Convicted in Wa. State with a valid authorization

bsemaj

New Member
In late 2004 I was arrested for having 9.73 grams of medicine. In 2005 the day of trial the State Prosecuting Authority filed a motion to dismiss my case because I had a valid authorization CONTRACT from my specialist. The court disposition of property said RETURN TO OWNER. The judge though wrote on a separate order dismissed without prejudice. The court never ELECTRONICALLY entered the PROPERTY disposition order into their system but, did enter the other order into their system. This gives the impression to anyone reviewing the court file that, I am up for investigation because the case file says DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE yet, the other order shows this is not true as once the state gives your medicine back, they convert the illegal possession of this type substance into possession of lawful type substance which is not unlawful to posses, use, cultivate.

In the mean time, officers have after this case was dismissed decided since the order signed by the judge reads dismissed without prejudice means I am open game to harass and steal from, without any worries of getting in any trouble for their illegal acts. They started just taking my meds and using it for their own recreational purposes. No, they did not turn in my medicine or even tell anyone they took them from me. One went even as far as to take my D/L and keep it, telling me I can not possess a D/L...:popcorn: LOL. He removed approx. 1/8th out of my jar and gave it back to me once his partner explained to him he WILL end up in court over taking my meds and to give them back... So he did but, kept the above.

Subsequently after this specific officer taking my D/L, I went down to the prosecutors office and requested he contact his client to demand the return of my D/L and my 1/8th... a week or so went by and heard no word from anyone.. So i contacted the prosecutors office again and was told maybe I should file a claim against the officer.. So I did, I filed a citizens criminal complaint under WA. state Ct. CLJ rule CrRLJ 2.1 (c) which is a P.C. affidavit filing process which any citizen may file a P.C. complaint with the court clerk in place of the prosecutor. Although, ONLY the prosecutor may actually prosecute the case once P.C. is found.

The idea behind this type of motion is so any citizen may protect their rights when the government won't. This specific rule is used to find P.C. against public employees for liability purposes when the prosecuting interests conflict, I call it a precursor to filing a serious claim against any government employee when you know the conflict is apparent. i.e. the state will not file a criminal case against a law enforcement officer whom just took your property... theft of medicine, or property with ceiling amount in each state which it's elements are a gross-misdemeanor or a misdemeanor.

Anyhow, subsequently after filing this case in court in my county, I was going to see my son on the other side of the state but, 1st needed to pick up some legal files from the print shop for a case he filed. On my way to the print shop in another county, a WSP trooper came flying up behind me, so I pulled over. He went flying past me without even a blink. I pulled back out on the road and about a mile or 2 up the road he had a truck pulled over.. but, he was still in his car with the window 1/2 way down signaling me to pull over...So I did. He went to the truck window and spoke with the driver.. the driver then pulled out on the road and left.

I trooper then proceeded to my car. He asked for my D/L !! Which was in an envelope which I got in the mail just before I left. I handed him the envelope to open as a witness to it being my D/L sent to me by this other LEO.. He denied to saying it could have a poison in it... DID YA CATCH THAT?? A poison? :popcorn: lmfao. Anyhow, he goes back to his patrol car and calls the local prosecutors office for instructions of what to do next... SINCE I DIDN'T HAND HIM MY D/L I COMPLAINED THE OTHER LEO STOLE FROM ME..This guy couldn't write in his report I am a liar. i,e, can't charge me for a crime, YET!!

So upon his return this officer with his metal clip board raps on my passenger side window for me to roll it down...So I did to receive my ticket for some unknown reason. Dude hands me the ticket at the same time unclasping his side arm whilst taking 2 steps backwards and yelling give me all your marijuana NOW!! Where is it?? I thought this clown was going to shoot me for sure beings I fight prohibition as hard as I do...

My hands went in the air as I didn't have a gun with me to even the odds at this moment..lol.:wood: I pointed to my glove box, in which he helped himself to ALL my 30+ grams yet, ONLY reported he turned in 9.59 grams he took from my possession. He also took my court certified authorization so I couldn't claim I was legal.. He gave me a TRAFFIC CITATION but, nothing for the medicine he took... I filed a motion to object to the citation. I subsequently had the case dismissed under pretext. The state never appealed the courts ruling..

Subsequently, I called the prosecutors office to ask for a good day to come pick-up my meds... approx. 45 days later I get summoned to court for possession of marijuana. HUH?? :popcorn: It appears the prosecutor has gone out and decided to charge me after contacting a clinic OWNER, not my signing health-care practitioner according to statute... This person claimed I had a legal contract with them instead, even though this specific person has no license to practice medicine which is against all public policy. Needless to say, my Affirmative defense was denied with the court and state making claim I am not a valid patient with qualifying conditions...

My case is now on appeal with the superior ct... This case will most likely end up at our supreme court level as I have subsequently been informed I was used as a TEST case.. RIGHT FROM THE GET GO. UPON SIGNING OF MY AUTHORIZATION BY THE PHYSICIAN..

I find it very interesting how in a cannabis case our public employees will commit some heinous acts against citizens it would not normally do. Upon researching why this phenomena exists, I found the DEA has contracted with our local LEA/LEO to be federal agents for liability purposes ONLY. Even though the signed contract specifies all liability goes to the LEA, not the DEA. A specific case here in WA. found out about these specific tactics..

THE DRUG WAR FUNDING.. in WA. state we have what is called CTED, community, trade, and economic development which just so happens to offer to LEA the Bryne grant. This grant is a MATCHING GRANT for the funds spent by local LEA/LEO ... matching the state tax dollars spent on the war on drugs... The problem here lies in the fact that this is actually a QUID-PRO-QUO UNDER FEDERAL LAW OF THE HOBBS ACT wire and mail fraud statutes.

I just subsequently found out that approx. 3 yrs prior to my conviction an investigation was launched against me.. this started after my case was dismissed in 2005 because of the order stating DISMISSED without prejudice.. ah, IN RES !! yet, the IN REM was converted to lawful property in which no monies maybe used, spent, stolen from the budget tax base by false pretences.. no in res exists without in rem violation NOW DOES IT, at least associated with cannabis. No violation occurs without the ILLEGAL CANNABIS type substance.

I am very interested to see what this appeal is going to bring to us patients in WA. after the Fry case last year.

Our Attorney General in 2009 in a petition to re-schedule cannabis made claim cannabis is an HERB, not a CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE...:nicethread:

The claim could be interpreted as our statute criminalizing cannabis specifically is invalid because the officer of the court lacks jurisdiction to file any P.C. as an HERB is not illegal under our statutes.

I sure hope the courts agree with the AG, as this would seriously undermine ALL prosecutions since this person took office... Knowingly bilking millions from our tax coffers under a federal grant contract is a federal criminal act.:high-five:

If they do, this would be a serious blow to the war on drugs.:party:
 
Appeal Brief was filed last week.Oral argument set for April 25, 2011. :slide: :popcorn: :thumb:
 
OH SNAP !!!




Pam Loginsky
Staff Attorney
Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys
206 10th Ave. SE
Olympia, WA 98501

Phone (360) 753-2175
Fax (360) 753-3943

E-mail pamloginsky@waprosecutors.org
 
>>> Steve Trinen < strinen@co.pierce.wa.us > 1/21/2010 10:45 AM >>>
What at first appears to be a victory in fact is not as far as any general rule is concerned, although Stevens Co. does prevail on the particular case at issue. I in include the following in case you have not had a chance to look it over.
S.
Today the Supreme Court issued its opinion in State v. Fry, a medical marijuana case in out of Stevens County in which I wrote an amicus brief for WAPA and as a courtesy to Stevens Co. was also specially designated and handled the oral argument.
The opinion is properly a rather uncommon occurrence of an 8-1 spilt in the result, but a 4-4-1 and 4-5-1 split as to the reasoning on the two issues the court considered.
A. (formal majority)
Justice Jim Johnson authored a technical majority opinion in which he was joined by Justices Barbara Madsen, Gerry Alexander and Mary Fairhurst. In that the court basically followed the statutory analysis arguments that were presented by Stevens Co and myself. They held two things:
1. That under the medical marijuana statutes, a medical marijuana certificate does not defeat probable cause in support of a warrant. However, there are only four votes for the reasoning given (concurrence agrees in result on that issue only), with the result that it is a 4-4-1 split decision as to the probable cause analysis. Hence it is not a majority opinion on this issue.
2. The defendant's claimed medical conditions of severe anxiety, rage and depression did not entitle him to the medical marijuana defense. The concurrence did not agree with this analysis, but did agree with the result (and Sanders joined the concurrence analysis) so as to this issue there is technically a 4-5 split and this is the minority analysis.
B. Concurrence
Justice Tom Chambers, joined by Charles Johnson, Susan Owens and Debra Stephens
1. The concurrence agrees with the majority on the probable cause issue in result only, with no additional analysis. So, as indicated above there is a 4-4-1 split as to this issue.
2. The four membes of the concurrence held that the medical marijuana certificate alone provided a sufficient basis to permit the defendant to present his affirmative defense at trial and that it would be up to the jury to determine whether he met his burden of proof. In this, Sanders agreed with them, so correctly this is the majority reasoning. However, without Sanders, the four members of the concurrence held that at the suppression hearing the defense attorney (mistakenly) conceded that the defendant did not have a qualifying condition and that based on this concession the trial court's denial of the defendant's presentation of the medical marijuana affirmative defense to the jury was harmless error. For this reason they held any error was harmless.
C. Dissent (Justice Sanders)
1. The medical marijuana certificate defeated probable cause.
2. He agreed with the concurrence to the extent that the court erred when it denied the defendant the opportunity to present the medical marijuana defense.
I have a suspicion that if given a chance in a subsequent case Sanders and the concurring justices will join forces to issue an opinion that the medical marijuana certificate can defeat probable cause. Here there was a question as to the validity of the certificate (my recollection is that it was a fake). I suspect on another case where that is not an issue and they have a valid one, the apparent probable cause analysis of the "lead" may be in trouble.






Pam Loginsky
Staff Attorney
Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys
206 10th Ave. SE
Olympia, WA 98501

Phone (360) 753-2175
Fax (360) 753-3943

E-mail pamloginsky@waprosecutors.org
 
>>> "Karl F. Sloan" < ksloan@co.okanogan.wa.us > 9/8/2010 11:22 AM >>>
Pam & Jeremy:

I think you are absolutely entitled to interview the doctor and have him
testify live. If it is Dr. Orvald he probably won't respond. The
defense should have to meet the foundation requirements of ER 702. If
it is Orvald or some other THC clinic doctor, it is significant that
they are not the defendant's treating physician. They are not
diagnosing the defendant's underlying qualifying condition, but instead
are relying upon the defendant's treating physician's diagnosis of the
condition. The THC doctors simply review those materials and opine that
the defendant would benefit from marijuana. In fact the TCH website
states:

Our physicians require that each patient have current medical records
that document the existence of one of the conditions for which medical
marijuana is authorized under their state law. You must either obtain
your medical records yourself (which may involve a fee) and bring them
in to us, or you may authorize that your medical records be faxed or
mailed to one of our office,

Since our doctors are consulting with patients solely about their
qualification for medicinal cannabis, and can not act as a patient's
primary physician, we require that all of our patients have at least one
other current physician.
(See website link below).


Arguably, this process outlined by the THC clinic does not satisfy the
statutory definition of "qualifying patient" under RCW 69.51A.010. The
definition appears to require the diagnosing health care professional be
the same one who advises the patient about medical marijuana. By their
own stated procedures, the THC clinic doctors are not the diagnosing
health care professional. I have not yet made this argument in one of
my cases, but may do so in the future. See RCW 69.51A.010(4)
"Qualifying patient" means a person who:
(a) Is a patient of a health care professional;
(b) Has been diagnosed by that health care professional as having a
terminal or debilitating medical condition;
(c) Is a resident of the state of Washington at the time of such
diagnosis;
(d) Has been advised by that health care professional about the risks
and benefits of the medical use of marijuana; and
(e) Has been advised by that health care professional that they may
benefit from the medical use of marijuana.


ER 803(a)(4), the hearsay exception for statements made for medical
diagnosis or treatment, applies typically to the patient's statements.
The only case applying it to the physician's statement appears to be Du
Pont v. Department of Labor and Industries, 46 Wash.App. 471, 730 P.2d
1345 (1986). That case involved an L&I appeal and information contained
in a doctor's letter. However, the doctor in that case also testified.
Moreover, the particular head note in that case regarding ER 804, does
not appear to have been cited to by any other case.

Additionally, the affidavit the defense is seeking to submit just before
trial should not fall under the business record exception ER 803 / RCW
5.45.020, since it is obviously being prepared for litigation, and not
in the regular course of business. The affidavit would also not likely
qualify as a business record because it is likely to contain speculative
opinion; not an objective record of an act, condition or event.

We had some similar issues presented in a medical marijuana case, where
defense tried to suppress our subpoena duces tecum for medical records
arguing physician-patient privilege; and arguing that the summary
medical marijuana documentation of the defendant was sufficient to
assert the affirmative defense. Attached is a short response we filed.
Also attached is the underlying subpoena we issued for the medical
records of the THC clinic. The request was based in large part on the
information from their website describing what patients need to submit
and what occurs during their exam at the clinic. See
Medical Marijuana Referral - Becoming a Patient | The Hemp and Cannabis Foundation, THCF Medical Clinics, THC Foundation, Medical Marijuana Doctors, Medical Marijuana Clinics, Medical Marijuana Referrals, Medical Marijuana Permits, Medical Marijuana



Sincerely,


Karl Sloan
Okanogan Co. Prosecutor

ksloan@co.okanogan.wa.us


WELL THERE WENT MY APPEAL.

