials, textiles, and plastics, these business managers, bankers, and government officials faced the stark reality of significant financial losses.

Two factors, in particular, made the wood pulp industry vulnerable during the 1930s.Within the established wood-pulp industry decentralization was occurring, while outwardly the industry and government promoted the utilization of the Southern Pine as a new source of wood-pulp. Both of these processes required a tremendous outlay of capital, which came from both private and public sectors. Sharing a similar purpose, business and government worked in unison to ensure the safety of their investment.

The government clearly possessed a dubious record with regard to its support of the wood-pulp industry and opposition to the development of alternative sources other-than-wood for the production of cellulose. A similar historical distinction emerges, in 1935, when the Federal Bureau of Narcotics launched its final assault against marihuana at approximately the same time that the new hemp industry was mustering the necessary resources to establish itself. During the span of the next two years, the Bureau destroyed all hope of establishing an industry based on cellulose produced from hemp.This feat was accomplished through the demonization of marihuana and the subsequent passage of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937.

If there had been a real reason for the final assault against marihuana, then maybe what happened to the hemp industry would be acceptable, but there is not.Instead, it was shown how hemp was considered to be one of the most promising alternative sources, and that private investors tried to create an industry based on the plant’s economic potential.Consequently, while analyzing the history of the hemp industry during the 1930s, a web of problematic economic influences was discovered which begs for further analysis.

The present situation with regard to the prohibition of marihuana has created a unique dilemma.American agriculture and industry have been prohibited from developing markets for a plant which offers a variety economic opportunities. Other countries around the globe have already taken the initiative to develop hemp-based industries and are presently demonstrating the value of such endeavors.The most prominent of these countries is China, where hemp is recognized as the most valuable nonwood alternative source for the production of cellulose pulp. Paper in China commonly contains five percent to twenty-five percent hemp pulp, which is usually combined with recycled material to add strength. One-hundred percent hemp pulp is also used for the production of finer grades of paper.In addition, the Chinese utilize the entire plant, pulping both the bast fibers and hurds.[337] Considering such progress, why does America proceed to drain the natural resources of our own country, as well as those of willing foreign countries, when another more practical option exists? Given the circumstances described in this thesis, it would seem appropriate to suggest further examination of the history of the prohibition of marihuana, in addition to new research into the economic potential of hemp.

Bibliography


MANUSCRIPT SOURCES

National Archives: Washington National Research Center, Suitland Md. Record Group 170, Accession Number: W 170-74-005, Boxes 1-5, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937.”



GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

Brand, C. J.“Crop Plants for Papermaking.”U. S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Plant Industry, Circ. 82. Washington: GPO, Aug. 31, 1911.

Congressional Record. 1927-1933. Washington: GPO.

Dewey, Lyster H.“Hemp.” U. S. Department of Agriculture Yearbook 1913. Washington: GPO, 1913.

———.“The Cultivation of Hemp in the United States.”U. S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Plant Industry - Circular No. 57.Washington: GPO, 1910.

———.“Hemp Varieties of Improved Types are Result of Selection.” U. S. Department of Agriculture Yearbook 1927. Washington: GPO, 1927.

———.“Hemp Fiber Losing Ground, Despite Its Valuable Qualities.”U. S. Department of Agriculture Yearbook 1931.Washington: GPO, 1931.

Dewey, Lyster H., and Jason L. Merrill. “Hemp Hurds as Paper-Making Material.” U. S. Department of Agriculture Bulletin No. 404.Washington: GPO, 1916.

Federal Trade Commission.NEWSPRINT PAPER INDUSTRY: Letter from the chairman of the FTC - Transmitting in Response to S. Res. No. 337 (70th Cong.) A Report on Certain Phases of the Newsprint Paper Industry. 71st Cong., Sp. sess., July 8, 1930.S. Doc. 214.

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Veitch, F. P.“Paper Making Materials and Their Conservation.”U. S. Department of Agriculture, Circ. 41. Washington: GPO, Dec., 1908.

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———.Regulations No. 1 Relating to the Importation, Manufacture, Production, Compounding, Sale, Dealing In, Dispensing, Prescribing, Administering, and Giving Away of MARIHUANA.Under the Act of August 2, 1937, Public, No. 238, 75th Congress, Narcotic Internal Revenue Regulations, Joint Marihuana Regulations made by the Commissioner of Narcotics and the Commissioner of the Internal revenue with the approval of the Secretary of Treasury, Effective date, October 1, 1937.Washington, 1937.

U. S. Department of Agriculture. “Warns Against HEMP Exploitation.” The Official Record v. 10, no. 15, Apr. 11, 1931.

U. S. Department of War. Report of Committee appointed per letter from the Governor dated April 1, 1925, for the purpose of investigating the use of Marihuana and making recommendations regarding the same. Balboa Heights, Canal Zone: December 18, 1925.

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U. S. Senate.National Pulp and Paper Requirements in Relation to Forest Conservation: Letter from the Secretary of Agriculture Transmitting in Response to Resolution No. 205 (73d Congress) a Report on National Pulp and Paper Requirements in Relation to Forest Conservation. 74th Cong., 1st sess., 1933. S. Doc. 115.

U. S. Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Finance. Taxation of Marihuana.75th Cong., 1st sess., 1937.



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About the Author



John Craig Lupien was born in Mountain View, California on March 22, 1969, to Brooks H. Lupien and Celia R. Lupien. For the first seventeen years of his life he lived in Cupertino, California. When he reached the age of eighteen, he moved to Malibu, California, where he attended Pepperdine University from 1987-1992. In the summer of 1992, John moved to Harrison, New York where he currently resides. At the moment, he is employed as research assistant at the Westchester County Records and Archives Center and is awaiting the completion of his Master of Arts degree in History.


[1]Jack Herer, The Emperor Wears No Clothes (Van Nuys, California: HEMP Publishing, 1991) p. 25. Herer also explains that “marihuana” is the Americanized spelling. The correct spelling is “marijuana.” To avoid confusion, the spelling which will be used throughout this paper, will be the Americanized version, “marihuana.”The use of “h” appears in the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 and the records of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Also see the Oxford English Dictionary listing for “marijuana, marihuana.”
[2]Richard J. Bonnie and Charles H. Whitebread II, The Marihuana Conviction: A History of Marihuana Prohibition in the United States (Charlottesville, Virginia: University of Virginia Press, 1974) pp. 93-126; Ernest L. Abel, Marihuana: The First Twelve Thousand Years (New York: Plenum Press, 1980) pp. 237-247; David F. Musto, The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic Control (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987) Chapter 9, “Marihuana and the FBN;” Jack Herer, Hemp & The Marijuana Conspiracy: The Emperor Wears No Clothes (Van Nuys, California: HEMP Publishing, 1991) pp. 15-30; Jack Frazier, The Great American Hemp Industry (Peterstown, West Virginia: Solar Age Press, 1991) pp. 40-71; Chris Conrad, HEMP: Lifeline to the Future (Los Angeles, California: Creative Xpressions Publications, 1993) pp. 38-55; Michael Schaller, “The Federal Prohibition of Marihuana” Journal of Social History 4, no. 1 (1970): 61-74. National Archives: Washington National Research Center, Suitland, Md, Record Group 170, Accession Number: W 170-74-0005 (boxes 1-5), “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937” [Hereafter cited as “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives].
[3]The set of conclusions which have been presented in this paragraph will be developed and thoroughly explained in Chapter 2: “The Evolution of the Marihuana Issue in America;” and Chapter 3: “The Final Assualt.”
[4]Herer, The Emperor, pp. 15-30; Frazier, Great American Hemp Industry, pp. 40-71; Conrad, HEMP, pp. 38-55; “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.

[5]The following books are the foundation of the decriminalization movement:

Richard J. Bonnie and Charles H. Whitebread II, The Marihuana Conviction: A History of Marihuana Prohibition in the United States (Charlottesville, Virginia: University of Virginia Press, 1974).

Ernest L. Abel, Marihuana: The First Twelve Thousand Years (New York: Plenum Press, 1980).

David F. Musto, The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic Control (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973; New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

J. Kaplan, Marihuana: The New Prohibition (New York: World Pub. Co., 1970).

L. Grinspoon, Marijuana Reconsidered (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).
[6]Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind: An Interpretation of American Thought and Character Since the 1880’s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950); George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of the Modern America 1900-1912 (Harper & Row: New York, 1958); Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F. D. R. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966); Merle Curti, The Growth of American Thought, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1964); William E. Leutchenburg, The Perils of Prosperity 1914-32, 8th Imp. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).
[7]Ibid. Also see Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought, rev. ed. (New York: George Brazillers, Inc., 1955).

[8]Bonnie and Whitebread, pp. 21-27.
[9]For a full explanation of the information contained in this paragraph see the works of the decriminalization scholars: op. cit., note 5, p. 3.

[10]The Federal Bureau of Narcotics was an independent division of the Treasury Department.

[11]Bonnie and Whitebread, The Marihuana Conviction, pp. 127-153.

[12]The following books comprise the second generation of legalization literature:

Jack Herer, Hemp & The Marijuana Conspiracy: The Emperor Wears No Clothes (Van Nuys, California: HEMP Publishing, 1st printing 1985, 7th ed. 1991).

Jack Frazier, The Great American Hemp Industry (Peterstown, West Virginia: Solar Age Press, 1991).

Chris Conrad, HEMP: Lifeline to the Future (Los Angeles, California: Creative Xpressions Publications, 1993).

[13]Herer, The Emperor, pp. 21-27; Conrad, HEMP, pp. 38-43.

[14]Herer, The Emperor, pp. 22-27; Conrad, HEMP, pp. 39-43.

[15]Herer, The Emperor, pp. 22-24. Quoting E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Company, Annual Report, 1937.

[16]Herer, The Emperor, pp. 22-24; Conrad, HEMP, pp. 40-43.

[17]Herer, The Emperor, pp. 24-25; Conrad, HEMP, pp. 42-43.

[18]“Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[19]Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, 1929) pp. 93-96, 1521-1546; John Loomis, “Who Owns the Daily Press?” The Nation 128 (Apr. 17, 1929): 446.