THCF DOES NOT DIAGNOSE QUALIFYING CONDITIONS AND THEREFORE THE AUTHORIZATIONS ARE INVALID !!!!:smokin::bravo::welldone::goodjob::loopy::loopy::yikes:

NOW WTF ? :popcorn:
 
After a moments thought here about the below factual statement from Ceo of THCF D. PAUL STANFORD...SINCE IS HIS SOLE BUSINESS AND HIS ALONE...

YOU GOT SOME ESPLAINING TO DO MISTER TO ALL OF US IN THE MMJ COMMUNITY...

HOW COULD YOU DO THIS TO PATIENTS KNOWINGLY AND WILLINGLY JUST TO TAKE OUR MONEY ?

NO WA. OR ANY OTHER PATIENT CAN MAKE A LEGAL CLAIM WITH YOUR PERMITS, AUTHORIZATIONS..I.E. JUST INK ON PAPER TO US...

THAT DISCLAIMER BELOW IS THE END OF THCF PAUL AND ALL OUR HARD WORK !!!

HOW COULD YOU DO THIS TO US???


In fact the TCH website
states:

Our physicians require that each patient have current medical records
that document the existence of one of the conditions for which medical
marijuana is authorized under their state law. You must either obtain
your medical records yourself (which may involve a fee) and bring them
in to us, or you may authorize that your medical records be faxed or
mailed to one of our office,

Since our doctors are consulting with patients solely about their
qualification for medicinal cannabis, and can not act as a patient's
primary physician, we require that all of our patients have at least one
other current physician.
 
Paul Stanford CEO of THCF was arrested March 7,2011 for tax fraud.

He neglected to pay his Oregon State "personal" income tax since his 501 (c ) 3 I.R.S. status was "revoked" in 2007...

Looks like the State of Wa. maybe going after him also.. only time will tell.
 
James Sr. files $60 mil.claim against Grays Harbor Co. for torture


Today I filed via mail, a $60 million Dollar claim against the County of Grays Harbor for knowingly AND "RECKLESSLY" "TORTURING" ME SINCE NOV. 29,2007 AND CONTINUING INTO THE FUTURE WITH AN UNKNOWN DATE OF STOPPING SUCH ACTS.

The claim also includes rico, defrauding, bribery/extortion, and multiple other federal and state crminal acts.

On Oct. 20,2010 the state of wa. AND "ALL" SOVEREIGNTY" WA is WAIVED AS IT was federally "PRE-EMPTED" RETROACTIVE to Jan. 1, 1999.

This will no doubt be a long haul for the state of wa. ins. co. to overcome. I am sure they will fight this all the way as the ship sinks with it's captain(s).

It's time the state of wa. "executive branch" wakes up!!! TORTURING DISABLED CITIZENS WILL NOT BE TOLERATED, PERIOD!!!!!!!
 
I'm afraid people still think that there is some sort of rule of law that protects innocent people from harassment. There is no rule of law any more. Its a law strictly based on how much net worth you have and who you know.
As it has always been, if you want to force change in the unconstitutional drug war you will need to be registered to vote and to get on these juries and engage in jury nullification. Its the only place in all of America that your one vote does matter. Laws, like government, can not grant you civil rights, they can only impede civil rights. Everyone on the planet is granted unalienable rights at birth and governments can only take them away, not grant them.
If you want to start winning, learn to play the game because thats all it is to government officials. Get on these juries and make a difference.
 
State of Washington v. James Barber Sr. case # 42669-2-II

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II

OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON


JAMES E. BARBER SR. ) No. District Ct. I5340727
) No. District Ct. 2008129
APPELLANT, ) No . Superior Ct. 10-00109-6
)
) Motion for discretionary
v. ) Review
)
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
RESPONDENT, )


________________________________________________________________________________​_____

MOTION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

________________________________________________________________________

James E. Barber Sr.


In Propria Persona



I. IDENTITY OF APPELLANT

James E. Barber Sr. asks this court to accept review of the superior court affirming of the

court of limited jurisdiction conviction finding that the court didn't commit any errors of

law in the proceedings validating an illegal contract under the corporate practice of

medicine doctrine, thus the search warrant was valid to seek medical records from THCF

in Oregon as the appellant never had services rendered in the state of Washington as

claimed by the state through Paul Stanford dba THCF Washington medical clinics

thereby dening the appellant his constitutional rights to any type of defense as if he was a

recreational user under strict liability crime, wherefore directly denying appellant his state

recognized property right' under RCW 69.51A.050(1) along with any attached defenses

and therefore denying his right to a fair trial . (Appendix A)

II. SUPERIOR COURT DECISION

Review is sought of the decision affirming Mr. Barber Sr' conviction and sentence a copy

is contained in appendix A.

III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW


1. Did probable cause exist to seize all of Mr. Barber' medicine (located in

trooper Wilson's marijuana seizure report ) and then charge him with a crime of only 9.59

grams in light of both RCW 69.51A.040 (1) and RCW 69.50.308(e) read in harmony :

RCW 69.51A.040 (1) :

If a law enforcement officer determines that marijuana is being possessed

lawfully under the medical marijuana law, the officer may document the

amount of marijuana, take a representative sample that is large enough to

test, but not seize the marijuana. A law enforcement officer or

agency shall not be held civilly liable for failure to seize marijuana

in this circumstance.

RCW 69.50.308 (e):

...or a lawful order of a practitioner, in order to be effective in legalizing

the possession of a controlled substance, must be issued in good faith for

a legitimate medical purpose by one authorized to prescribe the use of such

controlled substance.


Is this plain language above a presentment requirement read in harmony in which a

public premises defense would apply in this case, " has complied with all lawful


conditions imposed on access", if a person so complies, that person is "privileged

to...enter" and there is no "unlawful" entry" . The defense therefore negates an

element of the crime , and can not be deemed an affirmative defense because to do so

would relieve the state of the burden of it's proof thus negating reasonable suspicion a

crime leading into probable cause in this case existed ?


2. Did The Grays Harbor court judge(s) abuse their discretion on permitting the

government to present an illegal contract through the use of an alleged valid search

warrant to gain access to the courts criminal process against Mr. Barber Sr. to invalidate

his status as a already Deemed "Qualifying Patient" by 2 Washington state in the

County of Clark courts of limited jurisdiction which A state of Washington authorized

prosecuting authority was a party thereby prejudicing Mr. Barber from presenting any

defenses ?

3. Does the practice of medicine doctrine of the learned professions under Columbia

Physical therapy V. BFOA 228 P.3d 1260 (2010) (citing Deaton v. Lawson, 40 Wash.

486, 489-90, 82 P.879 (1905): Morelli v. Ehsan, 110 Wn.2d 555, 558, 756 P.2d 129

(1988) ) apply to Executive Director Paul Stanford dba THCF Washington medical

clinics thus voiding any and all on their face contracts of Paul Stanford dba THCF WA.

Alleged Valid Documentation signed by any THCF health care practitioners as

recognized in RCW 69.51A et. seq. and State v. Tracy 158 Wn.2d 683, 147 P.3d 559

(2006) ( The issue of the term "licensed" under RCW chapter 18.71) ?

4. Is a 1 yr. "valid documentation" restraint on speech Constitutional In light of Conant

v. Walters Injunction and a schedule 1 controlled substance ?


5. Did both courts in this case prejudice the appellant by applying the wrong facts and

misinterpret the law thereby committing reversible errors under due process of law as a

matter of law by ruling a repugnant illegal contract under public policy supersedes a valid

contract not repugnant to public policy ?


6. Do the facts in the records of this case warrant the issuance of a search warrant, for a

fishing expedition seeking irrelevant evidence from Mr. Barber Sr.' Oregon medical file

held in the custody of Paul Stanford dba THCF of Oregon under Oregon laws based on

his declaration admitting , to wit:


An illegal repugnant Washington state contract dated September 15, 2006 expiring on

September 15, 2007 of alleged medical records in the custody of Paul Stanford dba THCF

of Oregon acting in Washington state an illegal entity rendering services in Washington

state when the appellant never had services rendered in Washington state by Paul

Stanford dba THCF Washington, nor from his employees pursuant to RCW 69.51A or

any other laws of Washington state.? Should the search warrant have been issued for

Thomas Orvald of Yakima instead under the facts of this case or not at all ?


IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE HISTORY

In 2001 before the court of limited jurisdiction in the county of clark the appellant

appeared before Judge Randell Fritzler on a criminal matter. In the judgment and sentence

order of this criminal matter the judge addressed the appellants use of medical marijuana.

In the judges order it is written "no marijuana without prescription". The appellant had a

valid recommendation in which the court at that time recognized from Toxicologist Dr

Phil Leveque of Mollala, Or. For Barrettes esophagus . For both Oregon and Washington .

In 2003 appellant saw Dr. Dodge for his Oregon mandated renewal card for cannabis

therapy treatment in the State of Oregon ( State v. Berringer, 234 Or.App. 665, P.3d 615

(2010) ruled a patient doesn't have to be a resident of the State of Oregon to qualify for a

medical marijuana card as long as they pay the required fees pursuant to the operative

language in the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act.)

In 2004 after learning from news articles about Sharon Tracy' medical marijuana case

invalidating Dr. Dodge a non Washington licensed practitioner. The appellant had a non

Washington practitioner in his 2001 recommendation thereby invalidating appellants

lawful use under RCW 69.50.308(e) and RCW 69.51A.040(2). Appellant subsequently in

2003 as noted above seen Dr. Dodge for his Oregon Card mandated renewal from THCF

in Portland, Oregon. Appellant also sought his Wa. Recommendation as appellant is a

Washington resident and treats in Oregon also. This was in 2004 from Dr. Orvald before

he became an employee of Paul Stanford dba THCF Washington medical clinics of June

1, 2006. (Appendix B)

In early December of 2004 appellant was arrested with 9.73 grams, taken to jail and

charged with possession of less than 40 grams and Dr. Orvalds July 20th, 2004 (as no July

21st, 2004 documentation existed in the appellants medical file with Dr. Orvald)

recommendation was submitted to the law enforcement officer, the state and the court.

Subsequently in 2005 the state motioned for dismissal after appellant filed a notice of

affirmative defense and the state verified Dr. Orvald was licensed in wa. , verified his

authenticated signature (which is specifically written on the July 20th, 2004 valid

documentation ) and that the appellant had a qualifying condition of barrettes esophagus.

The appellant meeting his burden of proof under State v. Janes, 121 Wn.2d at 237 thus

the state filled out and filed a IN REM property disposition for the 9.73 grams the

appellant possessed to be released back to the owner, the appellant apparently complying

with RCW 69.50.308(e) and RCW 69.51A.040(2) which presumably triggered RCW

69.51A.050(1) (The LAWFUL possession or manufacture of medical marijuana as

authorized by this chapter shall not result in the forfeiture or seizure of any property) as

lawful use and possession as appellant never had to file a 2.3(e) motion for return of

seized property . See appendix "C" This process would have apprised the appellant he

was not to have more than a 60-day supply and his use of cannabis was rendered lawful

for barrettes esophagus cellular change causing serious damage which could be life

threatening, RCW 69.51A.010(6)(a) cancer, not that the appellant would have to prove an

affirmative defense every time law enforcement wanted to seize the appellants property

and ask any prosecutor to file charges forcing a patient to run the legal gauntlet again to

prove the patient qualifies again, such as happened in this case . But, that the appellant is

now lawful and must possess no more than a 60-day supply to stay within lawful

privilege and lawful right to treatment with a said specific special class drug. see TP -Vol.

1 at 174-175.

Appellant' condition is located under RCW 69.51A.010 (6)(a) which does not have

the restrictive statutory language unrelieved by standard medical treatment and

medications. The state in this case apparently is under the false impression appellant was

authorized under GERD per their research document from UCLA digestive department

which is under the restricted language either RCW 69.51A.010 (6)(b) Intractable pain ....

or (6)(f) Diseases,... which result in nausea, vomiting, or spasticity ... Appellants

relevant scientific lab reports for his authorized condition is Barrettes Esophagus and not

GERD. A Nissen Fundoplication is not a standard medical treatment nor medications for

Barrettes Esophagus degenerative cellular changes already damaged but is for

suppressing the debilitating symptoms GERD Gastro-Esophageal Reflux Disease.

On September 15, 2006 appellant went to THCF Portland , Oregon and saw Dr. Orvald

for a renewal of his Oregon mandated card and also received a complimentary illegal

contract from Paul Stanford dba THCF of Washington using Dr. Orvald as an employee

for the same qualifying condition as his Oregon card was authorized in which appellant

never relied upon for any lawful use or possession nor an affirmative defense under RCW

69.51A.040(2). This document allegedly claimed to have an expiation date of September

15, 2007 and letterhead of THCF of Washington State located in Bellevue Wa. in which

the appellant had never visited nor received any rendered services from. How could

appellant logically or lawfully rely on such an illegal contract on it's face considering the

plain language of RCW 69.51A.060 (5) " It is a class C felony to fraudulently produce

any record purporting to be, or tamper with the content of any record for the purpose of

having it accepted as, valid documentation under RCW 69.51A. 010 (7)(a) ? How would

any court explain it's reliance on such a fraudulent document to be accepted either to be

used by a defendant as an affirmative defense or for the state' ability to rely on the same

to prove an affirmative defense doesn't exist? The precedent case law on the practice of

medicine doctrine show' courts in the State of Washington do not entertain illegal void

contracts as they are repugnant to public policy and no legislative exemption exists ,

especially the type presented by the state from the appellants Oregon medical file as valid

and thus expired by a layperson passing himself off as a licensed professional rendering

lawful services through licensed employee's as of June 1st, 2006 as shown on the

Washington state business licensing check website:

https:/fortress.wa.gov/dol/dolprod/bpdLicenseQuery/lqsLicenseDetail.aspx?RefID=94227


On November 9th , 2007 appellant was pulled over in the county of clark subsequently

after leaving grays harbor county from a weekend stay after a hearing before judge

copland on the 7th of November 2007 in which his son James Barber Jr. was the petitioner

for a anti-harassment order against the chief of police from the city of Hoquiam cause #

Y7-2-D2341; See appendix "D".


This pull over consisted of the officer claiming the appellant had a headlight out.

Subsequently the officer asked for the appellants marijuana he smelled on

his person in his jacket pocket (which had just been opened at home 10 minutes before

being pulled over) and I.D. . The appellant complied with both requests (as they was not

threatening demands as in this case by trooper Wilson). The officer also requested

appellants valid documentation in which appellant didn't have in his possession but, a

copy was given to the chief criminal prosecutor ( now retired) Dennis Hunter and the

sheriff commander ( whom has since died of brain cancer) in the appellants jurisdiction

on the above 2005 unrelated case in which appellant advised the deputy sheriff. The

deputy sheriff removed some of the appellants marijuana from the same POM jar in this

case at bar and kept the appellants drivers license and made no report of contacting the

appellant. Clark County case given by the court clerk is No. 207370P (the P standing for

probable cause hearing.)

The appellant contacted the chief criminal prosecutor Dennis Hunter and requested an

investigation into the removal of said property without authority of law, as this was the

3rd time appellant has had contact with local law enforcement in which appellants

cannabis was seized , yet no report of such occurred except appellant was charged with a

different crime, nothing at all, or which charges are subsequently dismissed due to the

appellant being the victim. The Chief criminal prosecutor suggested for the appellant to

file a claim. The appellant filed a declaration of probable cause with the clark county

court of limited jurisdiction requesting a hearing. Subsequently thereafter the sheriff

deputy mailed said drivers license back to appellant. Subsequently within days Trooper

Wilson pulled over a red truck for speeding in which he claimed to have visual and radar

contact along with appellant less than 1 car length in distance. Trooper Wilson pulled

over the red truck . Then motioned the appellant over for allegedly speeding also. The

trooper let the red truck occupants go without checking any of their information with

dispatch. The appellant was asked for his drivers license and registration only, from his

driver side window as the car was pulled over in a safe zone out of any traffic danger

which could pose a threat to the trooper. As the trooper approached the appellants car for

the issuance of the traffic citation , the trooper went to the passenger side window and

tapped on the window with his metal clip board for appellant to roll the window down. It

was at this point in which the trooper claimed to have smelled the marijuana and

unclipped his side arm while also yelling at the appellant to give the trooper all the

appellants marijuana now as he was under arrest. The appellant unsure as to why the

trooper unclipped his side arm at just the claimed smell of marijuana, the appellant raised

his hands and pointed at the glove box advising the trooper of such which contained a

sealed POM jar from the prior pullover and case filed with the court as evidence, and a

sealed baggie both containing the appellants medical marijuana. The trooper opened the

glove box and removed the POM jar and the baggie.


The appellant after realizing the officer wasn't going to use deadly force reached over to

the passenger seat in which he produced a certified file from the city of battleground court

clerk in which there was the 7/20/2004 redacted birth date valid documentation signed by

Dr Orvald in the appellants name. The appellant also had the biopsies and lab report with

pictures of his barrettes cellular changes in which he offered to show the trooper. The

appellant also had a non-redacted copy in his files in the back seat of his car in which he

offered the trooper to no avail.

The trooper took the marijuana and the medical marijuana valid documentation back to

his car to call for advise as this was his first medical marijuana encounter and had no

training as what to do when a medical marijuana patient is encountered. The trooper

contacted Chief criminal prosecutor Gerald fuller whom advised the trooper to seize all of

the appellants marijuana and his medical marijuana redacted valid documentation dated

7/20/2004 from Dr. Orvald. The appellant was advised Gerald fuller had instructed

trooper Wilson to seize appellants lawful property. Appellant was subsequently cited for

speeding and following to closely but not possession of the marijuana nor was the

appellant handcuffed, removed from the car nor taken into custody. The appellant was not

arrested but he was seized from leaving.

The appellant timely filed a notice contesting the officers actions. Subsequently the

appellant followed the process by the only notice given as to the seizure of appellants

property and alleged traffic offense. The appellant argued pretext at the hearing set by the

clerk of the court after allowing the state extended time for discovery purposes. The

appellant on February 26th , 2008 by the grays harbor district court was found not to have

committed the reason for the trooper' alleged contact in the first place on November 29th ,

2007. The state had 15 days to file a forfeiture notice since the trooper just seized the

marijuana without citing the appellant for illegal possession to trigger a reasonable

investigation for prosecution. The appellant was required to file a notice to comply with

the process served within 45 days, what ever process that may be in which , Appellant did

so comply with the only served process by the state of Washington. The state did not so

comply with due process per statute as seizure and forfeiture is statutory and must strictly

be followed. Nor did the state comply with due process in filing a appeal for error in the

record to the superior court from the hearing date of February 26, 2008. The appellant

gave the state over 30 days to file an appeal for error on the record, then the appellant

called chief criminal prosecutor Gerald fuller and asked when the appellant can come

pick up his medical marijuana. Gerald fuller stated he would get back to the appellant to

let him know.

Instead, the chief criminal prosecutor Gerald Fuller had already typed up an application

for a search warrant for the appellants alleged medical records from THCF wa. In

Bellevue, wa. claiming the Hoquiam police had informed trooper Wilson of an on going

investigation into appellants son for allegedly being responsible for appellant' portion of

a medical marijuana grow in the city of Hoquiam in which both the appellant and his son

filed a forfeiture case with the superior court cause # 07-2-148-1 and -149- to be heard

instead of the chief of police of the city of Hoquiam for a raid which took place on

November 26th, 2006 the appellants oldest sons birthday and the Grays Harbor prosecutor

office also sought a declaration from the illegal entity doing business, Paul Stanford dba

thcf wa. Medical clinics to gain access to the appellants Oregon medical records held by

THCF Oregon which is a legal entity under the state of Oregon laws in attempts too

thwart appellants claims of being a lawful using medical marijuana patient in Washington

by mixing the appellants Oregon medical records in attempts to look like appellants

Washington records from Dr. Orvald in Bellevue, wa. on the same day in which appellant

was seen in the state of Oregon for his Oregon card, not in the state of Washington city of

Bellevue. The appellant has never been seen in Washington state by any Paul Stanford

dba THCF clinic using licensed professionals as employee's.

On or about April 23rd of 2008 the state charged appellant with possession of less than 40

grams of marijuana by information, after doing a search warrant fishing expedition and

the court served process on appellant . The court denied all of the appellants motions filed

in this case on request for review, because the court is under the presumption the facts are

Executive Director of THCF Paul Stanford is a lawful licensed professional under the

corporate practice of medicine doctrine RCW chapter 18.71 (see State v. Tracy ) since the

state produced a quid-pro-quo declaration from him implying so. It was the state and

court relying on an illegal void contract to trump a legal contract. Both court' applied the

law to an illegal void contract precedent case law clearly shows courts refuse to entertain

them under the corporate practice of medicine thereby committing a constitutional

reversible error and ruling the appellant could not have complied with the requirements in

State v. Hanson presentation to any law enforcement official.


V. PROCEDURAL HISTORY The appellant James E. Barber Sr. appeared in response to the notice filed by trooper

Wilson for speeding and following to closely with Honorable Pro Tem Judge Stephan

Hyde presiding .Transcript of the contested proceeding (herein after TCP) - Vol. 1 at 2.

Appellant Mr. Barber argued pretext pull over before the court in regards to his

marijuana TCP- Vol. 1 at 15-21. The court found the traffic offense not committed by

appellant TCP- Vol. 1 at 21. The state did not appeal to the superior court for any claim

of error on the record.

The appellant James E. Barber Sr. appeared in response to the charge filed April 23rd,

2008 of possession of marijuana less than 40 grams on May 19, 2008, with Judge Brown

presiding. Transcript of the proceedings(herein after TP)-Vol. 1 at 3. Prior to his

appearance, on May 2, 2008, he filed a document captioned disqualification/ affidavit of

prejudice. Record on review(herein after RP). That document contained argument to

disqualify both district court judges for cause. Id. After hearing Mr. Barber's argument,

Judge Brown denied Mr. Barber's argument for causal disqualification. Id.- Order filed in

district court on May 19, 2008. Instead Judge Brown considered Mr. Barber Sr.' argument

as an affidavit for prejudice and disqualified himself pursuant to the court rule regarding

an affidavit of prejudice. TP-Vol. 1 at 32.

The next hearing was for arraignment and was held June 2, 2008 with Judge Pro Tem

Micheau presiding. TP- Vol. 1 at 59. Mr. Barber Sr. addressed several issues, and the

court informed him that proper motions should be filed to have those issues heard. Id. At

59-79.

The next hearing was held on June 23, 2008 with Judge Copland presiding. TP- Vol. 1

at 80. Mr. Barber Sr. argued that Judge Copland was improperly hearing the case. Id. At

82-92. Judge Copland refused to disqualify himself stating that he could be far and Judge

Brown was affidavit previously. Id. Mr. Barber Sr. also argued collateral estoppel based

on a prior case in Clark County, pretext based on the ruling at the infraction hearing noted

above, and argued for dismissal based on government misconduct. TP- Vol. 1 at 92-120.

Before argument was complete, the court had a break for lunch and the hearing was

continued. See Id. At 120.

The continuation of the June 23rd, 2008 hearing was held on July 14th, 2008 with Judge

Copland once again presiding. TP-Vol. 1 at 142. The major thrust of this hearing revolve

around Mr. Barber Sr.' 7/20/2004 valid documentation /Dr. Orvald contract vs. Paul

Stanford dba THCF wa. Medical Clinic/ 9/15/2006-2007 illegal void contract under the

medical marijuana act. Id. At 148-203 . Judge Copland took the matters from both the

June 23rd and July 14th, 2008 hearings under advisement . See Id. At 211. Judge Copland

provided his ruling via letter to the parties. Attachment A ~RA- Letter from Judge

Copland to the parties filed in District court on July 7th, 2008 ( considering statutory

construction and determining that a physician has a right to limit the time of the

authorization; concluding that Mr. Barber's second authorization was expired on the

day of the violation herein and as such the first authorization was also expired and

consequently Mr. Barber could not avail himself of the medical marijuana affirmative

defense based on the information before the court at that point in time).

An August 18th, 2008 hearing with judge copland presiding addressed a motion by Mr.

Barber Sr. to reconsider the court's ruling stating Mr. Barber Sr. did not have a valid

authorization TP- Vol. 2 at 224. The court denied that motion. Id. At 232. The court also

entertained motions by he state. Id. At 233-309. The court took the matters under

advisement. Id. At 312. Judge Copland provided his ruling via letter to the parties.

Attachment B-RA-Letter from Judge Copland to the parties filed in District court on

August 21st, 2008 (denying Mr. Barber Sr.' motion to reconsider the court's denial of the

affirmative defense, but leaving the issue open).

March 13th, 2009 a hearing was held with Mr. Hamalian, attorney for Mr. Barber Sr.,

appearing and with Judge Copland presiding. See TP-Vol. 2 at 315. The defense motions

before the court dealt with issues regarding search warrant, collateral estoppels, the

medical marijuana affirmative defense, and other suppression issues. Id. At 317 The court

heard testimony from Mr. Barber Sr. and trooper Wilson. Id. At 317-414. Exhibits were

also introduced by both parties. Id. The court then heard argument from counsel. Id. At

414-466. After argument the court took the matters under advisement. Id. At 467-468.

Judge Copland provided his ruling via letter to the parties. Attachment C-RA- Letter

from Judge Copland dated March 23rd, 2009 to the parties and filed in District court

(denying motion to suppress based on traffic stop and seizure, denying collateral estoppel,

denying a motion to reconsider affirmative defense, denying motion regarding search

warrant).

On July 27th, 2009 Mr. Barber Sr.' motion to reconsider the affirmative defense was

held with Judge Copland presiding. TP- Vol. 3 at 480-490. The court denied the motion

to reconsider. Id. At 484. Mr. barber also requested a continuance to address search

warrant issues. Id. At 480-487. The court also granted a speedy trial waiver. .Id. At 488.

On November 30th, 2009 the jury was excused as the state had asked for a continuance

based on Mr. Barber raising the defense of mistake of fact. TP- Vol. 3 at 499-500 . The

court continued the case due to the new issue. Id. At 503. Mr. Barber then argued to

suppress the search warrant. Id. At 504-511. The court denied the motion. Id. At 511.

Jury confirmation, Judge Copland presiding, was held on February 8th, 2010 as was a

hearing to consider states motion regarding mistake of fact defense. TP- Vol. 3 at 513-

514. After hearing argument the court took that matter under advisement. Id. At 538. The

court issued its ruling via letter to the parties. Attachment D-RA- Letter from Judge

Copland to the parties filed in District court on February 10th, 2010 (stating that the issue

here was a mistake of law, not fact).

Jury trial was held February 19th, 2010. TP - Vol. 3 at 540. Mr. Barber was found guilty

#of the charge of marijuana possession less than 40 grams. See Id. At 625.







VI. ARGUMENT WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE ACCEPTED


Review of the issue(s) is this case should be accepted pursuant to RAP 2.3 (d)(1)-(4)

This is a case of 1st impressions as noted in Judge Copland's memorandum letter filed July

17, 2008 with the court clerk which states:

I have now had an opportunity to look more closely at some of the issues raised by the

parties in this case. "Not surprisingly, there does not appear to be any case law on point."


RALJ 9.1 governs appellate review of a superior court decision reviewing a decision of a

district court. State v. Brokman, 930 P.2d 354 (1997). Pursuant to RALJ 9.1(a), an

appellate court shall review the decision of the district court to determine whether the

court has committed any errors of law. State v. Brokman, 84 Wash.App. At 850, 930 P.2d

354.