[20]Congressional Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, 1933) pp. 4777-4779.
[21]Ferdinand Pecora, Wall Street Under Oath: The Story of Our Modern Money Changers, (New York: August M. Kelley Publishers, 1968) pp. 5-6. 22Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard, America in Midpassage, 2 vol. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1939) pp. 156-191. Matthew Josephson, The Money Lords: The Great Finance Capitalists 1925-1950. (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1972).
[22]Lyster H. Dewey, “Hemp,” Yearbook of the United States Department of Agriculture, 1913, pp. 289-290. The modern names are: bhang, ganja, hanf, hamp, hemp, chanvre, cañamo, kannab, and cannabis. Also see Jack Herer, Hemp & The Marijuana Conspiracy: The Emperor Wears No Clothes (Van Nuys, California: HEMP Publishing, 1991) p. 49.
[23]Herodotus, The Histories B. 4: 71-76, trans. Aubrey de Sélincourt, ed. A. R. Burn, (Viking Penguin, Inc.: New York, 1972) pp. 294-295.
[24]Ibid, B. 4: 71-76.Another citation occurs in B. 1: 202.Also see Ernest Abel, Marihuana: The First Twelve Thousand Years (Plenum Press: New York, 1980) pp. 3-35; Herer, pp. 49-56; Chris Conrad, HEMP: Lifeline to the Future (Los Angeles, California: Creative Xpressions Publications, 1993) pp. 2-22; Jack Frazier, The Great American Hemp Industry (Peterstown, West Virginia: Solar Age Press, 1991) pp. 1-47..

[25]Abel, Marihuana, p. 61-109; Herer, The Emperor, pp. 49-56; Conrad, HEMP, pp. 2-22.
[26]Andre Blum, The Origin of Paper (New York: R.R. Bowker Co., 1934) p. 16. Quoted from Frazier, Great American Hemp Industry, p. 52. Also see Abel, Marihuana, pp. 7-9.
[27]William Irwin Thompson, At the Edge of History, (New York: Harper & Row, 1971) p. 124. Quoted from Frazier, Great American Hemp Industry, p. 52.

[28]Abel, Marihuana, pp. 61-75; Frazier, Great American Hemp Industry, p. 52.

[29]Abel, Marihuana, pp. 76-91; Conrad, HEMP, pp. 23-37, 304-305.
[30]Andrew A Wright and Lyster H. Dewey, Hemp Fiber Production, Dec., 1933; Cornelius J. Kelly, Narcotic Agent, to James J. Biggins, District Supervisor, Dec., 19, 1939, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[31]Lyster H. Dewey, “Hemp Fiber Losing Ground Despite Its Valuable Qualities,” Yearbook of the United States Department of Agriculture, 1931, pp. 285-286.
[32]L. Ethan Ellis, Print Paper Pendulum: Group Pressure and the Price of Newsprint, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1948), pp. 1-2.
[33]F. P. Veitch, Paper Making Materials and their Conservation, United States Department of Agriculture, Circ. 41 (Dec., 1908).
[34]C. J. Brand, “Utilization of Crop Plants in Paper Making,” Yearbook of the United States Department of Agriculture, 1910, p. 338 [Italics are mine].
[35]C. J. Brand, Crop Plants for Papermaking, United States Department of Agriculture, Circ. 82 (Aug. 31, 1911).
[36]Savero Ragno, “Paper from Refuse Hemp Stalks,” Pulp Paper Magazine of Canada, 2, no. 10 (Oct. 1904): 291-292.

[37]”Hemp Waste for Paper,” Pulp Paper Magazine, Canada 4, no. 3 (Mar. 1906): 79-90.
[38]W. B. Snow, “Quality of Paper for Permanent Use,” Paper Trade Journal 46, no. 12 (Mar. 1908). Also see; Permanence and Durability of Paper: an annotated bibliography of the technical literature from 1885 A. D. - 1939 A. D., U. S. Bureau of Standards Technical Bulletin, no. 22 (Washington, 1940).
[39]L. H. Dewey and J. L. Merrill, Hemp Hurds as Papermaking Material, United States Department of Agriculture Bulletin No. 404 (Oct. 14, 1916).

[40]Ibid, pp. 1-6.

[41]Ibid, pp. 7-9.

[42]Ibid, pp. 7-9.

[43]Ibid, p. 24.

[44]Ibid, p. 24.

[45]Ibid. p. 25.

[46]Ibid, p. 25.
[47]Abstracts appear in: Paper Mill 39, no. 44 (Oct. 28, 1916): 42-44; no 45 (Nov. 4, 1916): 12, 14, 24, 26; Pulp Paper Magazine Canada 15, no. 2 (Jan. 11, 1917): 53, 62; Paper 19, no. 7 (Oct. 25, 1917): 18-19; Chemical Abstracts 11: 1299. Quoting Clarence J. West, Papermaking Properties of Flax and Hemp, Bibliographic Series Number 62, (The Institute of Paper Chemistry: Appleton, Wisconsin, 1939).

[48]Ellis, Print Paper Pendulum, p. 130.
[49]E. R. Schwalbe and Ernest Becker, “The Chemical Composition of Flax and Hemp Chaff,” Z. Angew. Chem. 32, no. 1 (1919): 126-129; Chemical Abstracts 13: 3315. Quoting Clarence J. West, Papermaking Properties of Flax and Hemp
[50]B. Rassow and A. Zschenderlein, “Nature of Hemp Wood,” Z. Angew. Chem. 34 (1921): 204-206; Paper Trade Journal 73, no. 15 (Oct. 13, 1921): 46-48; World’s Paper Trade Review 77, no. 14 (Apr. 1922): 1116, 1118; Chemical Abstracts 16: 1150.Quoting Clarence J. West, Papermaking Properties of Flax and Hemp.

[51]Clarence J. West, Paper Trade Journal 73, no. 15 (Oct. 13, 1921): 46, 48.
[52]The debates about developing alternative sources for the production of paper and similar cellulose products started during the 69th Cong., 2nd sess., 1927, and lasted until the 71st Cong., 1st sess., 1929.
[53]L. H. Dewey and J. L. Merrill, Hemp Hurds as Papermaking Material, United States Department of Agriculture Bulletin No. 404 (Oct. 14, 1916).
[54]Savero Ragno, “Paper from Refuse Hemp Stalks,” Pulp Paper Magazine, Canada 2, no. 10 (Oct., 1904) : 291-292; “Hemp Waste for Paper,” Pulp Paper Magazine, Canada 4, no. 3 (Mar., 1906): 79-90.
[55]Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, 1929) pp. 1247-1255, 5050-5055.
[56]Clarence J. West, Papermaking Properties of Flax and Hemp, Bibliographic Series Number 62, (The Institute of Paper Chemistry: Appleton, Wisconsin, 1939).
[57]E. R. Schafer and F. A. Simmonds, “Physical and Chemical Characteristics of Hemp Stalks and Seed Flax Straw,” Paper Trade Journal 90, no. 20 (May 15, 1930): 67-70.

[58]Ibid.

[59]Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, 1927) p. 2260.

[60]Ibid, p. 2260.

[61]Ibid, pp. 2260-2263.

[62]Ibid, pp. 2261-2263.
[63]L. H. Dewey and J. L. Merrill, Hemp Hurds as Papermaking Material, United States Department of Agriculture Bulletin No. 404 (Oct. 14, 1916) p. 6.
[64]Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 2nd sess. Wahington, 1927) p. 2262.
[65]Congressional Record, 70th Cong. 2nd sess. (Washington, 1929) p. 1252. Quoting Blair Coan, “Process of Making Print Paper from Cornstalks Suppressed for Twenty Years,” (1928).
[66]Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, 1929) pp. 5053-5054. Quoting The Kasson Call, Jan. 23, 1929.
[67]Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, 1929)p. 337.
[68]Ibid, p. 1183.
[69]Ibid, pp. 1186-1187.
[70]E. R. Schafer and F. A. Simmonds, “Physical and Chemical Characteristics of Hemp Stalks and Seed Flax Straw,” Paper Trade Journal 90, no. 20 (May 15, 1930): 67-70.
[71]United States Department of Agriculture, “Warns Against HEMP exploitation,” The Official Record vol. 10, no. 15, Apr. 11, 1931.
[72]L. H. Dewey and J. L. Merrill, Hemp Hurds as Papermaking Material, United States Department of Agriculture Bulletin No. 404 (Oct. 14, 1916) pp. 1-6.
[73]H. T. Nugent, Field Supervisor, Report of Survey: Commercialized Hemp (1934-35 crop) in the State of Minnesota, Oct. 1938,pp. 1-2, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[74]This decorticating machine was created by John N. Selvig. In 1939, he was reported to be 64 years of age and to have been employed for the past 40 years as a research engineer by the Western Electric Company. Cornelius J. Kelley, Narcotic Agent, to James B. Biggins, District Supervisor, Oct. 6, 1939, p. 6, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[75]H. W. Bellrose, President of the World Fibre Corporation to Elizabeth Bass, District Supervisor, Oct. 14, 1937, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[76]H. T. Nugent, Field Supervisor, Report of Survey: Commercialized Hemp (1934-35 crop) in the State of Minnesota, Oct. 1938,pp. 1-2, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[77]Ibid, p. 3.
[78]Ibid, pp. 3-4.
[79]United States Department of Agriculture, B. B. Robinson, Assistant Plant Breeder Bureau of Plant Industry, to Commissioner Anslinger, Nov. 23, 1935, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[80]H. T. Nugent, Field Supervisor, Report of Survey: Commercialized Hemp (1934-35 crop) in the State of Minnesota, Oct. 1938, pp. 4-5, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[81]Ibid, pp. 5-6.
[82]Clarence J. West, Papermaking Properties of Flax and Hemp, Bibliographic Series Number 62, (The Institute of Paper Chemistry: Appleton, Wisconsin, 1939).
[83]H. T. Nugent, Field Supervisor, Report of Survey: Commercialized Hemp (1934-35 crop) in the State of Minnesota, Oct. 1938, pp. 5-6, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[84]Ibid, pp. 6-7.
[85]Ibid, p. 7.
[86]B. B. Robinson, Bureau of Plant Industry, to Commissioner Anslinger, Nov. 23, 1935, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives. Also see: H. T. Nuggent, Field Supervisor, to Commissioner Anslinger, Nov. 12, 1938, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives. The president of the Nebraska Fiber Corporation was Dr. J. M. Johnson. It was organized in 1935 for the purpose of cultivating and selling hemp to processors. In the spring of 1935, the compnay contracted for 4000 acres to be grown amog local farmers. The harvest was successful, bu afterwards the company was unable to find a purchaser. This development probably influenced the company’s decision to cease its operations the following year.
[87]Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, 1929) pp. 3011-3013. The company was the Cornstalks Products Company, Danville, Illinios.
[88]Cornelius J. Kelly, Narcotic Agent, to James J. Biggins, District Supervisor, Decortication of Hemp, Danville, Illinois, Oct. 6, 1939, pp. 4-5, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives. Also see: B. B. Robinson, Bureau of Plant Industry, to Commissioner Anslinger, Nov. 23, 1935, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[89]Cornelius J. Kelly, Narcotic Agent, to James J. Biggins, District Supervisor, Decortication of Hemp, by Matt Rens Hemp Co., Brandon, Wis., Dec. 19, 1939, p. 6, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.