A defense not raised at trial can be raised for the first time on appeal for a reviewing court

to address it because it essentially challenges the sufficiency of the states evidence, an

issue of constitutional magnitude, and therefore can be raised for the first time on appeal.

See, e.g., State v. Alvarez, 128 Wn.2d 1, 9-10, 904 P.2d 754 (1995).


In State v. Fry, 228 Wn.3d 1 (2010) the Washington Supreme Court stated that "like" the

compassionate use defense" , self-defense is an affirmative defense. See City of

Kennewick v. Day, 11 P.3d 304 (2000) (quoting McBride v. Walla Walla County, 990

P.2d 967 (1999). Under this analysis an authorization does not negate probable cause.)


The Appellant urges this court in this case to analyze the compassionate use act under the

legal theory of criminal trespass/public premises defense. Under this analogy the

Appellant offers the proposition that an authorization does negate probable cause under

State v. R.H., 939 P.2d 217 (1997); State v. Finley, 982 P.2d 681 (1999) ( If the property

in question is a public place, however, a persons presence there is not unlawful as long as

the person has complied with "all lawful conditions imposed on access to or remaining in

the premises." ).

The public premises defense applies when the defendant has "complied with all the

lawful conditions imposed on access". RCW 9A.52.090(2). If a person so complies, that

person is "privileged" to...enter" and there is no "unlawful" entry. See RCW

9A.52.080(1); RCW 9A.52.010(3). The defense negates an element of the crime, and

cannot be deemed an affirmative defense because to do so would relieve the state of it's

burden of proof. See, e.g., Lively, 130 Wash.2d at 10-11, 921 P.2d 1035.

RCW 69.51A.040 (2) Read in harmony with RCW 69.50.308(e)... lawful order of a

practitioner, in order to be effective in legalizing the possession of a controlled substance,

must be issued in good faith for a legitimate medical purpose (RCW 69.51A.010 (6)(a)-

(f)) by one authorized to prescribe the use of such controlled substance,(RCW 18.71

chapter of specific health care practitioner in RCW 69.51A) Negates Probable Cause.


The element at issue here is of the same legal analogy as in the above cases, that is

whether Mr. Barber Sr. was " licensed, invited, or otherwise privileged to so enter and

remain". The state must disprove this defense beyond a reasonable doubt, which they did

not. The state has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt Mr. Barber Sr. was NOT

licensed, invited, and was NOT privileged to so enter and remain a qualifying patient

because the 2006/2007 Paul Stanford dba THCF Wa. Medical clinic contract is illegal

leaving the court ruling an illegal contract is valid, which is utterly contrary to

Washington State precedent case law and current public policy. Thus is an absurd,

strained result requiring a finding of abuse of discretion by this court. Otherwise, "one

would be guilty of trespass by returning to property after being unjustly ordered to vacate

it. That the law does not condone." State v. R.H.,


Hence,... this leaves Mr. Barber Sr. 7/20/2004 already ruled upon by a prior judicial

Order valid documentation as the states only evidence, the state was required to prove

Mr. Barber Sr. had more than a sixty day supply as the prior court order was dismissed

without prejudice. It is paramount too the amount reasonable for a 60-day supply in rem

is the required elements , not that his authorization is invalid or that he doesn't have a

qualifying condition of barrettes esophagus cellular changes which removes the status of

Mr. Barber Sr. qualifying condition due the fact it would no longer qualify under the act .

. Under the state and courts analysis one would be guilty of trespass by returning to the

property after being unjustly ordered to vacate it. See RCW 69.51A.060 (1)- (6) crimes

and limitations of chapter. That, the law does not condone. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536 (1965); State v. R.H., .
Authority to define crimes and set punishments rests firmly with the legislature,. State v.
Wadsworth, 139 Wn.2d 724, 734 991 P.2d 80 (2000).
Specifically, the legislature is responsible for defining the elements of a crime. State v.
Evans, 154 Wn.2d 438, 447 n.2, 114 P.3d 627 (2005); Wadsworth, 139 Wn.2d at 735.
The elements of a crime are those facts that the prosecution must prove to sustain a
conviction". State v. Miller, 15 Wn.2d 23, 27 123 P.3d 827 (2005) (quoting Blacks law
Dictionary 559 (8th ed. 2004). " An 'essential element is one whose specification is
necessary to establish the very illegality of the behavior'". State v. Tinker, 155 Wn.2d
219, 221, 118 p.3d 885 (2005)(quoting State v. Johnson, 119 Wn2d. 143, 829 P.2d 1078
(1992) ).
It is a standard rule of construction that what is not expressly mentioned is intentionally

excluded. Bour v. Johnson, 122 Wn.2d 829, 836, 864 P.2d 380 (1993). The penal

criminal part of the statute does not contain any 1 yr. mandate to renew nor any expiration

date of a condition. See RCW 69.51A.060 (1)-(6).


In The case of United States v. Wlitberger, 18 U.S. 76 (1820), the rule that penal laws are

to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old than construction itself. It is founded

on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle that

the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department. It is

the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.

The law should not be construed to do indirectly what it cannot do directly.

Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall) 175, 192, 17 L. Ed. 520 (1864) ("It is

almost unnecessary to say, that what the legislature cannot do directly, it cannot do

indirectly. The stream can mount no higher than its source.");

W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 516, 12 L. Ed. 535 (1848) ("All the

powers of the states, as sovereign states, must always be subject to the limitations

expressed in the United States Constitution ... . What is forbidden to them, and which

they cannot do directly, they should not be permitted to do by color, pretence, or oblique

indirection.")
Appellant James E. Barber Sr. followed the law, reasonably relied on a judicial order,
reasonably relied on the state prosecuting authority in rem property disposition filed
document in regards to RCW 69.51A.050 (1) The "lawful possession" or "manufacture"
of medical marijuana as authorized by this "chapter" shall not result in the forfeiture or
seizure of any property.
To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due
process violation of the most basic sort. See North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, at 738 (opinon
of Black,J), and for an agent of the state to pursue a coarse of action whose objective is to
penalize a persons reliance on his legal rights is "patently unconstitutional." Chaffin v.
Stynchcombe, supra, at 32-33.n. 20
In general, a trail court must instruct on a party's theory of the case if the law and the
evidence support it; failure to do so is reversible error. State v. May, 997 P.2d 956 (citing
Birdwell, 6 Wn.App. 284, 297, 492 P.2d 249 review denied, 80 Wn.2d 1009, cert. denied,
409 U.S. 973, 93 S.Ct. 346, 34 L.Ed.2d 237 (1972)), review denied, 142 Wn.2d 1004, 11
P.3d 825 (2000).


Ordinarily, a reviewing court treats unchallenged findings of fact as verities on appeal.

See State v. Noble, 144 Wn.App. 812, 817, 60 P.3d 1224(2003). However, an appellate court

may excuse a party's failure to assign error where the briefing makes the nature of the

challenge clear and the challenged finding is argued in the text of the brief. See Noble, 114

Wn. App. At 817; RAP 1.2(a).



The disposition of guilt in this case must therefore be reversed and the case dismissed

with prejudice.





Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a state may not

"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.. ." U.S.

Const. Amend. XIV. The due process clause (along with the Sixth Amendment right to

compulsory process) guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present

a complete defense. Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 3 19 at 324, 126 S. Ct. 1727,

164 L. Ed. 2d 503 (2006). This includes the right to introduce evidence that is relevant

and admissible. State v. Lord, 16 1 Wn.2d 276 at 301, 165 P.3d 1251 (2007). Denial of

this right requires reversal unless it can be established beyond a reasonable doubt that the

error did not affect the verdict. State v. Elliott, 121 Wn.App. 404 at 410, 88 P.3d 435

(2004). In evaluating whether the evidence is sufficient to support a defense,

trial court must interpret the evidence most strongly in favor of the defendant. State v.

Ginn, 128 Wn.App. 872 at 879, 117 P.3d 1 155 (2005). RCW 69.5 1A.040 creates an

affirmative defense to crimes "relating to marijuana." Under the statute, "any Qualifying

Patient who retains "valid documentation" from a Washington licensed professional for

an appropriate condition defined in RCW 69.51A.010(6)(a)-(f) , will be deemed to have

established an affirmative defense to such charges by proof of his or her compliance

with the requirements provided in this chapter." RCW 69.5 lA.040(2).

In this case, the provisions relating to "valid documentation" are a main issue. See

Attachment A- Letter from Judge Copland to the parties filed in Disrict court on July 17th,

2008 (considering statutory construction and determining that a physician has a right to

limit the time of the authorization; concluding that Mr. Barber Sr.' second authorization

was expired on the day of the violation alleged herein and as such the first authorization

was also expired and consequently Mr. Barber Sr. could not avail himself of the medical

marijuana affirmative defense based on the information before the court at that point in

time). Among other things, a "Qualifying Patient" must "[plresent his or her valid

documentation to any law enforcement official who questions the patient or provider

regarding his or her medical use of marijuana." See e.g. State v. Hanson, 138 Wn.App.

322, 157 P.3d 438.

RCW 69.5 lA.040(3)©.

Valid documentation includes "[a] statement signed by a qualifying patient's

physician, or a copy of the qualifying patient's pertinent medical records, which

states that, in the physician's professional opinion, the potential benefits of the

medical use of marijuana would likely outweigh the health risks for a particular

qualifying patient.. ." RCW 69.5 1 ~ . 010( 5)(a).~

Proof of identity such as a Washington state drivers licensed or identicard, as defined in

RCW 46.20.035 . RCW 69.51A.010(5)(b)~

RCW 46.20.035 (1)(b) :

A Washington state identicard or an identification card issued by another state.


A. Dr. Orvalds 7/20/2004 declaration qualifies as "valid documentation" under RCW

69.51A.010(5)(a). A Unlicensed layperson sole shareholder Paul Stanford

dba THCF Washington clinic using licensed professionals to render services "purporting

to be valid documentation" does not so Qualify as they are illegal contracts under

Washington state precedent case law of Columbia Physical Therapy v. BFOA, 168

Wash.2d 421, 228 P.3d 1260 (2010) (citing a South Carolina Supreme court decision

which argued that commercialization of professions would destroy professional

standards and that the duties of professionals to their clients are incompatible with

commercial interests of business entities. Id. At 331-32, 135 P2d 839 (citing Ezell v.

Ritholz, 188 S.Ct. 39, 198 S.E. 419, 424 (1938). At bottom, the doctrine exists to protect

the relationship between the professional and the client ; See RCW 69.50.308(e) ... "An

order purporting to be" a prescription not in the course of professional treatment is not a

valid prescription or lawful order of a practitioner within the meaning and intent of this

chapter. See e.g. State v. Fry, 168 Wn.2d 1, 228 P.3d 1 (2010)

The meaning of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo. State Owned Forests v.

Sutherland, 124 Wn.App. 400 at 409, 10 1 P.3d 880 (2004). The court's inquiry "always

begins with the plain language of the statute." State v. Christensen, 153 Wn.2d 186 at

194, 102 P.3d 789 (2004). If the statute's meaning is plain on its face, then the court must

give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent. Sutherland, supra,

at 409; see also State v. Punsalan, 156 Wn.2d 875 at 879, 133 P.3d 934 (2006) ("Plain

language does not require construction.") The plain language of RCW 69.51A.010(5)(a)

does not require documentation to contain the exact language of the statute; nor does it

require documentation to be substantially in the form of the statute. The operative language-

"[a] statement.. . which states that.. . "- says nothing about "exact language" or "substantial

compliance." Nor does the definition contain any other words restricting "valid

documentation" to those statements containing particular phrasing or format. From this, it

can be presumed that such restrictions of a 1yr. expiration date are not intended. Sutherland,

supra; Punsalan, supra.

Instead, under the plain language of the statute, a doctor's statement that generally conveys

the required information-that the benefits of marijuana outweigh the health risks-qualifies as

"valid documentation." The same result would apply even if the statute were determined to

be ambiguous. First, it is an "elementary rule" of statutory construction that the use of certain

language in one instance and different language in another establishes a difference in

legislative intent. Spain v. Employment Sec. Dep't, - Wn.2d , 185 P.3d 1188 (2008). The

legislature has repeatedly demonstrated that it is capable of imposing inflexible requirements

on written documents, going so far as to regulate style and font size in some contexts. See,

e.g., RCW 10.96.020 ("Criminal process issued under this section must contain the following

language in bold type on the first page of the document.. ."); RCW 26.09.165 ("All court

orders containing parenting plan provisions or orders of contempt, entered pursuant to RCW

26.09.160, shall include the following language.. ."); RCW 47.36.200 ("[Tlhe department

shall adopt by rule a uniform sign or signs for this purpose, including at least the following

language, 'MOTORCYCLES USE EXTREME CAUTION"'); RC W 64.36.028 ("The

timeshare interest purchase agreement must contain the following language in fourteen-point

bold face type.. . "); RCW 70.95.630 ("A person selling vehicle batteries at retail in the state

shall.. . Post written notice which must be at least eight and one-half inches by eleven inches

in size and must contain the universal recycling symbol and the following language. . . ").

The legislature has also repeatedly imposed a requirement that certain notices and other

documents substantially comply with a particular statutory form. For example RCW

6.21.030, RCW 7.08.030, RCW 9.96.020, RCW 9A.16.110, RCW 11.40.030, RCW

17.28.100, RCW 18.27.114, RCW 19.138.040, and RCW 28A.343.330 all require notices

and other documents to be "in substantially the following form.. ." The difference between

the medical marijuana act's definition of "valid documentation" and the wording used in the

numerous statutes referenced above establishes that "valid documentation" need not contain

specific time limiting language, or be substantially in a particular time limit form. Spain v.