[90]Cornelius J. Kelly, Narcotic Agent, to James J. Biggins, District Supervisor, Decortication of Hemp, Danville, Illinois, Oct. 6, 1939, pp. 4-5, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives. Also see: B. B. Robinson, Bureau of Plant Industry, to Commissioner Anslinger, Nov. 23, 1935, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[91]Ernest L. Abel, Marihuana: The First Twelve Thousand Years (New York: Plenum Press, 1980) pp. 122-132.
[92]Ibid.
[93]Jack Herer, Hemp & The Marijuana Conspiracy: The Emperor Wears No Clothes, (Van Nuys, California: HEMP Publishing, 1991) pp. 61-62. In 1860 cannabis was listed as a treatment for: neuralgia, nervous rheumatism, mania, whooping coughs, asthma, chronic bronchitis, muscular spasms, tetanus, epilepsy, infantile convulsions, palsy, uterine hemorrage, dysmenorrhea, hysteria, withdrawl from alcohol, and loss of appetite.
[94]Mrs. Seymour Gertrude to Commissioner Anslinger (taken from 1937 folder), “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.Mrs. Gertrude informed Commissioner Anslinger of the existence of U. S. Department of Agriculture Farmer’s Bulletin No. 663 (1915), which told farmers how to cultivate hemp and opium poppies for pharmaceutical purposes. Commissioner Anslinger had this document censored.
[95]Chris Conrad, HEMP: Lifeline to the Future (Los Angeles, California: Creative Xpressions Publications, 1993) pp. 15-16; Abel, Marihuana, pp. 170-185; Herer, The Emperor, pp. 11, 31-32, 61-62.
[96]David F. Musto, The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic Control (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987) p. 216.
[97]Richard J. Bonnie and Charles H. Whitebread II, The Marihuana Conviction: A History of Marihuana Prohibition in the United States (Charlottesville, Virginia: University of Virginia Press, 1974) p. 51.
[98]Ibid, p. 33.
[99]Ibid, p. 38.
[100]Abel, Marihuana, pp. 203-204, 212-213.
[101]Bonnie and Whitebread, The Marihuana Conviction, p. 33.
[102]Ibid, p. 37.
[103]“Our Home Hasheesh Crop,” Literary Digest 89 (1926): 64.
[104]Bonnie and Whitebread, The Marihuana Conviction, p. 37.Under the stipulations of the Pure Food and Drug Act the Chief of the Bureau of Chemistry at the Department of Agriculture was responsible for overseeing the Act’s importation restrictions.
[105]Bonnie and Whitebread, The Marihuana Conviction, p. 37.
[106]Ibid, p. 55.
[107]Ibid, p. 54. Original source: Reginald Smith, Report of Investigation in the State of Texas, Particularly along the Mexican Border, of the Traffic in, and Consumption of the Drug Generally known as ‘Indian Hemp’ or Cannabis Indica, Known in Mexico and States Bordering the Rio Grande as ‘Marihuana’; sometimes also referred to as ‘Rosa Maria,’ or ‘Juanita’ filed by R. F. Smith to Dr. Alsberg, Chief of the Bureau of Chemistry, Department of Agriculture, Apr. 13, 1917.
[108]Abel, Marihuana, p. 205-207.
[109]United States Department of War, Report of Committee appointed per letter from the Governor dated April 1, 1925, for the purpose of investigating the use of Marihuana and making recommendations regarding the same. Balboa Heights, Canal Zone: December 18, 1925.
[110]Abel, Marihuana, pp. 214-220; Bonnie and Whitebread, The Marihuana Conviction, pp. 42-47; Herer, The Emperor, pp. 65-68; Conrad, HEMP, pp. 55, 197-198; “Facts and Fancies about Marihuana,” Literary Digest 122 (Oct. 24, 1936): 7-8..
[111]Ibid.
[112]Abel, Marihuana, p. 148. Hashish had been reintroduced into the West by Napoleon during his Egyptian campaign. Silvestre de Sacy, one of the three scientists Napoleon included on his expedition, was the first Westerner to conduct experiments with hashish. Based on his observations, de Sacy noted that hashish could induce ecstasy, delirium, insanity, and even death
[113]Ibid, pp. 151-153.
[114]Abel, Marihuana, pp. 148-149; Bonnie and Whitebread, The Marihuana Conviction, pp. 143-145.
[115]Abel, Marihuana, pp. 172-175.
[116]Two examples: A. E. Fossier, “The Marihuana Menace,” New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal 44 (1931); E. Stanley, “Marihuana as a developer of Criminals,” American Journal of Police Science 2 (1931). Quoted from Abel, pp. 216-217.
[117]Bonnie and Whitebread, The Marihuana Conviction, p. 56.
[118]Ibid, pp. 56-59.
[119]Herer, The Emperor, p. 22.
[120]Bonnie and Whitebread, The Marihuana Conviction, p. 65-66.
[121]Ibid, pp. 79-82.
[122]Ibid, p. 84-92.
[123]Ibid, pp. 77-76.
[124]Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 12, 1931. Quoting Bonnie and Whitebread, The Marihuana Conviction,pp. 76-77.
[125]Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 3, 1931. Quoting Bonnie and Whitebread, The Marihuana Conviction,pp. 76-77.
[126]New York Times, Sept. 16, 1931, 37:2.
[127]Bonnie and Whitebread, The Marihuana Conviction, p. 85.
[128]Dr. Lyster H. Dewey and Dr. Andrew H. Wright, Hemp Fiber Production, Dec. 1933, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[129]Dr. Andrew H. Wright to Commissioner Anslinger, Mar. 28, 1934; Dr. Lyster H. Dewey to Commissioner Anslinger, Apr. 5, 1934, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[130]Commissioner Anslinger to Dr. Andrew H. Wright, Apr. 7, 1934, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.

[131]Michael Schaller, “The Federal Prohibition of Marihuana,” Journal of Social History, v. 4, no. 1 (Fall 1970): 65. Also see: Bonnie and Whitebread, The Marihuana Conviction, p. 98.Quoting from two public statements made by the Bureau, one which appeared in 1933 and the other in 1936.The 1933 statement explained the need for a Uniform Narcotic Drug Law and emphasized international obligations of the United States, the need for more effective coordination in law enforcement, and the impact the law would have on the incidence of morphine, *******, and opium addiction. In his latter statement, however, Commissioner Anslinger demonstrated the Bureau’s new emphasis as he devoted more than half his time to a discussion of the ‘worst evil of all,’ the marihuana problem. The statement from 1933: “Official Statement on the Need for Uniform Narcotic Drug Act,” Federal Bureau of Narcotics White Paper circulated to all legislators, July 1933. The statement from 1936: H. J. Anslinger, “The Need for Narcotic Eductation,” speech over NBC, 24 Feb. 1936.
[132]Bonnie and Whitebread, The Marihuana Conviction, pp. 94-100. The authors cite a combination of the following rationale as the motivating force behind the final assualt of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics against marihuana: “1) bureaucratic exigencies; 2) moral crusade; 3) the Bureau believed its own propaganda.” p. 94.
[133]Ibid, pp. 94-100. The evidence cited by Bonnie and Whitebread to support this contention dated from 1935 and 1936. As such, the emergence of the Bureau’s final assualt against marihuana was preceded chronologically by their awareness of the new developments in the hemp industry.
[134]M. A. McCall, Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Plant Industry, to Helen Howell Moorehead, Secretary of the League of Nations Opium and Dangerous Drugs Advisory Committee, Foreign Policy Association, May, 22, 1935, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[135]Ibid. This document was the earliest dated evidence in the collection: “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives, to suggest that the Federal Bureau of Narcotics was aware of the new developments in the hemp industry.

[136]Check the Reader’s Guide to Periodical Literature under: Farm Wastes: 1920-37. Three articles which represent this body of literature: Paul Paddock, “Wealth from Farm Waste,” Popular Mechanics 51 (Jan, 1929): 67-70; Patrick Duffy, “Money from Farm Waste,” Popular Mechanics 53 (May, 1930): 755-56; “New Uses for Old Crops,” Popular Mechanics 62 (Sept., 1934): 354-57.
[137]The debates began during the 69th Cong., 2nd sess., and concluded during the 71st Cong., 1st sess.
[138]United States Department of Agriculture, “Warns Against HEMP exploitation,” The Official Record, vol. 10, no. 15, Apr. 11, 1931.
[139]H. T. Nugent, Field Supervisor, Report of Survey: Commercialized Hemp (1934-35 crop) in the State of Minnesota, Oct. 1938 p. 2, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[140]H. W. Bellrose, President of the World Fibre Corporation, to Elizabeth Bass, District Supervisor, Chicago, Illinois, Oct. 12, 1937, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[141]B. B. Robinson, Bureau of Plant Industry, to Commissioner Anslinger, Nov. 23, 1935, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[142]B. B. Robinson, Bureau of Plant Industry, to Commissioner Anslinger, Feb. 26, 1937, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[143]F. D. Richey, Bureau of Plant Industry, to Commissioner Anslinger, Dec. 31, 1937, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[144]B. B. Robinson, Bureau of Plant Industry, to Commissioner Anslinger, Nov. 23, 1935, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[145]B. B. Robinson, Bureau of Plant Industry, to Commissioner Anslinger, Feb. 26, 1937, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[146]F. D. Richey, Bureau of Plant Industry, to Commissioner Anslinger, Dec. 31, 1937, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[147]Commissioner Anslinger to B. B. Robinson, Bureau of Plant Industry, 1935, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[148]This file is presently lost.Interview between author and Drug Enforcement Agency Freedom of Information Specialist, Feb. 1994.
[149]“Ind. Tech. Sec.” Paper Trade Journal v. 101 (July-Dec., 1935). Also see “Ind. Tech. Sec.” Paper Trade Journal v. 102-106 (1936-1938).
[150]Commissioner Anslinger to Elizabeth Bass, District Supervisor, Sept. 28, 1936, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[151]Elizabeth Bass, District Supervisor, to Commissioner Anslinger, Sept. 30, 1936, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[152]Elizabeth Bass, District Supervisor, to Commissioner Anslinger, Oct. 6, 1936, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[153]Commissioner Anslinger to Elizabeth Bass, District Supervisor, Nov. 2, 1936, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[154]Elizabeth Bass, District Supervisor, to Commissioner Anslinger, Nov. 3, 1936, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[155]Elizabeth Bass, District Supervisor, to Commissioner Anslinger, Nov. 5, 1936, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[156]Ibid.
[157]Elizabeth Bass, District Supervisor, to Commissioner Anslinger, Nov. 6, 1936, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives. The Chicago Tribune article was attached to the communication and its author was Frank Ridgway.
[158]It is possible that any further information regarding the experimental work involving the Chicago Tribune would have been filed away in the 1936 general file which is presently lost.
[159]L. F. Dixon, Champagne Paper Corporation, to Dr. Robinson, Bureau of Plant Industry, Jan. 18, 1937, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[160]Commissioner Anslinger to A. F. Sievers, Senior Biochemist United States Department of Agriculture, Feb. 2, 1937, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[161]G. P. Smith, Attorney at Law, Mankato, Minnesota to The Hon. Elmer J. Smith, Congressman Minnesota, June 12, 1937, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[162]Ibid.
[163]Commissioner Anslinger to The Hon. Elmer J. Ryan, June 29, 1937, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[164]Michael Schaller, “The Federal Prohibition of Marihuana,” Journal of Social History, v. 4, no. 1 (Fall 1970) p. 66.
[165]U. S. Bureau of Narcotics, Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs for the Year Ended December 31, 1937 (Washington, 1938) p. 51.
[166]Richard J. Bonnie and Charles H. Whitebread II, The Marihuana Conviction: A History of Marihuana Prohibition in the United States (Charlottesville, Virginia: University of Virginia Press, 1974) p. 94. Also see op. cit. note 129.
[167]Jack Herer, Hemp & The Marijuana Conspiracy: The Emperor Wears No Clothes (Van Nuys, California: HEMP Publishing, 1991) p. 27; “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives. The file appeared to consist of a folder labelled “CRIME.”
[168]Herer, The Emperor, pp. 21-26; Schaller, “The Federal Prohibition of Marihuana,” pp. 65-74; Bonnie and Whitebread, pp. 92-126; Ernest Abel, Marihuana: The First Twelve Thousand Years (New York: Plenum Press, 1980) pp. 237-247; Chris Conrad, Hemp: Lifeline to the Future (Los Angeles, California: Creative Xpressions Publications, 1993) pp. 38-55.
[169]Bonnie and Whitebread, The Marihuana Conviction, pp. 103-112.
[170]Ibid, pp. 103-112.
[171] “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives. In a series of correspondence, which continued from 1935 to 1937 George Halliday, a New York-based jounalist, expressed his dismay to the Bureau regarding the exploitation of the marihuana issue by certain morality groups such as the General Federation of Women. According to Halliday, there was no truth to the sensationalistic accounts of marihuana’s evils being proliferated by these organizations. Halliday expressed the desire to publish a truthful account and contacted the Bureau since he figured that they would be interested in the truth. However, he was wrong on this point. The Commissioner politely informed Halliday that the Bureau had no need for such help.
[172]Schaller, “The Federal Prohibition of Marihuana,” p. 67.
[173]Herer, The Emperor, p. 27; Schaller, “The Federal Prohibition of Marihuana,” p. 66; Bonnie and Whitebread, The Marihuana Conviction, pp. 127-153; Conrad, HEMP, pp.46-48.
[174]Bonnie and Whitebread, The Marihuana Conviction, pp. 148-149.
[175]Schaller, “The Federal Prohibition of Marihuana,” p. 74.
[176]Bonnie and Whitebread, The Marihuana Conviction, pp. 127-153.
[177]The two bill were: S. 1615, Senator Carl A. Hatch, New Mexico; H. R. 6145, Congressman John J. Dempsey, New Mexico.
[178]Bonnie and Whitebread, The Marihuana Conviction, p. 119.
[179]Ibid, pp. 119-124.
[180]League of Nations Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, Report prepared by Dr. J. Bouquet [O.C. 1542 (0)], 17 Feb. 1937.
[181]Ibid, pp. 33-34.
[182]Ibid, p. 33.