Employment Sec. Dep't, supra. Accordingly, the plain language of the statute allows doctors

-to draft "valid documentation" using their own phrasing and terminology. Second, a

fundamental rule of statutory construction is that courts must interpret legislation

consistently with its stated goals. Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wn.2d 20 1 at 211, 5 P.3d 691

(2000). The goal and purpose is not to allow for "prescriptions" as cannabis is a schedule 1

controlled substance thus the substance is not available in any pharmacy wherefore, no

healthcare practitioner can "prescribe" regardless of state law allowing it's specific personal

use. In otherwords, Federal Preemption applies as the field is fully occupied. Cannabis can

only be recommended as a lawful order of a practitioner in the use of treatment for specific

covered conditions under state law but, not can not be "prescribed.

To ascertain legislative intent, courts look to the statute's declaration of purpose. Donohoe v.

State, 135 Wn. App. 824 at 844, 142 P.3d 654 (2006). Such declarations are "useful in

determining how the legislative body intended the entire statute to operate," and "can be

crucial to the interpretation of a statute." Food Servs. ofAm. v. Royal Heights, 123 Wn.2d

779 at 788,871. RCW 69.5 1A.005 sets forth the purpose and intent of the medical marijuana

act, and reads as follows: The people of Washington [Sltate find that some patients with

terminal or debilitating illnesses, under their physician's care, may benefit from the medical

use of marijuana. Some of the illnesses for which marijuana appears to be beneficial include

chemotherapy-related nausea and vomiting in cancer patients; AIDS wasting syndrome;

severe muscle spasms associated with multiple sclerosis and other spasticity disorders;

epilepsy; acute or chronic glaucoma; and some forms of intractable pain. The people find

that humanitarian compassion necessitates that the decision to authorize the medical use of

marijuana by patients with terminal or debilitating illnesses is a personal, individual

decision, based upon their physician's professional medical judgment and discretion.

Therefore, the people of the state of Washington intend that: Qualifying patients with

terminal or debilitating illnesses who, in the judgment of their physicians, may benefit from

the medical use of marijuana, shall not be found guilty of a crime under state law for their

possession and limited use of marijuana; Persons who act as designated providers to such

patients shall also not be found guilty of a crime under state law for assisting with the

medical use of marijuana.. . RCW 69.51A.005. The phrase "valid documentation" should be

interpreted broadly to ensure that legitimate patients "shall.. . not be found guilty of a

crime." RC W 69.5 1 A.005. Tunstall v. Bergeson. Accordingly, documentation that implies

rather than states a physician's professional opinion that the potential benefits of marijuana

outweigh the health risks must fit within the definition. Tunstall v. Bergeson. Third, the rule

of lenity requires criminal statutes to be construed in the manner most favorable to the

accused person. State v. Gonzales Flores, 164 Wn.2d 1 at 17, 186 P.3d 1038 (2008); State v.

Jackson, 61 Wn.App. 86 at 93, 809 P.2d 221 (1991). The policy underlying the rule of lenity

is "to place the burden squarely on the Legislature to clearly and unequivocally warn people

of the actions that expose them to liability for penalties and what those penalties are."

Jackson, supra, at 93. Applying this rule, the statute must be read to allow for "valid

documentation" that varies from the language of the statute, remembering the statute is silent

as to any "specific" time constraints and not silent under RCW chapter 18.71. See State v.

Tracy.

In this case, the documentation consisted of a certified court document with the birth date

redacted with an authenticated signature dated in 2005 signed by Dr. Thomas Orvald M.D.,

there is no letterhead designation that it purports to be anything other than from Dr. Thomas

Orvald M.D. ONLY . The Valid documentation reads, in relevant part, that Mr. Barber Sr.

was advised the medical benefits outweigh the risk.. Taken in a light most favorable to Mr.

Barber Sr., this declaration qualifies as "valid documentation," because the required

professional opinion is implicit in Dr. Orvald' declaration. Ginn, supra. A reputable

physician would not write that a patient "should be able to use marijuana for Barrettes

Esophagus" if the doctor believed that the medical benefits did not outweigh the risk.

The trial court held that Dr. Orvald' 7/20/2004 Declaration "did not conform to the statute as

it had expired due to a subsequent repugnant to public policy illegal void contract and, by

itself, is insufficient to raise any allowed defense.. See Attachment A- Letter from Judge

Copland to the parties filed in District court on July 17th, 2008 (considering statutory

construction and determining that a physician has a right to limit the time of the

authorization; concluding that Mr. Barber Sr.' second authorization was expired on the

day of the violation alleged herein and as such the first authorization was also expired and

consequently Mr. Barber Sr. could not avail himself of the medical marijuana affirmative

defense based on the information before the court at that point in time).~This was error.

Dr. Orvald' 7/30/2004 declaration qualified as "valid documentation," and should have

permitted Mr. Barber Sr. to raise a defense. The court was mandated to rule Paul Stanford

dba THCF Wa. Medical clinic' is illegal Morelli 110 Wash.2d at 556, 756 P2d 129 . In the

course of the finding that the partnership was illegal, the court noted "the common law rule

that a corporation cannot engage in the practice of a learned profession through licensed

employee' unless legislatively authorized." Id. At 561, 756 P.2d 129. and may not render

professional service through licensed employee' ; See also e.g. Deaton v. Lawson, 40 Wash.

486, 82 Pac. 879, 111 Am. St. 922, 2 L.R.A (N.S.) 392 :

Stripped of all subterfuges and pretenses, this is nothing more than a

contract on part of the appellant Lawson to render professional services

for the respondent, a contract he could not perform without violating the

laws of the state. The contract was therefore against public policy, and is

utterly void."

The court was mandated not to entertain a repugnant to public policy contract thus rule it

null and void. This is consistent with the general rule that illegal agreements are void, and

courts will not enforce them. See Brower v. Johnson, supra; Williams v. Burrus, 20

Wn.App. 494, 497, 581 P.2d 164(1978); 17 Am. Jur.2d conracts 216, at 584-85 (1964).

Allowing the court to enforce a repugnant to public policy contract would, in effect,

sanction the illegal corporation and allow the enforcement of an illegal agreement. See

e.g. Baugh v. Dunstan & Dunstan, inc., 67 Wn.2d 710, 409 P.2d 658 (1966).


The doctrine of informed consent, which is premised on the principle that "every human

being of adult years and of sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with

his/her own body .'" reflects judicial recognition of the critical importance of this right.

Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972), (quoting Schloendorff v.

Soc'y of new york hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (Cardozo, J.)). See

also Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) (doctrine of

informed consent is "firmly entrenched in American tort law"). To ensure that patients

can exercise this right, the informed consent doctrine requires physicians to provide

patients sufficient information and advice necessary to "evaluate knowledgeably the

options available and the risks attendant upon each". Canterbury, 464 F.2d 772, 271.

Physicians must offer enough medical information and advice to give a patient

"familiarity with the therapeutic alternatives and their hazards." Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d

229, 243 (Cal.(1972); see also American Medical Association, code of medical Ethics

120 (1996-1997) ("AMA Code of Medical Ethics".)


Perhaps more significantly, patients have a constitutional right to receive all information

and advice that the physician sincerely and reasonably believes is relevant to the patients

condition and which he/she wishes to convey. Thus, in the medical context, as in other

areas, the listeners right to receive information from a willing speaker is paramount. See,

e.g. First Nat'l bank v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) ( the First Amendment "prohibits

government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public

may draw"); Virginia state bd. of pharmacy v. Virginia citizens consumer council, 425

U.S. 748 (1976) (First Amendment "protection afforded is to the communications, to its

source and to its receipts both"); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (it is "now well

established that the constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas").

This information and advice which patients do not have and cannot easily obtain. If

physicians cannot share the recommendations and advice they reasonably believe are

relevant to their patients condition, those patients first amendment rights are infringed, as

are the rights of the physicians to inform, recommend, and counsel their patients

according to their best medical judgment.


Conant v. McCaffey, No. C 97-00139 (2000), upheld by Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629

(2002) is in opposite to a 1 yr. expiration date as to one of self- censorship under a schedule 1

classification unregulated drug to be restricting view-point and content-neutral speech.

Given the doctrine of constitutional doubt, the Governments and Courts construction of the

act can not stand. If the legislature chose to enact a 1 yr. restriction without rescheduling

cannabis to a schedule III or less due too the same efficacy of marinol which is a schedule

III, this would be unconstitutional to be abridging the rights of both patient and physician

rights to speak about an unclassified drug without infringement.


In another most recent pronouncement on regulating speech about controlled substances,

Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357 (2002), the supreme court found

that provisions of the Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997 that restricted physicians

and pharmacists from advertising compounding drugs violated the first amendment. Id. at

1500. The court refused to make the "questionable assumption that doctors would prescribe

unnecessary medications" and rejected the government's argument that "people would make

bad decisions if given the truthful information about compounded drugs." Id. at 1507.


The court should take note of the abomination noted in Thompson: "If the first amendment

means anything, it means that regulating speech must be the last- not first- resort. Yet it

here, It seems to have been the first strategy of the Government and Court . Such strategies of

condemnation of particular views is especially troubling in the first amendment context.

"When the Government and Court targets not subject matter but particular views taken by

speakers on a subject, the violation of the first amendment right becomes all the more

blatant." Rosenburger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819 (1995). Indeed, even content-based

restrictions on speech are "presumptively invalid". R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).


A-1. The appellant James E. Barber Sr. presented trooper Wilson a law

enforcement officer/official with a current valid copy of his Washington state

identicard which was verified by grays harbor dispatch. Hence, satisfying all

required element(s) to establish all defenses available to any similarly situated

person. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE STATE'S

MOTION IN LIMINE AND THEREFORE REFUSING TO ALLOW THE APPELLANT

TO ADMIT EVIDENCE AS A QUALIFYING PATIENT UNDER THE MEDICAL

MARIJUANA ACT. ?


The Appellant assigns error to the trial courts order granting the

State's motion IN LIMINE. The motion IN LIMINE prohibited the Appellant

from disclosing evidence regarding any authorization to possess marijuana

under the Medical Marijuana Act. This act prejudiced Mr. Barber Sr. from being allowed any

defenses at all.

"A motion IN LIMINE is a procedural mechanism to limit in advance

testimony or evidence in a particular area." State v. O'Connor, 155 Wash.

App. 282, 290, 229 P.3d 880 (2010). The appellate court reviews such a

decision under the abuse of discretion standard. State v. O 'Connor, 155

Wash. App. at 290; State v. Finch, 137 Wash. 2d 792,810,975 P.2d 967

(1999).

"An abuse of discretion occurs only when the decision or order of the

court is manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable

reasons. State v. Enstone, 137 Wn.2d 675,679-80,974 P.2d 828 (1999).

Under the Medical Marijuana Act "qualifying patients with terminal

or debilitating illnesses who, in the judgment of their physicians

( not a layperson circumventing the laws of the state), may benefit

from the medical use of marijuana, shall not be found guilty of a

crime under state law for their possession and limited use of marijuana." RCW

69.51A.040(2).

Under Washington State law, a person falls within the statutory

protection of the Medical Marijuana law and therefore can present it as an

affirmative defense if he/she :

(1) meets all the criteria for status as a qualifying patient,

(2) possesses "no more marijuana than is necessary for the

patient's personal, medical use, not exceeding the amount for a sixty-day

supply" and

(3) "presents his or her valid documentation to any law

enforcement official who questions the patient or provider regarding his

or her medical use of marijuana." RCW 69.51A.040(1) (emphasis added)

(4) Presents some for of I.D. such as an example a Wa. State I.D. card.


In this case, it is clear from the entire record that the trial judge granted the

motion IN LIMINE that prohibited the Appellant from raising any reasonable

defense because Judge Copland statutorily believed Mr. Barber Sr. did not fall

within the legal boundaries of RCW 69.51A.010 (6)(a) cancer, because of the

illegal contract of Paul Stanford the state produced under false pretenses as an offer of proof

of probable cause as reasonable suspicion Mr. Barber Sr. committed a crime of possession

of cannabis without any exemptions under RCW 69.50.308(e) which reads:

"Lawful order of a practitioner to be effective in "legalizing" the possession

of a controlled substance, must be issued in good faith for legitimate medical

purpose by one authorized to prescribe the use of such controlled substance.


The court took the illegal contract produced by the state from the medical records

unlawful seized from the State of Oregon without due process of law as meaning the

latter part of this statute, which further reads:

" An order purporting to be a prescription not in the course of professional

treatment is not valid or lawful order of a practitioner within the meaning

and intent of this chapter: and the person who knows or should have known

that the person filling such an order, as well as the person issuing it, can be

charged with a violation of this chapter.

The trial court denied Mr. Barber Sr. his rights and privileges under ER 402 which reads:

"All relevant evidence is admissible, except as limited by constitutional

requirements or as otherwise provided by statute, by these rules, or other rules or

regulations applicable in the courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not

admissible."


Thus, was not a harmless error and prejudiced Mr. Barber Sr. by denying him any defense

what so ever.. Criminal defendants have a right to have their defenses heard. State v.

Lord, 165 P.3d 1251 (2007)(citing Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988); accord

Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 ((1973). And the right to a jury trial on the merits

must remain inviolate. WA. CONST. Art. 1 sec. 21.

Evidentiary error is not harmless if there is a reasonable probability that but for the error,

the outcome of the trial would have differed. In re Det. Of Post, 170 Wn.2d 302, 314, 241

P.3d 1234 (2010). (quoting State v. neal, 144 Wn.2d 600, 611, 0 P.3d 1255 (2001)

(internal quotation marks omitted). If not for the Evidentiary error(s) made by the trail

court, the outcome would have surely been different as allowing Mr. Barber Sr. to

present his 7/20/2004 already deemed valid documentation as qualifying threshold of his

meeting of the burden of proof in a medical marijuana case in Washington state.

See State v. Janes, 121Wn.2d at 237; e.g., State v. Locati, 43 P.3d 1288; 2002.

Reasonable reliance is an element of the estoppel defense. Barker, 546 F.2d at 940;

Lansing, 424 F.2d at 225. Thus, it should be deemed a defense under such legal analogy

of the public premises defense found in the criminal trespassing laws as privileged to

enter and so remain which is not unlawful conduct and negates reasonable suspicion

leading to probable cause a crime has been or is about to be committed. See e.g., State v.

R.H.,939 P.2d 217 (1997); State v. Green, 239 P.3d 1130 (2010) State v. Lively, 921

P.2d 1035 (1995).

A trial court abuses it's discretion when it adopts a position that no reasonable person

would take, when it applies the wrong legal standard, or when it relies on unsupported

facts. Salas v. Hi-Tech Erectors, 168 Wn.2d 664, 669, 230 P3d 583(2010).



The Court abused it's discretion in allowing a illegal contract which is repugnant of

clear Washington public policy of the corporate practice of medicine, supersede a legal

contract . See e.g., Columbia Physical Therapy, Inc., v. Benton Franklin Orthopedic

associates, 228 P.3d 1260 (2010), .

Thus, this case should be reversed as it qualifies as a absurd result, the court should find

the state committed egregious misconduct under rule 8.3 and dismissed this case with

prejudice.



C. The trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress evidence from the fishing

expedition general search warrant which caught an irrelevant illegal repugnant to public

policy contract exclaiming some legislative exemption which the court ruled as valid.



The Washington constitution provides that, " No person shall be disturbed in his private

affairs without authority of law. Const. Art. 1 sect. 7




The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Const. states:

[T]he right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrant shall

issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation....



A search warrant may issue only upon a determination of probable cause. State v. Cole,

128 Wn.2d 262, 906 P.2d 925 (1995). An application for a warrant must state the

underlying facts and circumstances on which it is based in order to facilitate a detached

and independent evaluation of the evidence by the issuing magistrate. State v. Smith, 93

Wn.2d 329, 352, 610 P.2d 869(1980); State v. Helmka, 86 Wn.2d 91, 92-93, 542 P.2d

115 (1975). Probable cause exists if the affidavit in support of the warrant sets forth facts

and circumstances sufficient to establish a reasonable inference that the defendant is

probably involved in criminal activity and the evidence of the crime can be found in the

place to be searched." State v. Goble, 88 Wn.App. 03, 509, 945 P.2d 263 (1997) (citing

Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure sec. 3.7(d), at 372 (3d ed. 1996)).

Assuming arguendo, In finding reasoning of Rangitsch, Dalton, Olson, and Goble, and

similar cases from other jurisdictions, should be persuasive. These cases are consistent

with the Washington Supreme Court requirement that a finding of probable cause must be

grounded in fact. State v. Cole(1995); State v. Smith(1980); State v. Helmka (1975). This

requirement is constitutionally prescribed because information that is not sufficiently

grounded in fact is inherently unreliable and frustrates the detached and independent

evaluation function of the magistrate. See, e.g. State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 436-37,

688 P.2d 136 (1984) (magistrate cannot perform constitutionally prescribed function

unless affidavit includes underlying facts); State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 907, 632 P.2d

44(1981) ( it is the duty of the issuing magistrate to independently judge the

persuasiveness of the evidence in order "to ascertain whether the warrant sought is being

reasonably requested and on reasonable grounds."); Smith, 93 Wash.2d at 352 610 P.2d

869 ( application for warrant must state underlying facts and circumstances on which it is

based).

Absent a sufficient basis in fact from which to conclude evidence of illegal activity will

likely be found at a place to be searched, a reasonable nexus is not established as a matter

of law. See, e.g. Smith, 93 Wash.2d at 352, 610 P.2d 869 ( "if affidavit or testimony

reveals nothing more than a declaration of suspicion and belief, it is legally

insufficient."); Helmka, 86 Wash.2d at 92, 542 P.2d 115 ( "Probable cause cannot be

made out by conclusory affidavits."); state v. Patterson, 83 Wn.2d 49, 52, 61, 515 P.2d

496 (1973) (record must show objective criteria going beyond the personal beliefs and

suspicions of the application for the warrant).

The rule the state proposes would broaden "to an intolerable degree" the strict

requirement that probable cause to search a certain location must be based on a factual

nexus between the evidence sought and the place to be searched. State v. Olson, 73

Wn.App. 348, 357, 869 P.2d 110(1994). Such a rule would not only subvert fundamental

constitutional protections but would be inconsistent with the approach and reasoning of

the courts previous and precedent cases.

It is a fact in this case trooper Wilson didn't file or fill out the required affidavit, nor did

he claim he even signed it to establish any facts for any magistrate to reasonably rely

upon for a detached and independent evaluation . TP- Vol. II at 408.

This requirement is constitutionally prescribed because information that is not sufficiently

grounded in fact is inherently unreliable and frustrates the detached and independent

evaluation function of the magistrate.


TP- Vol. II at 408.

Cross examination by Mr. Hamalian of trooper Wilson:

Q: ... Were you the one who wrote the search warrant ?

A: No, I was not.

Q: Okay. Did you have any participation in it ?

A: I reviewed it and that was about it.

Q: Other than the information that you gathered and the evidence that you took control of

at the scene and later entered into evidence and processed, did you do any other

investigation into this case ?

A: I looked on the internet to see if Dr. Orvald was a doctor in the state of Washington

and I did find a web site with his name and phone number on it. However, the phone

number that his practicing office in Yakima was different than the one that Mr. Barber

had provided me.

Keeping in mind appellant had a bona-fide relationship per Oregon statute with Dr.

Orvald in the state of Oregon for his Oregon medical marijuana card mandated by law, it

would only be normal to provide the easiest number to speak with Dr. Orvald himself

in 2007 vs. possibly a wrong Washington number from 2004.


This case is not the type of case in which falls under the criteria of which the state, the

trail court or the reviewing court relies upon, State v. Hyder, 244 P.3d 454(2011). Those

line of cases are mandated reporting by licensed learned professions of a client admitting

criminal conduct . The medical marijuana law is not based on admitting criminal conduct

but, carving out protected class of citizen(s), and drug use. Paul Stanford dba THCF Wa.

Medical clinics does not qualify as a licensed person nor corporation engaging in lawful

rendered services under RCW chapter 18.71 et.seq. The only person or even entity that

could reasonably fall under this criteria would be the lawful custodian of the 7/20/2004

medical record, Dr. Orvald' Yakima place of business of Cardiothoracic Surg., Inc., 7017

Scenic Drive Yakima, WA. 98908, i.e. his office . Therefore, the reliance on State v.

Hyder is misplaced.



VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, discretionary review is necessary . Wherefore, the reasonable

requested remedy is, the conviction be reversed and the case remanded to the Superior

Court Jurisdiction for :

1). A declaration Declaring James Barber Sr' 7/20/2004 valid documentation with no

required expiration date therefore qualifies for exemption under RCW 69.0.308(e)...

Is a lawful order of a practitioner, legalizing the possession of cannabis, issued in good faith

for a legitimate medical purpose by Dr Thomas Orvald pursuant to RCW chapter 69.51A.



2). A written Finding Mr. James E. Barber Sr. has a right to medical treatment with cannabis

without ANY government interference(s) or "impairments" , his conduct is not a criminal

offense under the Washington UCSA wherefore his cannabis shall be his rightful property

under Washington state law.

3). Remand with instructions to dismiss the case under court rule 8.3 governmental

misconduct with prejudice.

4). Writing an order declaring Paul Stanford dba THCF Wa. Medical clinic is an illegal entity

engaging in the practice of medicine, thus all contracts purporting to be valid documentation

are repugnant to public policy thereby are null and void.

Respectfully submitted on October 23 ,2011

_________________
James E. Barber Sr.
In Propria Persona
 
Good luck to ya brother. I hope all turns out well. The d.a was forced to give me my pipe and weed back. A norml lawyer helps. If you got your medical card through Paul Stanford/ the hemp and cannabis foundation, He will back you in court, So will any of his doctors.
 
Good luck to ya brother. I hope all turns out well. The d.a was forced to give me my pipe and weed back. A norml lawyer helps. If you got your medical card through Paul Stanford/ the hemp and cannabis foundation, He will back you in court, So will any of his doctors.

If you got your medical card through Paul Stanford/ the hemp and cannabis foundation, He will back you in court, So will any of his doctors.

Sorry but, Paul Stanford is a loser and so is his business. THCF. I guess you didn't read the thread. :p
 
THCF IS NOT LICENSED ANYMORE ..LMFAO. Big Grin at least as of today their not.. maybe under a different name now.. BUT THEY DON'T EXIST WITH PAUL STANFORD RUNNING IT AS SOLE SHAREHOLDER ANYMORE..

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Information Current as of 11/29/2011 3:08AM Pacific Time
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II

OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON


JAMES E. BARBER SR. ) No. District Ct. I5340727
) No. District Ct. 2008129
APPELLANT, ) No . Superior Ct. 10-00109-6
) Notice of Discretionary ) Review to the Court of
) Appeals Division II
v. )
)
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
RESPONDENT,


________________________________________________________________________________​_____


NOTICE TO SEEK DISCRETIONARY REVIEW OF THE

SUPERIOR COURT AFFIRMATION OF THE COURT OF LIMITED

JURISDICTION FOR CONVICTION OF POSSESSION OF LESS

THAN 40 GRAMS OF CANNABIS.

________________________________________________________________________________​_____


COMES NOW THE APPELLANT JAMES E. BARBER SR. in propria persona and

pursuant to RAP 2.3(3), RAP 2.3 (4)(d)(1),(2),(3),(4) hereby seeks discretionary review

by the Court of Appeals Division II of the misdemeanor jury trial conviction in the Grays

Harbor Court of Limited Jurisdiction , possession of less than 40 grams by the Appellant

James E. Barber Sr. entered on February 19, 2010 and affirmed by the Grays Harbor

Superior Court on August 29, 2011. This timely notice followed.




This is a case of 1st impressions as noted in Judge Copland’s memorandum letter filed July

17, 2008 with the court clerk which states:

I have now had an opportunity to look more closely at some of the issues raised by the

parties in this case. “Not surprisingly, there does not appear to be any case law on point.”




RALJ 9.1 governs appellate review of a superior court decision reviewing a decision of a

district court. State v. Brokman, 930 P.2d 354 (1997). Pursuant to RALJ 9.1(a), an

appellate court shall review the decision of the district court to determine whether the

court has committed any errors of law. State v. Brokman, 84 Wash.App. At 850, 930 P.2d

354.

A defense not raised at trial can be raised for the first time on appeal for a reviewing court

to address it because it essentially challenges the sufficiency of the states evidence, an

issue of constitutional magnitude, and therefore can be raised for the first time on appeal.

See, e.g., State v. Alvarez, 128 Wn.2d 1, 9-10, 904 P.2d 754 (1995).



In State v. Fry, 228 Wn.3d 1 (2010) the Washington Supreme Court stated that “like” the

compassionate use defense” , self-defense is an affirmative defense. See City of

Kennewick v. Day, 11 P.3d 304 (2000) (quoting McBride v. Walla Walla County, 990

P.2d 967 (1999). Under this analysis an authorization does not negate probable cause.)



The Appellant urges this court in this case to analyze the compassionate use act under the

legal theory of criminal trespass/public premises defense. Under this analogy the

Appellant offers the proposition that an authorization does negate probable cause under

State v. R.H., 939 P.2d 217 (1997); State v. Finley, 982 P.2d 681 (1999) ( If the property

in question is a public place, however, a persons presence there is not unlawful as long as

the person has complied with “all lawful conditions imposed on access to or remaining in

the premises.” ).


The social security administration ruled as of Oct. 28, 2010 in which the Appellant was

found to have 8 qualifying conditions retroactive to Jan. 1, 1999.

Of the most significant debilitating conditions defined in RCW 69.51A.010 6(a)-(f)

which should be noted in the case record evidence for this appeal are :

1) Chronic Barrettes Esophagus requiring endoscopies every 2 yr. for stages of cancer

progression 6(a)

2) Chronic Degenerative Disc Disease 6(b)

3) Chronic Celiac Disease 6(f)

4) Chronic Complex Seizure Disorder 6(a)

5) Chronic Instability of Left knee 6(b)

As all 5 above qualifying conditions scientific medical evidence are found in Dr. Orvalds

2004 assessments located in his notes which are not a diagnosis from any other healthcare

practitioner(s), but are identified “laboratory“ test results . See ER 402, 403

Dr. Orvalds inclination for turning down appellants application is not based on a

qualifying debilitating physical medical condition in which he approved the appellants

application under the RCW 69.51A.010. 6(a) Cancer. (which was noted in Mr. Barber Sr.

Oregon medical file retained in the search warrant documents for his Oregon Mandated

registry program under Oregon law which Dr. Orvald referenced to in the SOAP page).

(The appellants medical file came from the State of Oregon, not Washington state.)

Which do not require any limited standards of treatment or medications be meet before

authorizing the use of cannabis, see e.g., unpublished opinion of State v. Dalton No.

66638-0-1 Div. I . as this is the only WA.. State case close in reference to section 6(a)

medical conditions.


See also, Merriam-Webster dictionary definition of Arrogant : exaggerating or disposed

to “exaggerate one’s own worth or importance” often by an overbearing manner.



Dr. Orvald was speaking about GERD (Gastro-Esophageal Reflux Disease) which is not barrettes esophagus when he was referencing to having surgery.