[183]Ibid, p. 40.
[184]U. S. Senate, Hearings on the Taxation of Marihuana Before a Subcommittee of the Senate on Finance, 75th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, 1937) p. 12.
[185]U. S. Congress, Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and Means on H. R. 6385, 75th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, 1937) p. 92. Quoting Schaller, p. 71.
[186]Schaller, “Thr Federal Prohibition of Marihuana,” p. 71.
[187]U. S. Congress, Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and Means on H. R. 6385, 75th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, 1937); U. S. Senate, Hearings on the Taxation of Marihuana Before a Subcommittee of the Senate on Finance, 75th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, 1937); “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives:Series of correspondence between the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and the various commercial concerns in the hemp industry.
[188]Herer, The Emperor, p. 26. Information from an interview between Jack Herer and Jerry Colby, author of Du Pont Dynasties, (Lyle Steward, 1984).
[189]Regulations No. 1 Relating to the Importation, Manufacture, Production, Compounding, Sale, Dealing In, Dispensing, Prescribing, Administering, and Giving Away Of MARIHUANA, Under the Act of August 2, 1937, Public, No. 238, 75th Congress, Narcotic Internal Revenue Regulations, Joint Marihuana Regulations made by the Commissioner of Narcotics and the Commissioner of the Internal revenue with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, Effective date, October 1, 1937, (Washington, 1937).
[190]Ibid, pp. 52-53.
[191]Ellis, Print Paper Pendulum, pp. 130-149. Also see: U. S. Senate, Letter from the Chairman of the FTC transmitting in response to S. Res. No. 337 (70th Cong.) A Report on Certain Phases of the Newsprint Industry, 71st Cong., Sp. sess., July 8, 1930, Senate Doc. 214; Thomas D. Clark, The Greening of the South: The Recovery of Land and Forest, (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1984) pp. 119-120.
[192]John Loomis, The Nation, “Who Owns the Daily Press?” v. 128,n. 3328 (Apr. 17, 1929): 446. Also see Ellis, Print Paper Pendulum, pp. 8. “His organization [the newspaper publisher], the ANPA, is one of the most effective of pressure groups to whose desires official Washington gives careful heed.”
[193]Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, 1929) pp. 1336-1339. Senator Schall’s investigation was Senate Resolution 292, 70th Cong., 2nd sess.
[194]Federal Trade Commission, NEWSPRINT PAPER INDUSTRY: Letter from the chairman of the FTC - Transmitting in Response to S. Res. No. 337 (70th Cong.) A Report on Certain Phases of the Newsprint Paper Industry, 71st Cong., Sp. sess., July 8, 1930, Senate Doc. 214, p. 114.
[195]New York Times, “Hearst Interests Aquire Canada stock, Relinquishing Shares in Their Own Subsidiary,” Sept. 19,1930, 39: 2.
[196]John A. Guthrie, The Newsprint Industry: An Economic Analysis (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1941) p. 68. Also see: Ellis L. Ethan, Newsprint Producers, Publishers, Political Pressures, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1960) p. 23.
[197]Bonnie and Whitebread, The Marihuana Conviction, pp. 100-101.
[198]Beard, America in Midpassage, p. 192.
[199]Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, 1929) p. 1246, 1252.
[200]Ibid., p. 1252.In 1928, Blair Coan wrote: “About twenty years ago a chemist working in the Department of Agriculture discovered that white paper could be produced cheaper and better by using the cellulose of field crops than by the conversion of spruce wood. Also see: pp. 1336-1339, 5044-5050; and p. 24 of this thesis.
[201]C. J. Brand, “Utilization of Crop Plants in Paper Making,” Yearbook of the United States Department of Agriculture, 1910, p. 338 [Italics are mine]; also see pp. 23-24 of this thesis.
[202]Lyster H. Dewey, “Hemp,” Yearbook of the United States Department of Agriculture, 1913, pp. 282-346; L. H. Dewey and J. L. Merril, Hemp Hurds as Papermaking Material, United States Department of Agriculture Bulletin No. 404 (Oct. 14, 1916); also see pp. 23-32 of this thesis.
[203] New York Times, “Cornstalk Paper Not Satisfactory,” Mr. 10, 1929, III 2:4.
[204]Ibid.
[205]Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, 1929) p. 1246.
[206]New York Times, “Cornstalk Paper,” Mr. 24, 1929, III 5:8.
[207]Suggestions began to surface during the alternative source debate for farm wastes: Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, 1929) p. 1339.
[208]New York Times, “‘Golden Rod Paper’ Fails,” F. 6, 1932, 32:3.
[209]U. S. Senate, National Pulp and Paper Requirements,74th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington 1933) Senate Doc. 115, p. 10.
[210]New York Times, “Roosevelt Approves Development of New Southern Industry,” Je. 7, 1934, 2:6.
[211]New York Times, “RFC to Aid South’s Pulp Mills,” F 1, 1935, 37:3; “RFC Aid Predicted on Pine Newsprint,” Mr. 8, 1935, 18:5.
[212]New York Times, “Challenge Found in Newsprint Cost,” Ap. 22, 1937, 15:3; “Publishers Foster U. S. Paper Industry,” Ap. 23, 1937, 16:2; “Newspapers Printed on Slash Pine Paper,” Je. 27, 1937, 19:1.
[213]New York Times, “Paper Concern Gets Loan,” N. 30, 1938, 32:2; “Texas Newsprint Near,” D. 4, 1938, 36:1.
[214]Michael Williams, Americans and their Forests: A Historical Geography, (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1989) pp. 287-288.
[215]David P. West, “Fiber Wars: The Extinction of Kentucky Hemp,” Hemp Today, ed. Ed Rosenthal (Oakland, CA: Quick American Archives, 1994) p. 40.
[216]United States Department of Agriculture, “Warns Against HEMP exploitation,” The Official Record, vol. 10, No. 15, Apr. 11, 1931.
[217]National Archives, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” H. T. Nugent, Field Supervisor, Report of Survey: Commercialized Hemp (1934-35 crop) in the State of Minnesota, Oct. 1938, pp. 6-7.
[218]Helen Moorehead, Foreign Policy Association, to Commissioner Anslinger, Mar. 23, 1938. In regard to an interview held on Mar. 22, 1938 by Helen Moorehead and Dr. McCall, Dr. Barre, and Dr. Robinson of the Department of Agriculture Bureau of Plant Industry, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives. Also see: Marihuana Conference,Bureau of Internal Revenue Building, (Room 3003), Washington, D.C. Called by the Bureau of Narcotics of the United States Treasury Department, Presided over by Mr. H. J. Anslinger, Commissioner of Narcotics, and Mr. H. J. Wollner, Consulting Chemist, Treasury Department, Dec. 5, 1938.
[219]Congressional Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, 1933) p. 4778.
[220]Herer, The Emperor, p.23.
[221]William Haynes, Cellulose: The Chemical that Grows, (NY: Doubleday, 1953) pp. 280-287.
[222]Thomas D. Clark, The Greening of the South: The Recovery of Land and Forest, (Lexington, KY: Unversity of Kentucky Press, 1984) pp. 114-132.
[223]New York Times, “South’s Paper to Boom,” N. 27, 1938, III, 9:8.
[224]Congressional Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, 1933) p. 4778.
[225]For verification see Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, 1929) pp. 93-96, 1521-1546; 71st Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, 1930) pp. 12269-12278; 72nd Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, 1932) pp. 15195-15204; 72nd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, 1933) pp. 4769-4780.
[226]H. T. Nugent, Field Supervisor, Report of Survey: Commercialized Hemp (1934-35 crop) in the State of Minnesota, Oct. 1938, p. 8, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[227]Ibid, p. 8.
[228]Ibid, p. 9.
[229]Harry H. Strauss, “Paper from Flax and Hemp,” Farm Chemurgic Journal no. 1 (Sept. 1937): 32-36.
[230]U.S. Congress, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Finance on H. R. 6906, 75th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, 1937) pp. 28-32.
[231]H. T. Nugent, Field Supervisor, Report of Survey: Commercialized Hemp (1934-35 crop) in the State of Minnesota, Oct. 1938, pp. 8-9, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[232]“Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[233]The Marihuana Problem, Dec. 1937, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[234]Dr. Wollner, Consulting Chemist, to Commissioner Anslinger, Feb. 14, 1938, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[235]Henry Morgenthau Jr., Secretary of the Treasury, to Henry A. Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture, Mar. 25, 1938, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[236]W. R. Gregg, Acting Secretary of Agriculture, to Henry Morgenthau Jr., Secretary of the Treasury, May 3, 1938, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[237]Helen Moorehead, Foreign Policy Association, to Commissioner Anslinger, Mar. 23, 1938, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives. In regard to an interview held on Mar. 22, 1938, by Helen Moorehead and Dr. M. A. McCall, Dr. H. W. Barre, and Dr. Brittain B. Robinson of the Department of Agriculture Bureau of Plant Industry.
[238]Both men possessed biases. Dr. Andrew H. Wright was employed by the Matt Rens Hemp Company of Brandon, Wisconsin. In essence, he represented this company’s specific interests. Dr. Brittain B. Robinson was employed by the Bureau of Plant Industry which had a record of opposing the new developments in the hemp industry.
[239]Marihuana Conference, Bureau of Internal Revenue Building, (Room 3003), Washington, D.C. Called by the Bureau of Narcotics of the United States Treasury Department, Presided over by Mr. H. J. Anslinger, Commissioner of Narcotics, and Mr. H. J. Wollner, Consulting Chemist, Treasury Department, Dec. 5, 1939.
[240]Ibid, pp. 20-22.
[241]Helen Moorehead, Foreign Policy Association, to Commissioner Anslinger, Mar. 23, 1938. In regard to an interview held on Mar. 22, 1938, by Helen Moorehead and Dr. M. A. McCall, Dr. H. W. Barre, and Dr. Brittain B. Robinson of the Department of Agriculture Bureau of Plant Industry, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[242]Marihuana Conference, Bureau of Internal Revenue Building, (Room 3003), Washington, D.C. Called by the Bureau of Narcotics of the United States Treasury Department, Presided over by Mr. H. J. Anslinger, Commissioner of Narcotics, and Mr. H. J. Wollner, Consulting Chemist, Treasury Department, Dec. 5, 1939, p. 31.
[243]H. W. Bellrose, President of the World Fibre Corporation, to Elizabeth Bass, District Supervisor, Oct. 12, 1937, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[244]H. W. Bellrose, President of the World Fibre Corporation, to Elizabeth Bass, District Supervisor, Oct. 14, 1937, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[245]Popular Mechanics, “The New Billion Dollar Crop,” 69 (Feb. 1938): 238-239.
[246]R. S. Kellogg, The Story of News Print Paper, (Newsprint Service Bureau, NY 1936) pp. 48-49.
[247]H. W. Bellrose, President of the World Fibre Corporation, to Elizabeth Bass, District Supervisor, Oct. 12, 1937, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.The Chicago Tribune article was included in the file.
[248]Will Wood, Acting Commissioner, to H. W. Bellrose, President of the World Fibre Corporation, Nov. 7, 1937, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[249]Frank Ridgway, Agricultural Editor for the Chicago Tribune, to Commissioner Anslinger, Jan. 21, 1938, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[250]Elizabeth Bass, District Supervisor, to Commissioner Anslinger, Mar. 5, 1938, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[251]Elizabeth Bass, District Supervisor, to Commissioner Anslinger, Mar. 10, 1938, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[252]Frank Holton, president of the Northwest Hemp Corporation, to Narcotic Division, Treasury Dept., Oct. 11, 1937, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[253]Commissioner Harry J. Anslinger to the Northwest Hemp Corporation, Oct. 19, 1937, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[254]H. T. Nugent, Field Supervisor, Report of Survey: Commercialized Hemp (1934-35 crop) in the State of Minnesota, Oct. 1938, pp. 10-11, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[255]Ibid, p. 14.
[256]Ibid, pp. 14-18.
[257]Ibid, pp. 18-20.
[258]Ojai A. Lende, Lawyer, Granite Falls, Minnesota, to The Hon. Henrik Shipstead, U.S. Senator, Minnesota, Jan. 27, 1938, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[259]Ojai A. Lende, to the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, Mar. 23, 1938, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[260]Ojai A. Lende, to the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, Apr. 27, 1938, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[261]Ojai A. Lende, to the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, July 5, 1938, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[262]Commissioner Anslinger to Ojai A. Lende, July 1938 (the exact day was smudged during the coping process), “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[263]H. T. Nugent, Field Supervisor, Hemp Situation in Minnesota, Aug. 26, 1938, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[264]Ojai A. Lende to Commissioner Anslinger, Dec. 23, 1938, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[265]Ojai A. Lende to Commissioner Anslinger, Feb. 1, 1939, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[266]Commissioner Anslinger to Ojai A. Lende, Feb. 1939 (the exact date was smudged in the copying process), “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[267]Ojai A. Lende to The Hon. Henrik Shipstead, Feb. 16, 1939, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[268]Senator Henrik Shipstead to Commissioner Anslinger, Feb. 22, 1939, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[269]Commissioner Anslinger to Senator Henrik Shipstead, Feb. 27, 1939, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[270]Ojai A. Lende to The Hon. Henrik Shipstead, Feb. 27, 1939, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[271]Senator Henrik Shipstead to Commissioner Anslinger, Mar. 1, 1939, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[272]Commissioner Anslinger to Senator Henrik Shipstead, Mar. 6, 1939, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[273]Ojai A. Lende to The Hon. Henrik Shipstead, Mar. 20, 1939, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[274]Memorandum to Acting Commissioner Wood and Commissoner Anslinger, Mar. 27, 1939, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[275]Commissioner Anslinger to Senator Henrik Shipstead, Mar. 28, 1939, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[276]Ojai A. Lende to The Hon. Henrik Shipstead, Mar. 31, 1939, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[277]Ojai A. Lende to The Hon. Henrik Shipstead, Apr. 10, 1939, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[278]Senator Henrik Shipstead to Commissioner Anslinger, Apr. 12, 1939, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[279]Commissioner Anslinger to Senator Henrik Shipstead, Apr. 19, 1939, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[280]Harry D. Smith, District Supervisor, to Commissioner Harry J. Anslinger, June, 11, 1941; Harry D. Smith, District Supervisor, to Commissioner Harry J. Anslinger, July, 3, 1941, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[281]Bureau of Plant Industry to Commissioner Anslinger, Dec. 31, 1937, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[282]Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, 1929) pp. 3013-3015.
[283]Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, 1929) pp. 5044-5050.
[284]Cornelius J. Kelly, Narcotic Agent, to Thomas F. Cummins, Acting District Supervisor, Apr. 1, 1940, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[285]Charles A. Beard, “A New Morgan Thesis,” New Republic, v. 89 (Ja. 20, 1937): 350-353; Congressional Record, 70th Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 5044-5049; 72nd Cong., 2nd sess., p. 4778.
[286]M. G. Moksnes to Clinton Hester, Assistant General Counsel Treasury Department, Feb. 7, 1938, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[287]Ibid.
[288]A. L. Tennyson, Chief Legal Advisor, to Commissioner Anslinger, Sept. 22, 1939, pp. 1-2, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[289]Ibid, p. 2-3.
[290]It is highly possible that theletter from the Ford Motor Company pertained to the topic of utilizing hemp for the production of a methanol fuel for its automobiles. Chris Conrad, HEMP: Lifeline to the Future (Los Angeles, California: Creative Xpressions Publications, 1993) p. 40: “In the 1930s, the Ford Motor Company operated a successful bio-mass fuel conversion plant, using cellulose at Iron Mountain, Michigan. Ford engineers extracted methanol, charcoal fuel, tar, pitch, ethyl-acetate and creosote from hemp. These fundamental ingredients for industry could also be made by fossil fuel-related industries.” Conrad cites information from: Hugh Downs, “Dope hope for oil imbroglio?” on ABC radio, Nov. 1990. In this scenario hemp biomass energy conversion would compete with petrofuels.
[291]Ibid, p. 3-4.
[292]Commissioner Anslinger to James Biggins, District Supervisor, Chicago, Illinois, Sept. 27, 1939, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[293]Cornelius J. Kelly, Narcotic Agent, to James Biggins, District Supervisor, Decortication of Hemp, Danville, Illinois, Oct. 6, 1939, p. 1, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[294]Ibid, pp. 2-3.
[295]Ibid, pp. 3-4.
[296]Ibid, pp. 5-6.
[297]Arthur S. Nestor, Fibrous Industries, Inc., Chicago, Illinois, to Commissioner Anslinger, Nov. 22, 1939, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[298]Ibid.
[299]Commissioner Anslinger to A. S. Nestor, Fibrous Industries, Inc., Dec. 5, 1939, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[300]Commissioner Anslinger to Jame J. Biggins, District Supervisor, Dec. 5, 1939, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[301]Commissioner Anslinger to A. S. Nestor, Fibrous Industries, Inc., undated-after Jan. 10, 1940, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[302]A. L. Tennyson to Commissioner Harry J. Anslinger, June 27, 1940, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[303]Cornelius J. Kelly, Narcotic Agent, to James J. Biggins, District Supervisor, Dec. 21, 1939, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[304]Dr. Andrew H. Wright, University of Wisconsin, Department of Agronomy, to Cornelius J. Kelly, Narcotic Agent, Dec. 18, 1939, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[305]Cornelius J. Kelly, Narcotic Agent, to James J. Biggins, District Supervisor, Dec. 19, 1939, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[306]H. M. Lundien, MEMORANDUM ON FILE, Hemp Industry in Wisconsin; Cornelius J. Kelly, Narcotic Agent, to James J. Biggins, District Supervisor, Dec., 19, 1939; Cornelius J. Kelly, Narcotic Agent, to James J. Biggins, District Supervisor, Nov. 20, 1940, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[307]Ernest L. Abel, Marihuana: The First Twelve Thousand Years (New York: Plenum Press, 1980) p. 249.
[308]La Guardia Commission, The Marihuana Problem in the City of New York (Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow Reprint Corp. 1973) pp. 24-25. Quoting from Abel, p. 249.
[309]La Guardia File, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[310]R. Chopra and G. Chopra, “Cannabis Sativa in Relation to Mental Diseases and Crime in India,” Indian Journal of Medical Research 30 (1942): 155-171.
[311]Eli Marcovitz and Henry J. Meyers, “The Marihuana Addict in the Army,” War Medicine 6 (1944): 382-391; “Army Study of Marihuana,” Newsweek, (Jan. 15, 1945).The study reported that marihuana users exhibited undesirable qualities, such as a lack a discipline and motivation.The experimental procedure compared data gathered on 35 soliders (34 African-Americans and 1 caucasian), who performed routine menial tasks, such as sweeping out warehouses.The 34 African-Americans were allowed to use marihuana while the caucasian subject acted as the drug-free control factor.According to the report, the African-Americans were both unmotivated and undisciplined. Needless to say, the use of marihuana was cited for the lack of motivation and discipline, which was observed among the African-Americans.
[312]Jack Herer, The Emperor Wears No Clothes (Van Nuys, California: HEMP Publishing, 1991) p. 28. “Why you ask, was the AMA now on Anslinger’s side in 1944-45 after being against the Marihuana Tax Act in 1937? Answer: since Anslinger’s FBN was responsible for prosecuting doctors who prescribed narcotic drugs for what he, Anslinger, deemed illegal purposes, they (the FBN) had prosecuted more than 3,000 AMA doctors for illegal prescriptions through 1939. In 1939, the AMA made specific peace with Anslinger on marijuana. The results: Only three doctors were prosecuted for illegal drugs of any sort from 1939 to 1949.”
[313]Chris Conrad, HEMP: Lifeline to the Future (Los Angeles, California: Creative Xpressions Publications, 1993) pp. 56-58.
[314]Ibid.
[315]Paul G. Brigham, Narcotic Inspector, to A. B. Crisler, District Supervisor, Minneapolis, Minnesota, Aug. 11, 1944, p. 1, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[316]Paul G. Brigham, Narcotic Inspector, to A. B. Crisler, District Supervisor, Feb. 3, 1945, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[317]R. L. Lapham, Secretary-Treasurer, Northwest Flax Industries, Inc., Winona, Minnesota, to Federal Bureau of Narcotics, Dec. 27, 1944, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[318]David P. West, “Fiber Wars: The Extinction of Kentucky Hemp,” Hemp Today ed. Ed Rosenthal (Oakland, CA: Quick American Archives, 1994) pp. 41-42.
[319]Ibid, pp. 41-42.The Matt Rens Hemp Company of Brandon, Wisconsin, continued to cultivate hemp for the production of fiber until 1958.Competion from synthetic fibers made the business unprofitable. Furthermore, during an interview conducted in 1994, Willard Rens, the son of the company’s founder, Matt Rens, made the following statement regarding the political climate, “I don’t think I would have enjoyed being in the business another five years because of the marihuana problem.”
[320]Noxious Weed File; Dr. H. J. Wollner, Consulting Chemist, to Commissioner Anslinger, Feb. 14, 1938, p. 3, “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” National Archives.
[321]For a thorough listing of federal and state marihuana laws see William B. Eldridge, Narcotics and the Law (Chicago, 1967). Quoting Schaller, “The Federal Prohibition of Marihuana,” p. 74, footnote no. 71.
[322]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and Means on H. R. 3490, 82nd Cong., 1st sess (Washington, 1951) p. 206. Quoting from Abel, p. 253.
[323]Abel, Marihuana, pp. 251-256.
[324]New York Times, Feb. 15, 1970. Quoting from Abel, Marihuana, p. 255.
[325]1962, President Kennedy’s Ad Hoc Panel on Drug Abuse; 1963, President Kennedy’s Advisory Commission on Narcotics and Drug Abuse; 1967, President Johnson’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice; 1972, President Nixon’s Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse (issued: Marihuana - A Signal of Misunderstanding, 1972)
[326]These scholars created the decriminalization movement.
[327]Jack Frazier, The Great American Hemp Industry (Peterstown, West Virginia: Solar Age Press, 1991) p. 48. Frazier’s article first appeared in the British journal: Ecologist, 1974.
[328]Jim Young, “It’s Time to Reconsider Hemp,” Pulp & Paper, (1991). Quoted from Frazier, p.48.
[329]E. P. M. de Meijer, “Hemp Variations as Pulp Source Researched in the Netherlands,” Pulp & Paper, v. 67, no. 7 (July, 1993) p. 43.
[330]Tree Free EcoPaper. 121 SW Salmon #1100, Portland, OR 97204. Quoted from Conrad, p. 125. Also of interest Tim Maylon and Anthony Henman, “No Marihuana: Plenty of Hemp,” New Scientist (Nov. 13, 1980):433-435.
[331]Herer, The Emperor, p. 78. The Federal Bureau of Narcotics was renamed the Drug Enforcenment Agency during the 1960s.
[332]Ibid, p. 78.
[333]Ibid, pp. 78-79. Also see; Gabriel Nahas, Marihuana: Deceptive Weed (New York: Raven Press, 1973).
[334]Herer, The Emperor, p. 79. “Dr. Thomas Ungerlieder, M.D., UCLA, appointed by Richard Nixon in 1969 to the President’s Select Committee on Marijuana, re-appointed by Ford, Carter and Reagan, and currently head of California’s “Marijuana Medical Program; Dr. Donald Tashkin, UCLA, M.D., for the last 14 years the U.S. government’s and the world’s leading marijuana researcher on pulmonary functions; and Dr. Tod Mikuriya, M.D., former national head of the U.S. government research programs in the late 1960s.”
[335]Ibid, pp. 79-80.
[336]Richard Restak, “Brain by Design,” The Sciences, v. 33, n. 5 (Sept/Oct. 1993): 27-33.
[337]D. Paul Stanford, “China, Hemp and Fiber,” Hemp Today ed. Ed Rosenthal (Oakland, CA: Quick American Archives, 1994) pp. 199-201.

You can find the original of this document at History of the Non-Medical Use of Drugs in the United States

To read Part 1 see http://www.420magazine.com/forums/c...monization-marijuana-part-1-a.html#post682281
 
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BILBUS

New Member
You think that Ca. will allow Hemp and Cannabis (shops) to be taxed to allow them to save there economy? Then other states will follow suit all for the revenue aspect?
 
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wm97

New Member
You think that Ca. will allow Hemp and Cannabis (shops) to be taxed to allow them to save there economy? Then other states will follow suit all for the revenue aspect?
If the initiative in 2010 does not pass, there will certainly be another one in 2012 that will. The polls are in favor of it at this point. The only real issue is that the polls have to be waaay in favor of something for the initiative to win.
 
Very informative!! Here is some more grea info as to why marijuana was originally criminalized:

Many people assume that marijuana was made illegal through some kind of process involving scientific, medical, and government hearings; that it was to protect the citizens from what was determined to be a dangerous drug.
The actual story shows a much different picture. Those who voted on the legal fate of this plant never had the facts, but were dependent on information supplied by those who had a specific agenda to deceive lawmakers. You’ll see below that the very first federal vote to prohibit marijuana was based entirely on a documented lie on the floor of the Senate.

You’ll also see that the history of marijuana’s criminalization is filled with:
  • Racism
  • Fear
  • Protection of Corporate Profits,
  • Yellow Journalism
  • Ignorant, Incompetent, and/or Corrupt Legislators
  • Personal Career Advancement and Greed
These are the actual reasons marijuana is illegal.