The Appellant further moves that this Appeal for discretionary review & PRP be accepted

do to the important public policy interests. It is a general rule that where the contract

grows immediately out of, and is connected with, an illegal act, a court will not lend its

aid to enforce it. Armstrong v. Toler, 24 U.S. 115, 6 L.Ed. 468, 11 wheat. 258. A contract

which is contrary to the terms and policy of an express legislative enactment is illegal and

unenforceable. State v. Northwest Magnesite Co., 28 Wn.2d 1, 182 P.2d 643:

Sienkiewicz v. Smith, 633 P.2d 905 (1981); Goldberg v. Sanglier, 616 P.2d 1239(1980).

Taking into account the interests of society and the state, which demand the complete

suppression of illegal agreements. Henderman v. George, supra.

See also, e.g., Pomeroy’s Specific Performance of Contracts (3rd ed.) 651 $ 286.


See leading precedent corporate practice of medicine case law Columbia Physical

Therapy, Inc., P.S. v. Benton Franklin Orthopedic Associates, PLLC, et. al., 228 P.3d

1260 (2010) ( In RCW 18.100.010, the legislature declared that it’s intent on passing the

PSCA was “to provide for the incorporation of an individual or group of individuals to

render the same professional services to the public for which such individuals are

required by law to be licensed or to obtain other legal authorization”. In RCW

18.100.050(1), the legislature authorizes the formation of a professional services

corporation by professionals “duly licensed or otherwise legally authorized to render

the same professional services.. For the purpose of rendering professional service.”

Reading the relevant provisions in harmony, it is clear that the professional services for

which a professional service corporation is incorporated, and in which it may therefore

engage, are those for which the shareholders (or, in the case of a professional limited

liability company, members, RCW 25.15.045(3)) are licensed. Thus, under RCW

18.100.080, BFOA may not engage in any business other than the rendering of the

professional services that its members are licensed to practice. Medicine.


Also see, THE HEMP & CANNABIS FOUNDATION UBI : 602616670 approval date

June 1, 2006

Governing People : Douglas Paul Stanford (sole shareholder)

Registered trade names:

Hemp News

THE Hemp & Cannabis Company

THCF Medical Clinic

Cannabis Common Sense

THCF

The Hemp & Cannabis Foundation

https:/fortress.wa.gov/dol/dolprod/bpdLicenseQuery/lqsLicenseDetail.aspx?RefID=94228

7

Also see:

Provider Credentials Search : Douglas Paul Stanford does not exist in this required data

base and never did. THUS, HE S NOT LICENSED AS MANDATED BY WA. STATE

LAW TO BE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF A MEDICAL CLINIC THUS, 2006-2007

PAUL STANFORD dba THCF MEDICAL CLINICS OF WASHINGTON

CONTRACTS ARE ALL ILLEGAL, THUS, NULL AND VOID..

The appellant never visited any THCF medical clinics in Washington State.

https:/fortress.wa.gov/doh/providercredentialsearch/SearchCriteria.aspx


The public premises defense legal theory applies to this case at bar. Due process requires

the state prove every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. R.H.,

86 Wash. App. 807, 812, 939 P.2d 217 (1997); State v. Lively, 921 P.2d 1035

Compliance with the terms of the public premises defense necessarily means that the

actor was “privileged” to enter and thus negates the crime of trespass’s element that the

entry be unlawful, R.H. 86 Wash. App. At 812. ( rejecting state’s argument that public

premises is an affirmative defense that the defendant must prove).



Assuming arguendo, This case now falls on whether the appellant Mr. Barber Sr.’

possession of said cannabis constitutes “contraband” in light of 2 prior court cases in

which the state of Washington was the plaintiff, hence was the appellant informed he was

deemed a qualifying patient by the actions of the government representatives in a position

to state what the law is and is not. 1) A Washington state judge 2) A Washington State

Authorized Prosecuting Authority.

1) Honerable Judge Randall Fritzler signing a sentence and judgment order defining no

marijuana without prescription.

2) The state authorized prosecuting authority on their own motion submitted an order of

dismissal without prejudice in a medical marijuana case and the state prosecuting

authority signing a property disposition order for the return of 9.73 grams back to

appellant Mr. Barber connotes lawful possession of the same type of substance Mr.

Barber Sr. was prosecuted for in the case at bar. Medical Use of Cannabis.

Thus, qualifying under RCW 69.50.308(e) Lawful order of a practitioner, for a lawful

purpose, by someone authorized to sign.


Read in context with 69.51A.050(1) The lawful possession of medical marijuana as

authorized by this chapter shall not result in the forfeiture or seizure of any property.

“Contraband” has been defined by the U.S. Supreme Court as an object, the possession of

which without more, constitutes a crime. One 1958 Plymouth sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380

U.S. 693 (1965).

The fourteenth amendment prohibits a state from depriving a person of his property

without due process of law. The application of this prohibition to the instant case involves

two determinations:

1) Does the appellant have a recognized property interest in the seized cannabis: and

2) If so, what process is due to protect that interest ?

In light of the controlling first amendment case law of Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (2002), and the controlling corporate practice of medicine case law Columbia Physical Therapy, Inc., P.S. v. Benton Franklin Orthopedic Associates, PLLC, et. al., 228 P.3d 1260 (2010). Discretionary Review is warranted .



A copy of the decision(s) are attached to this notice.


James E. Barber Sr.
In propria persona







Gerald Fuller
Chief Criminal Prosecuting Attorney
Grays Harbor County CourtHouse,
Montesano, WA. 98563




Dated this 23rd day of September, 2011






_____________________
James E. Barber Sr.
"It is the Imaginative and Intellectual mind that "their" afraid of. An educated mind, is the world's most powerful weapon".

Chapter 69.51a RCW: Medical cannabis(formerly medical marijuana) "Ignorance of the law is no excuse officer"
Legal Citations (Page 1) - ASA Forum " MMJ Case law"
 
Today I received this in the mail.. and have a hearing on friday . The prosecutor wants the judge to impose sentence then.. I was given approval by the court to appear telephonic, i.e. no imposition of sentencing. The Judge has stayed my sentence until I am done appealing with my case to the U.S. Supreme Court. Tongue

*uck the state. Smile

This guy last time I was in court assaulted me 3 separate times in a matter of 3 minutes in front of the Same superior court judge whom signed the dismissal order and remand. Not to mention he is the same one whom wrote the search warrant and signed it in the troopers name.. NOT HIS OWN !!

Notice this prosecutor is dodging the 1st amendment right strict scrutiny requirement and also trying to use state v. Fry. lol.

And claiming state v. Hyder applies, a sexual assault case in which the patient spoke with his therapist about it.. and the court ruled.. the statute of mandated reporting over rides the physician-patient privileged communications... i.e. the person committed a crime and told their medical professional..

We patients do not commit a crime by communicating with our practitioners about cannabis therapy.. this is covered under the conant injunction of free speech rights.. a chimo has no "protected" 1st amendment communication rights. Patients do.. so says the 9th cir. court of appeals.. *uck the state. Tongue

It is substantially in the public interest that we don't have layperson passing themselves off as medical professionals.. signing sworn affidavits a patient has no coverage.. thats like saying your neighbor can do the same thing if not a licensed practitioner but, gets our medical file and gives it to the state.. Like a snitch does to get off on another charge.. someone from another state whom has a medical authorization in wa. like paul stanford of THCF..


IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II



STATE OF WASHINGTON,
NO. 42669-2-II
Respondent,

RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR
DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

JAMES E. BARBER,

Appellant,




1. IDENTITY OF REPONDING PARTY.

The State of Washington, by and through Gerald Fuller, Chief Criminal Deputy, Grays Harbor
County Prosecuting Attorney's Office.


2.RELIEF REQUESTED.

The State of Washington requests that the court deny discretionary review of this matter.

3. STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

(a) Procedural BackGround.

The defendant was convicted in Grays Harbor District Court, Cause No. 2008129, of VUCSA-
Possession of marijuana-less than 40 grams. The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal to
the Grays Harbor Superior Court. The Superior Court, by letter opinion dated July 20, 2011,
affirmed the decision of the District Court. An Order of Dismissal and Remand was entered on
August 8, 2011. (Appendix 1).

(b) Factual BackGround.

The Facts are set forth in the brief of Appelant and Brief of Respondent filed in the superior
Court. (Appendix 2). They are not in dispute.

In summary, the defendant was stopped by Trooper Wilson for speeding on November 29,
2007. Following issuance of The Notice of Infraction, Trooper Wilson smelled the oder of
Marijuana emanating from the defendants motor vehicle. Following advisement of Miranda
the defendant admitted to having marijuana and surrendered a quantity of marijuana to
Trooper Wilson. The defendant also presented a medical authorization dated 2004 indicating
that he was allowed to possess marijuana for medical reasons. The defendant was released.
Charges for the marijuana possession were not filed at that time.

The facts developed during the district court proceedings demonstrated that the defendant had
a marijuana authorization dated July 20,2004, issued by Dr. Thomas Orvald which, on it's
face, had no expiration date. The field for the defendants date of birth was blacked out. It did
not designate an amount constituting a 60-day supply. (see Attachment 1 to brief of Appellant)
Records were obtained from Dr. Orvald by a search warrant served at his office in Bellevue,
Washington. The records showed that on the date of the current offense Dr. Orvald had issued
the defendant a medical marijuana authorization dated September 15, 2006, with an expiration
date of September 15, 2007. (see Attachment J to brief of Appellant) .

Based on these undisputed facts, the district court refused to allow the defendant to present
the affirmative defense that he had medical authorization to possess the marijuana. A copy of
the letter opinion of the Honorable Thomas A. Copland, dated July 17, 2008, is attached
hereto, and incorporated herein by this reference .(Appendix 3).

4. ARGUMENT.


The issues raised herein do not meet the standards of RAP 2.3(d) for acceptance of review.

The grounds for this court's acceptance of discretionary review are limited by RAP 2.3(d). The
decision of the trial court is not in conflict with the decision of the court of appeals or the
supreme court. RAP 2.3(d)(1). Likewise, the decision of the trial court does not raise a
significant issue of constituitional law. RAP 2.3(d)(2). The superior court did not in any fashion
departed from accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or sanction such departure by
the district court. RAP (d)(4).

The only possible ground would be that this case raises a significant issue of public interest
which this court needs to decide. RAP 2.3(d)(e). It is apperant on the face of the facts and legal
issues raised in this case that no issue of public interest is raised.

The defendants medical records were seized pursuant to search warrant. The execution of a
search warrant to obtain such records is proper. This division of the court has so held. State v.
Hyder, 19,Wn.App. 234, 244 P.3d 454 (2011). The search warrant affidavit established probable
cause to seize the defendants medical records. Neither of these matters raise a significant issue of
public interest.

The undisputed facts in the district court were that the 2004 medical marijuana authorization
shown to the trooper at the time of the stop had been superseded by a subsequent authorization
issued by the same physician, which had an expiration date. That authorization expired prior to
the time of the stop. The district court properly found that the only evidence before it was that the
defendant, at the time of the stop, had no medical marijuana authorization to possess marijuana.
The defendant did not have a valid medical marijauna authorization at the time of the stop. This
is a prerquisite that must be met in order to allow the defendant to raise an affirmative defense.
State v. Fry, 168 Wn.2d 1, 9, 228 P.3d 1 (2010). Once again, this argument does not raise a
significant issue of public interest.

5.CONCLUSION.
For the reasons set forth, the petition for discretionary review must be denied.

Respectfully Submitted,

Gerald R. Fuller
Chief Criminal Deputy
WSBA 5143
"It is the Imaginative and Intellectual mind that "their" afraid of. An educated mind, is the world's most powerful weapon".

Chapter 69.51a RCW: Medical cannabis(formerly medical marijuana) "Ignorance of the law is no excuse officer"



If you notice I made a 1st amendment argument in this motion to the court. In regards to those type of claims, the court must 1st go through this claim before reaching any other claims I made.

I have been doing major research into this lately to prepare for a conant v. walters argument for patients instead of doctors.. for wa. state patients and providers .

Now here is what I found which has peaked my interest to hammer this pretty hard..

This is case law from another jurisdiction with our jurisdictional case law giving rise to why these cases are ruled in this fashion.

See Worrell, 219 F.3d at 1212 ("[A]ny form of official retaliation for exercising one's freedom of speech, including prosecution, threatened prosecution, bad faith investigation, and legal harassment, constitutes an infringement of that freedom." (internal quotation marks omitted))

We have required proof of the following elements:

(1) that the plaintiff "was engaged in constitutionally protected activity";

(2) that the defendant's actions caused the plaintiff "to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity"; and

(3) that the "defendant's adverse action was substantially motivated as a response to the plaintiff's exercise of constitutionally protected conduct." Id.

That approach has been followed by other circuits. See, e.g, Mendocino Environmental Center v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300-01 (9th Cir. 1213*1213 1999); Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 678 (6th Cir.1998).

Gehl Group v. Koby, 63 F.3d 1528, 1534 (10th Cir. 1995) ("[G]overnment actors cannot intentionally suppress constitutionally protected expression because of its content and avoid First Amendment scrutiny simply by claiming that they were acting pursuant to an otherwise valid criminal law."), abrogated on other grounds by Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998).

I have 2 different arguments which should be covered by this case law since we have a first impression case per the Judge of the "trial court" .

I have not been able to find any thing closer than this in regards to the facts of this case, and our protections we the patients and providers are entitled too. 100% absolute immunity like a judge has..

After further review , I made sure that at least 3 reasonable 1st amendment right arguments are included in this motion for discretionary review. All 3 are at different levels of this "established right" .

All with the same tortured ending result.. chilling of protected conduct.

It all started with speech of some sort. And that speech was assaulted,tortured and maimed in retaliation for speaking up against corrupt law enforcement and likewise the court system. On more than 1 occasion. All on the court record in multiple cases I have been involved in.
 
looks like my appeal got dismissed because they didn't get my response.. I will have to look into this a bit further..