Background
For most of human history, marijuana has been completely legal. It’s not a recently discovered plant, nor is it a long-standing law. Marijuana has been illegal for less than 1% of the time that it’s been in use. Its known uses go back further than 7,000 B.C. and it was legal as recently as when Ronald Reagan was a boy.
The marijuana (hemp) plant, of course, has an incredible number of uses. The earliest known woven fabric was apparently of hemp, and over the centuries the plant was used for food, incense, cloth, rope, and much more. This adds to some of the confusion over its introduction in the United States, as the plant was well known from the early 1600’s, but did not reach public awareness as a recreational drug until the early 1900’s.
America’s first marijuana law was enacted at Jamestown Colony, Virginia in 1619. It was a law “ordering” all farmers to grow Indian hempseed. There were several other “must grow” laws over the next 200 years (you could be jailed for not growing hemp during times of shortage in Virginia between 1763 and 1767), and during most of that time, hemp was legal tender (you could even pay your taxes with hemp — try that today!) Hemp was such a critical crop for a number of purposes (including essential war requirements – rope, etc.) that the government went out of its way to encourage growth.
The United States Census of 1850 counted 8,327 hemp “plantations” (minimum 2,000-acre farm) growing cannabis hemp for cloth, canvas and even the cordage used for baling cotton.
The Mexican Connection
In the early 1900s, the western states developed significant tensions regarding the influx of Mexican-Americans. The revolution in Mexico in 1910 spilled over the border, with General Pershing’s army clashing with bandit Pancho Villa. Later in that decade, bad feelings developed between the small farmer and the large farms that used cheaper Mexican labor. Then, the depression came and increased tensions, as jobs and welfare resources became scarce.
One of the “differences” seized upon during this time was the fact that many Mexicans smoked marijuana and had brought the plant with them, and it was through this that California apparently passed the first state marijuana law, outlawing “preparations of hemp, or loco weed.”
However, one of the first state laws outlawing marijuana may have been influenced, not just by Mexicans using the drug, but, oddly enough, because of Mormons using it. Mormons who traveled to Mexico in 1910 came back to Salt Lake City with marijuana. The church’s reaction to this may have contributed to the state’s marijuana law. (Note: the source for this speculation is from articles by Charles Whitebread, Professor of Law at USC Law School in a paper for the Virginia Law Review, and a speech to the California Judges Association (sourced below). Mormon blogger Ardis Parshall disputes this.)
Other states quickly followed suit with marijuana prohibition laws, including Wyoming (1915), Texas (1919), Iowa (1923), Nevada (1923), Oregon (1923), Washington (1923), Arkansas (1923), and Nebraska (1927). These laws tended to be specifically targeted against the Mexican-American population.
When Montana outlawed marijuana in 1927, the Butte Montana Standard reported a legislator’s comment: “When some beet field peon takes a few traces of this stuff… he thinks he has just been elected president of Mexico, so he starts out to execute all his political enemies.” In Texas, a senator said on the floor of the Senate: “All Mexicans are crazy, and this stuff [marijuana] is what makes them crazy.”
Jazz and Assassins
In the eastern states, the “problem” was attributed to a combination of Latin Americans and black jazz musicians. Marijuana and jazz traveled from New Orleans to Chicago, and then to Harlem, where marijuana became an indispensable part of the music scene, even entering the language of the black hits of the time (Louis Armstrong’s “Muggles”, Cab Calloway’s “That Funny Reefer Man”, Fats Waller’s “Viper’s Drag”).
Again, racism was part of the charge against marijuana, as newspapers in 1934 editorialized: “Marihuana influences Negroes to look at white people in the eye, step on white men’s shadows and look at a white woman twice.”
Two other fear-tactic rumors started to spread: one, that Mexicans, Blacks and other foreigners were snaring white children with marijuana; and two, the story of the “assassins.” Early stories of Marco Polo had told of “hasheesh-eaters” or hashashin, from which derived the term “assassin.” In the original stories, these professional killers were given large doses of hashish and brought to the ruler’s garden (to give them a glimpse of the paradise that awaited them upon successful completion of their mission). Then, after the effects of the drug disappeared, the assassin would fulfill his ruler’s wishes with cool, calculating loyalty.
By the 1930s, the story had changed. Dr. A. E. Fossier wrote in the 1931 New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal: “Under the influence of hashish those fanatics would madly rush at their enemies, and ruthlessly massacre every one within their grasp.” Within a very short time, marijuana started being linked to violent behavior.
Alcohol Prohibition and Federal Approaches to Drug Prohibition
During this time, the United States was also dealing with alcohol prohibition, which lasted from 1919 to 1933. Alcohol prohibition was extremely visible and debated at all levels, while drug laws were passed without the general public’s knowledge. National alcohol prohibition happened through the mechanism of an amendment to the constitution.
Earlier (1914), the Harrison Act was passed, which provided federal tax penalties for opiates and *******.
The federal approach is important. It was considered at the time that the federal government did not have the constitutional power to outlaw alcohol or drugs. It is because of this that alcohol prohibition required a constitutional amendment.
At that time in our country’s history, the judiciary regularly placed the tenth amendment in the path of congressional regulation of “local” affairs, and direct regulation of medical practice was considered beyond congressional power under the commerce clause (since then, both provisions have been weakened so far as to have almost no meaning).
Since drugs could not be outlawed at the federal level, the decision was made to use federal taxes as a way around the restriction. In the Harrison Act, legal uses of opiates and ******* were taxed (supposedly as a revenue need by the federal government, which is the only way it would hold up in the courts), and those who didn’t follow the law found themselves in trouble with the treasury department.
In 1930, a new division in the Treasury Department was established — the Federal Bureau of Narcotics — and Harry J. Anslinger was named director. This, if anything, marked the beginning of the all-out war against marijuana.

Anslinger was an extremely ambitious man, and he recognized the Bureau of Narcotics as an amazing career opportunity — a new government agency with the opportunity to define both the problem and the solution. He immediately realized that opiates and ******* wouldn’t be enough to help build his agency, so he latched on to marijuana and started to work on making it illegal at the federal level.
Anslinger immediately drew upon the themes of racism and violence to draw national attention to the problem he wanted to create. He also promoted and frequently read from “Gore Files” — wild reefer-madness-style exploitation tales of ax murderers on marijuana and sex and… Negroes. Here are some quotes that have been widely attributed to Anslinger and his Gore Files:
“There are 100,000 total marijuana smokers in the US, and most are Negroes, Hispanics, Filipinos, and entertainers. Their Satanic music, jazz, and swing, result from marijuana use. This marijuana causes white women to seek sexual relations with Negroes, entertainers, and any others.”
“…the primary reason to outlaw marijuana is its effect on the degenerate races.”
“Marijuana is an addictive drug which produces in its users insanity, criminality, and death.”
“Reefer makes darkies think they’re as good as white men.”
“Marihuana leads to pacifism and communist brainwashing”
“You smoke a joint and you’re likely to kill your brother.”
“Marijuana is the most violence-causing drug in the history of mankind.”
And he loved to pull out his own version of the “assassin” definition:
“In the year 1090, there was founded in Persia the religious and military order of the Assassins, whose history is one of cruelty, barbarity, and murder, and for good reason: the members were confirmed users of hashish, or marihuana, and it is from the Arabs’ ‘hashashin’ that we have the English word ‘assassin.’”

Yellow Journalism
Harry Anslinger got some additional help from William Randolf Hearst, owner of a huge chain of newspapers. Hearst had lots of reasons to help. First, he hated Mexicans. Second, he had invested heavily in the timber industry to support his newspaper chain and didn’t want to see the development of hemp paper in competition. Third, he had lost 800,000 acres of timberland to Pancho Villa, so he hated Mexicans. Fourth, telling lurid lies about Mexicans (and the devil marijuana weed causing violence) sold newspapers, making him rich.
Some samples from the San Francisco Examiner:
“Marihuana makes fiends of boys in thirty days — Hashish goads users to bloodlust.”
“By the tons it is coming into this country — the deadly, dreadful poison that racks and tears not only the body, but the very heart and soul of every human being who once becomes a slave to it in any of its cruel and devastating forms…. Marihuana is a short cut to the insane asylum. Smoke marihuana cigarettes for a month and what was once your brain will be nothing but a storehouse of horrid specters. Hasheesh makes a murderer who kills for the love of killing out of the mildest mannered man who ever laughed at the idea that any habit could ever get him….”
And other nationwide columns…
“Users of marijuana become STIMULATED as they inhale the drug and are LIKELY TO DO ANYTHING. Most crimes of violence in this section, especially in country districts are laid to users of that drug.”
“Was it marijuana, the new Mexican drug, that nerved the murderous arm of Clara Phillips when she hammered out her victim’s life in Los Angeles?… THREE-FOURTHS OF THE CRIMES of violence in this country today are committed by DOPE SLAVES — that is a matter of cold record.”
Hearst and Anslinger were then supported by Dupont chemical company and various pharmaceutical companies in the effort to outlaw cannabis. Dupont had patented nylon, and wanted hemp removed as competition. The pharmaceutical companies could neither identify nor standardize cannabis dosages, and besides, with cannabis, folks could grow their own medicine and not have to purchase it from large companies.
This all set the stage for…
The Marijuana Tax Act of 1937.
After two years of secret planning, Anslinger brought his plan to Congress — complete with a scrapbook full of sensational Hearst editorials, stories of ax murderers who had supposedly smoked marijuana, and racial slurs.
It was a remarkably short set of hearings.
The one fly in Anslinger’s ointment was the appearance by Dr. William C. Woodward, Legislative Council of the American Medical Association.
Woodward started by slamming Harry Anslinger and the Bureau of Narcotics for distorting earlier AMA statements that had nothing to do with marijuana and making them appear to be AMA endorsement for Anslinger’s view.
He also reproached the legislature and the Bureau for using the term marijuana in the legislation and not publicizing it as a bill about cannabis or hemp. At this point, marijuana (or marihuana) was a sensationalist word used to refer to Mexicans smoking a drug and had not been connected in most people’s minds to the existing cannabis/hemp plant. Thus, many who had legitimate reasons to oppose the bill weren’t even aware of it.
Woodward went on to state that the AMA was opposed to the legislation and further questioned the approach of the hearings, coming close to outright accusation of misconduct by Anslinger and the committee:
“That there is a certain amount of narcotic addiction of an objectionable character no one will deny. The newspapers have called attention to it so prominently that there must be some grounds for [their] statements [even Woodward was partially taken in by Hearst's propaganda]. It has surprised me, however, that the facts on which these statements have been based have not been brought before this committee by competent primary evidence. We are referred to newspaper publications concerning the prevalence of marihuana addiction. We are told that the use of marihuana causes crime.
But yet no one has been produced from the Bureau of Prisons to show the number of prisoners who have been found addicted to the marihuana habit. An informed inquiry shows that the Bureau of Prisons has no evidence on that point.
You have been told that school children are great users of marihuana cigarettes. No one has been summoned from the Children’s Bureau to show the nature and extent of the habit, among children.
Inquiry of the Children’s Bureau shows that they have had no occasion to investigate it and know nothing particularly of it.
Inquiry of the Office of Education— and they certainly should know something of the prevalence of the habit among the school children of the country, if there is a prevalent habit— indicates that they have had no occasion to investigate and know nothing of it.
Moreover, there is in the Treasury Department itself, the Public Health Service, with its Division of Mental Hygiene. The Division of Mental Hygiene was, in the first place, the Division of Narcotics. It was converted into the Division of Mental Hygiene, I think, about 1930. That particular Bureau has control at the present time of the narcotics farms that were created about 1929 or 1930 and came into operation a few years later. No one has been summoned from that Bureau to give evidence on that point.
Informal inquiry by me indicates that they have had no record of any marihuana of Cannabis addicts who have ever been committed to those farms.
The bureau of Public Health Service has also a division of pharmacology. If you desire evidence as to the pharmacology of Cannabis, that obviously is the place where you can get direct and primary evidence, rather than the indirect hearsay evidence.”
Committee members then proceeded to attack Dr. Woodward, questioning his motives in opposing the legislation. Even the Chairman joined in:
The Chairman: If you want to advise us on legislation, you ought to come here with some constructive proposals, rather than criticism, rather than trying to throw obstacles in the way of something that the Federal Government is trying to do. It has not only an unselfish motive in this, but they have a serious responsibility.
Dr. Woodward: We cannot understand yet, Mr. Chairman, why this bill should have been prepared in secret for 2 years without any intimation, even, to the profession, that it was being prepared.
After some further bantering…
The Chairman: I would like to read a quotation from a recent editorial in the Washington Times:
The marihuana cigarette is one of the most insidious of all forms of dope, largely because of the failure of the public to understand its fatal qualities.
The Nation is almost defenseless against it, having no Federal laws to cope with it and virtually no organized campaign for combating it.
The result is tragic.
School children are the prey of peddlers who infest school neighborhoods.
High school boys and girls buy the destructive weed without knowledge of its capacity of harm, and conscienceless dealers sell it with impunity.
This is a national problem, and it must have national attention.
The fatal marihuana cigarette must be recognized as a deadly drug, and American children must be protected against it.
That is a pretty severe indictment. They say it is a national question and that it requires effective legislation. Of course, in a general way, you have responded to all of these statements; but that indicates very clearly that it is an evil of such magnitude that it is recognized by the press of the country as such.
And that was basically it. Yellow journalism won over medical science.
The committee passed the legislation on. And on the floor of the house, the entire discussion was:
Member from upstate New York: “Mr. Speaker, what is this bill about?”
Speaker Rayburn: “I don’t know. It has something to do with a thing called marihuana. I think it’s a narcotic of some kind.”
“Mr. Speaker, does the American Medical Association support this bill?”
Member on the committee jumps up and says: “Their Doctor Wentworth[sic] came down here. They support this bill 100 percent.”
And on the basis of that lie, on August 2, 1937, marijuana became illegal at the federal level.
The entire coverage in the New York Times: “President Roosevelt signed today a bill to curb traffic in the narcotic, marihuana, through heavy taxes on transactions.”
Anslinger as precursor to the Drug Czars
Anslinger was essentially the first Drug Czar. Even though the term didn’t exist until William Bennett’s position as director of the White House Office of National Drug Policy, Anslinger acted in a similar fashion. In fact, there are some amazing parallels between Anslinger and the current Drug Czar John Walters. Both had kind of a carte blanche to go around demonizing drugs and drug users. Both had resources and a large public podium for their voice to be heard and to promote their personal agenda. Both lied constantly, often when it was unnecessary. Both were racists. Both had the ear of lawmakers, and both realized that they could persuade legislators and others based on lies, particularly if they could co-opt the media into squelching or downplaying any opposition views.
Anslinger even had the ability to circumvent the First Amendment. He banned the Canadian movie “Drug Addict,” a 1946 documentary that realistically depicted the drug addicts and law enforcement efforts. He even tried to get Canada to ban the movie in their own country, or failing that, to prevent U.S. citizens from seeing the movie in Canada. Canada refused. (Today, Drug Czar John Walters is trying to bully Canada into keeping harsh marijuana laws.)
Anslinger had 37 years to solidify the propaganda and stifle opposition. The lies continued the entire time (although the stories would adjust — the 21 year old Florida boy who killed his family of five got younger each time he told it). In 1961, he looked back at his efforts:
“Much of the most irrational juvenile violence and that has written a new chapter of shame and tragedy is traceable directly to this hemp intoxication. A gang of boys tear the clothes from two school girls and rape the screaming girls, one boy after the other. A sixteen-year-old kills his entire family of five in Florida, a man in Minnesota puts a bullet through the head of a stranger on the road; in Colorado husband tries to shoot his wife, kills her grandmother instead and then kills himself. Every one of these crimes had been proceeded [sic] by the smoking of one or more marijuana “reefers.” As the marijuana situation grew worse, I knew action had to be taken to get the proper legislation passed. By 1937 under my direction, the Bureau launched two important steps First, a legislative plan to seek from Congress a new law that would place marijuana and its distribution directly under federal control. Second, on radio and at major forums, such that presented annually by the New York Herald Tribune, I told the story of this evil weed of the fields and river beds and roadsides. I wrote articles for magazines; our agents gave hundreds of lectures to parents, educators, social and civic leaders. In network broadcasts I reported on the growing list of crimes, including murder and rape. I described the nature of marijuana and its close kinship to hashish. I continued to hammer at the facts.
I believe we did a thorough job, for the public was alerted and the laws to protect them were passed, both nationally and at the state level. We also brought under control the wild growing marijuana in this country. Working with local authorities, we cleaned up hundreds of acres of marijuana and we uprooted plants sprouting along the roadsides.”
After Anslinger
On a break from college in the 70s, I was visiting a church in rural Illinois. There in the literature racks in the back of the church was a lurid pamphlet about the evils of marijuana — all the old reefer madness propaganda about how it caused insanity and murder. I approached the minister and said “You can’t have this in your church. It’s all lies, and the church shouldn’t be about promoting lies.” Fortunately, my dad believed me, and he had the material removed. He didn’t even know how it got there. But without me speaking up, neither he nor the other members of the church had any reason NOT to believe what the pamphlet said. The propaganda machine had been that effective.

The narrative since then has been a continual litany of:
  • Politicians wanting to appear tough on crime and passing tougher penalties,
  • Constant increases in spending on law enforcement and prisons,
  • Racist application of drug laws,
  • Taxpayer funded propaganda
  • Stifling of opposition speech
  • Political contributions from corporations that profit from marijuana being illegal (pharmaceuticals, alcohol, etc.)
… but that’s another whole story.

Source: Why is Marijuana Illegal? - Drug WarRant
 
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I swear the more history I learn the more I wish you guys would just go back to europe. I know not all of you are bad but so many of you are that I am old and tired of trying to find the cool white folks. Just today I went to pick my wife from work (she works in one of the local hospitals) and I parked in front left the minivan running and waited for her to come out. I looked around and saw an older white guy standing by his truck in the parking lot so I waved and nodded hello (I was raised to be polite I'm a texan) he waved and nodded and then proceeded to lock his truck and turn on the alarm. Like I'm gonna steal his truck with him standing there! Now I know he doesn't know that I am in constant pain and that just moving causes a symphony of agony but why can't I just be a brown guy that's friendly why do I have to be branded a criminal by virtue of my skin color?

This is just more of that same attitude keep them out well most of my people are from the texas area we just happened to migrate back and forth all year we belong you go.
Let me smoke my weed you go back to europe and and drink.
 
I sure hope Cali. passes that bill.

We had a similar proposal in Nevada in 2006 and it was running around 55% approval in the polls until some big money swooped in and for the last three months leading up to the election there was an absolute blitz of anti marijuana ads. Talkin about how it was gonna ruin good neighborhoods. Oh yeah but the two bars with slot machines in them in every strip mall and every street corner around here, those enhance neighborhoods right.

Ended up getting 44% of the vote. It will be on the ballot again in 2012. Hopefully if Cali. passes in 2010 that will pave the way for Nevada to pass it too.
 
Yellow Journalism
Harry Anslinger got some additional help from William Randolf Hearst, owner of a huge chain of newspapers. Hearst had lots of reasons to help. First, he hated Mexicans. Second, he had invested heavily in the timber industry to support his newspaper chain and didn’t want to see the development of hemp paper in competition. Third, he had lost 800,000 acres of timberland to Pancho Villa, so he hated Mexicans. Fourth, telling lurid lies about Mexicans (and the devil marijuana weed causing violence) sold newspapers, making him rich.
I am glad that you brought this up, I always heard this is the main reason it happen.
 

420 Motoco

Member of the Month: October 2014 - Member of the Year: 2014
Amazing how the majority still believes this propaganda machine to this day. The tide is changing rapidly, even against the billions of dollars our G, pharmies, tobacco & alcohol spend to keep MJ in the basement.
The power of propaganda !
 

420 Motoco

Member of the Month: October 2014 - Member of the Year: 2014
I sure hope Cali. passes that bill.

We had a similar proposal in Nevada in 2006 and it was running around 55% approval in the polls until some big money swooped in and for the last three months leading up to the election there was an absolute blitz of anti marijuana ads. Talkin about how it was gonna ruin good neighborhoods. Oh yeah but the two bars with slot machines in them in every strip mall and every street corner around here, those enhance neighborhoods right.

Ended up getting 44% of the vote. It will be on the ballot again in 2012. Hopefully if Cali. passes in 2010 that will pave the way for Nevada to pass it too.
What a joke that election was...no way to lose that much ground in that short of time. BTW who counted the votes? Money & greed won out again. Basically the same thing happened in Cali the last time. See what happens this time around. Nice post!
 
This story is American-centric, and doesn't really explain why marijuana is banned in almost all countries, including ones that fiercely resist American influence, like Russia, China, and Iran.
 

JBUptown

Well-Known Member
An excellent read, parts 1 and 2 really tell a sad story. As always, politics and money rule us without human conscious. A legal system that arrests and jails people for having a plant, well that's just insane. Americas drug laws are what's really criminal in this matter, not the populace, but the politics and profit machines keep churning and spewing propaganda. I know a perfect society has never existed and never will, but I am embarrassed at what Americans have swallowed as truth and reality regarding cannabis. The propaganda produced by Hearst and Anslinger was criminal, and that we as a nation accepted the lies and deceit as truth is telling.

How on earth did the "majority" of Americans become so gullible?

IMHO ... Because BB tied and connected the "Reefer" to a supposed minority "problem", thus racism and bigotry outshone a communities' common sense. Division by difference is always a negative sum.

Best of Buds

JB

:420:
:Namaste:
 

Weaselcracker

Nug of the Year: 2016 - Member of the Month: Sept 2015, Nov 2016 - Nug of the Month: Oct 2016 - Plant of the Month: May 2016
Television mainly I think. The most powerful everyday tool, when it comes to altering human consciousness. Humans are the ultimately adaptable creature. Capable of believing almost anything with some 'training'. It's a gift and a curse too. We've adapted to living in little concrete boxes, breathing dirty air, sitting in traffic jams and lineups day after day, and eating processed 'food' from packages with no real sense of the systems, natural and artificial, that support us. What it amounts to is- we are easily brainwashed. It's only natural that we adjust to cope with our circumstances. And it's only natural that daily ingestion of hours of bullshit from televisions and other media sources in society can convince us of damn near anything, no matter how insane.
Ok - end of mini rant. :)
 
I swear the more history I learn the more I wish you guys would just go back to europe. I know not all of you are bad but so many of you are that I am old and tired of trying to find the cool white folks. Just today I went to pick my wife from work (she works in one of the local hospitals) and I parked in front left the minivan running and waited for her to come out. I looked around and saw an older white guy standing by his truck in the parking lot so I waved and nodded hello (I was raised to be polite I'm a texan) he waved and nodded and then proceeded to lock his truck and turn on the alarm. Like I'm gonna steal his truck with him standing there! Now I know he doesn't know that I am in constant pain and that just moving causes a symphony of agony but why can't I just be a brown guy that's friendly why do I have to be branded a criminal by virtue of my skin color?

This is just more of that same attitude keep them out well most of my people are from the texas area we just happened to migrate back and forth all year we belong you go.
Let me smoke my weed you go back to europe and and drink.
Racist people scum for sure. Making generalities about someone's shade of skin is messed up. I would say haile selassie had it right. As long as you look it at another person and see only differences your gonna live in constant war. There is only one race. We all are part of it. All this talk about how the drug wars is used by the elite class to control us you would think people on here would know "race" is used the same way. When I saw those kkk people get stomped in anaheim it was by people of all shades.