Why my motion was dismissed_________________________________
Mr. Eric B. Schmidt wrote:

He presented an authorization signed by Thoams Orvald, M.D. On July 20,2004, which had no expiration date, "and" an authorization signed by Dr. Orvald on september15, 2006, which had an expiration date of september15, 2007.

But, he does not show how that affects Dr. Orvald's authority regarding his medical authorization to possess marijuana.

Finally, he contends that the search warrant for "Dr. Orvalds clinic" to obtain medical records was illegal. But upon a showing of probable cause, a search warrant for "medical records" may issue.


Washington State Court of Appeals
Division Two


January 23, 2012

Gerald R. Fuller James Barber Sr.

RE; CASE #: 42669-2-II State of Washington v James Barber Sr.

Counsel:

On January 6, 2012, a motion to modify a commissioner's ruling of December 22, 2011 was filed in the above-referenced matter. A panel of Judges will consider the motion without oral argument on the next availble motion calendar. Any response to the motion should be filed no later than February 2, 2012. A reply, if any, must be filed within seven days after the response has been filed.

Very truly yours,
David C. Ponzoha
Court Clerk

The state never responded by February 2, 2012 to the new motion according to the case manager of division II , and my mail box. Smile

Here is the new motion I filed in which the Panel of Judges is going to rule on.. Generally it is 3 Judge panel doing the ruling.

[size=xx-small]IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II



NO. 42669-2-II
STATE OF WASHINGTON ,
respondent, Motion to modify court
commissioner ruling

v.

RAP 17.7 ; RAP 12.2
JAMES EDWARD BARBER SR.
appellant,

To: All Division II ; Honorable Justices of Court Commissioner Eric B. Schmidt

RAP RULE 17.7 OBJECTION TO RULING--REVIEW OF DECISION ON MOTION

An aggrieved person may object to a ruling of a commissioner or clerk,
including transfer of the case to the Court of Appeals under rule 17.2©,
only by a motion to modify the ruling directed to the judges of the court
served by the commissioner or clerk. The motion to modify the ruling must
be served on all persons entitled to notice of the original motion and
filed in the appellate court not later than 30 days after the ruling is
filed. A motion to the Justices in the Supreme Court will be decided by a
panel of five Justices unless the court directs a hearing by the court en
banc.
MOTION
Appellant is aggrieved by the ruling of Honorable court commissioner Eric B. Schmidt and hereby objects to such ruling and requests the Justices of this Honorable court modify said ruling which would allow Appellant to address the questions posed and misunderstandings of "significant" materiality elements by the commissioner in full,as so, this Honorable court allowing discretionary review to go forward. Appellant requests "liberal" reading herein.


1.)The Appellant nor the court have received any declaration of service of the states response to the Appellant's motion for discretionary review, nor does the record contain one as the court record shows.

2.)The record then shows the Appellant not replying to that which he was not declared served with.

3.)The record then shows the commissioner denying the Appellant review based on this non reply which was never declared served to which Appellant was not obligated to reply too.

4.)The state did not cure the record.

5.) The record is completely void of any service declarations by the state, to this very day. Appellant hereby objects .

This is what the Appellant declaration of service contained in October 10,2011 record:

I James E. Barber hereby swear under the penalties of perjury of the state of Washington,

I hand delivered :

Amended Motion for An order of Indecency

Motion for Discretionary Review-pg's. 1-40

Motion to Stay Judgment and Sentence

Verbatim Report of proceedings GH case No. I5340727

Appendix A-Superior court denial of reconsideration

Appendix B- State Licensing of thcf paul standford dba wa. thcf medical clinic

Lack of Professions License by dept. of health as required by law

Appendix C- City of Battle Ground In Rem evidence disposition document case no.

28262

Appendix D- 7/20/2004 valid documentation denied by judge copland in cause no. Y7-2-

2341 dated 11/07/2007

Attachments A-E -Judge Copland letters to the parties

The Appellant feels prejudiced by allowing the officers of the court to play unethical procedural games to deny Appellants access to the courts and fundamental constitutional rights. Is the Appellants conviction a serious significant miscarriage of justice.?

Honorable Court Commissioner Eric B. Schmidt interposed and wrote: :

A.) He presented an authorization signed by Thoams Orvald, M.D. On July 20,2004, which had no expiration date, [and] an authorization signed by Dr. Orvald on september15, 2006, which had an expiration date of september15, 2007.

B.) But, he does not show how that affects Dr. Orvald's authority regarding his medical authorization to possess marijuana.

C.) Finally, he contends that the search warrant for [Dr. Orvalds clinic] to obtain [medical records ]was illegal. But upon a showing of probable cause, a search warrant for medical records may issue.

D.) For the record [clarification] Appellant [did not present any] 2006-2007 authorization as interposed by Commissioner Eric B. Schmidt. The state claims it [seized it with a valid search warrant from a lawful business acting in a normal lawful fashion of rendering health care services]. Appellant has consistently claimed it is invalid and [does not conform to the statute as "valid documentation" derived out of the normal course of a practitioners lawful business, as it is not a practitioners lawful business.] And practitioners are [prohibited] in aiding and abetting [unlicensed] laypersons from [subverting the laws of the profession and state]. And a layperson such as Douglas Paul Stanford has [no license to advertise the rendering of lawful health care services] with out a license to do so, and [may not use a licensed practitioner as an employee] to lawfully do so either, as they are all [public policy prohibitions]. i.e. Malum prohibitum

Appellant was not under the [presumption] he needed to show common sense unlawful rendered health care informed consent but, the opposite. Or lack of authority for a dr. to work and/or render unlawful services from a foreign corporation not lawfully authorized to transact business in this state [without having a lawful certificate from the secretary of state] do not conform to the definition of lawful [medical records]. The Appellant thought this was common knowledge without having to prove it is such.. as the state has the lawful discretion to prosecute people whom launder money . RCW 9A.83.020 , or violate [any] law and should have more interest than, wrongfully [without just cause, convicting a valid qualifying patient] whom hasn't partaken in such a rude violation of [CLEAR unambiguous public policy]. It would seem to the average disinterested person [the court has partaken] in the [scheme and artifice to defraud] and [joined in the laundering of money] with it's such departed ruling [being the only expert witness] a court room has is, the [judges] themselves. Appellants 2004 informed consent [was not derived from the normal and/or abnormal course of foreign corporation thcf medical clinics business].1.
1.It is a well-established rule that, where one construction would make a contract unreasonable or such as prudent men would not ordinarily enter into, while another, equally consistent with the language, would make it reasonable, fair, and just, the interpretation which makes it a rational and probable agreement must be adopted. Jacobs v. Teachout, 126 Wn. 569, 219 Pac. 38; Kandoll v. Penttila, 18 Wn.2d 434, 139 P.2d 616; Cohn v. Cohn, 20 Cal.2d 65, 123 P.2d 833. Application of this principle leads to the conclusion that, in the instant case, appellant' interpretation of the contract is the correct one.

Therefore, f Appellant is [required] to "show" this court how Dr. Orvald's [authority to proffer] informed consent in 2004 [is not lawfully superseded by invalid and unlawful services] allegedly rendered in 2006 to effect appellants ability to [lawfully possess marijuana] with appellants 2004 [valid documentation] which was an offer of proof the Appellant was given valid [lawful informed consent contract] in 2004 and [invalid ,alleged lawful informed consent] in 2006 [proffered] by the state. Thereby, invalidating it's [evidential value]. The 2006 [illegal contract] would also be [restrained] from being [relevant to] the states case as it [does not conform to] probable cause [to file for] a search warrant either. It becomes meaningless to determination of [probable cause analysis] because it consists of [no reliable facts] a detached and impartial finder of fact can [reasonably rely upon to issue] a search warrant or [issue a summons] for the Appellant . [Officers of the courts] clearly didn't abuse their discretion, they [partook] in a [conspiracy for personal gain and/or profit], [Knowing] thcf is an [not a medical enterprise in wa.] . No [substantial evidence in the record] shows otherwise.

Rcw 69.50.308(e) delegates under the controlled substances act what type of doctor orders are valid and those doctors orders which are invalid :

1).A valid prescription or lawful order of a practitioner, in order to be effective in legalizing the possession of controlled substances, must be issued in good faith for a legitimate medical purpose by one authorized to prescribe the use of such controlled substance..- Appellants 2004 medical authorization of informed consent.

2)., An order purporting to be a prescription not in the course of professional treatment is not a valid prescription or lawful order of a practitioner within the meaning and intent of this chapter;- states/courts ruling 2006-2007 thcf alleged medical record of informed consent.


Read in harmony section 1 above with rcw 69.51A .010(5) "valid documentation" means: (a) a statement signed by a qualifying patients physician "or" a copy of the patient' [pertinent] medical records,which states that, in the [physician's professional opinion]... wac-246-75-010 (a) lawful use of cannabis by one having an already validated 2004 medical authorization. rcw 69.51A.010(a-e),.040(2)..any person meeting the requirements ... shall be considered to have engaged in activities authorized by this chapter, shall not be penalized in any manner....


Read in harmony with section 2 above with rcw 69.51A.010(5) "valid documentation"
means: (a) a statement signed by a qualifying patients physician "or" a copy of the
patient' [pertinent] medical records,which states that, in the [physician's] professional
opinion... rcw 69.51A.010(3)(a-e) 2006-2007 [not in the course of professional
treatment is not valid ]. rcw 23B.15.010 [must obtain a certificate of authority]

In state v. Fry the supreme court used the words "purporting to authorize" Fry presented the officer with documentation purporting to authorize his use of marijuana. Nevertheless, the authorization only created a potential affirmative defense that would excuse the criminal act.

The trail court and the superior court both recognize the Appellant's 2004 authorization as valid upto sep 15, 2007 until the purported 2007 expiration date had passed, and it allegedly became invalid because of the same[drug] & doctor' signature. This presumption is, no probable cause a crime had been committed or existed by the courts own reasoning until after sep.15, 2007 date of expiration but, not before then. This presumption notes the court recognized Appellants serious debilitating condition also. The presumption is then the cannabis in Appellant possession is valid property as under wac-246-75-010(3)(a) 15/24

If both court' in this case are incorrect as to the [authored authority] of doctor orvald or any other practitioner licensed or not on September 15, 2006 or validity of the September 15, 2007 expiration date thcf authorization . The Appellants constitutional [rights to access the courts] would have obviously been seriously clearly violated beyond a reasonable doubt. As no probable cause for seizure would or could be valid with the plain language of the act authorizing the lawful use of the substance cannabis by qualifying patients with valid documentation . To hold otherwise,[shall hold the statute and both constitutions meaningless].

The Appellant is being [subjected to jurisdiction] the trail and/or superior court which [does not have authority for personal gain and/or profit]. As no crime could have been committed and no search warrant could have been sought or issued as [the facts would not have established] the [Appellant was involved in] ; traffic violation; criminal activity; informed consent for 2006 medical treatment equaling "medical records" ; 2006 valid documentation defined in rcw 69.51A.010 [pertinent]; 2006 lawful order of a practitioner as defined in rcw 69.50.308(e); as required for a lawful arrest and/or a warrant to be issued by process in this case in [the name of the Washington State Supreme Court dba The State of Washington]. No [authority of law]exists in this case to warrant any process being brought before a court of law.

Argument

The standard of care embodied in RCW 4.24.290 was reiterated in RCW 7.70.040.

The Wa. Supreme court held that the "reasonable prudence" test of Helling had survived the enactment of these statutes, at least in certain limited circumstances. Gates v. Jensen, supra; Keogan v. Holy Family Hosp.,95 Wn.2d 306, 328, 622 P.2d 1246 (1980).

Parallel to these developments in the law relating to medical negligence was the adoption by this court of the doctrine of informed consent. See Comment, Informed Consent in Washington: Expanded Scope of Material Facts that the Physician Must Disclose to His Patient, 55 Wash. L. Rev. 655 (1980). We first considered the doctrine in ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Med. Ctr.,81 Wn.2d 12, 23, 499 P.2d 1 (1972). That court characterized informed consent as a general principle which imposed a duty on a physician to disclose information to a patient about the risks associated with proposed treatment. Failure to impart such information is negligence.

The doctrine was further refined in Miller v. Kennedy,11 Wn.App. 272, 522 P.2d 852 (1974), aff'd per curiam,85 Wn.2d 151, 530 P.2d 334 (1975).

Informed consent, therefore, is the name for a general principle of law that a physician has a duty to disclose what a reasonably prudent physician in the medical community in the exercise of reasonable care, would disclose to his patient as to whatever grave risks of injury may be incurred from a proposed course of treatment so that a patient, exercising ordinary care for his own welfare, and faced with a choice of undergoing the proposed treatment, or alternative treatment, or none at all, can, in reaching a decision, intelligently exercise his judgment by reasonably balancing the "probable risks against the probable benefits". See Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. Rev. 628 (1969-70). Failure to impart such information to the patient is by the great weight of authority deemed negligence rendering the physician liable for injuries proximately caused thereby." ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Med. Ctr., 81 Wn.2d at 23.


"The doctor may establish the existence of a standard of nondisclosure by medical experts in his field or practice, but it is for the jury to accept or reject whether any standard of nondisclosure should deprive a patient of his right of self-determination." Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wn. App. at 288.

The medical marijuana act requires an authorized medical practitioner informed consent in the normal course of lawful business be given before authorizing the use of marijuana for medical purposes. This establishes that the medical authorizations for marijuana must meet this minimum threshold of informed consent to conform to the statute and be "valid documentation" as defined in the act.

Appellant' 2004 Medical Authorization signed by Dr. Orvald qualifies under the informed consent doctrine because it was derived in the normal course of doctor Orvalds business. Hence, why there is no "designation" on it's face of a medical clinic [THCF medical clinics] on the informed consent in 2004 . This informed consent has no expiration for the condition " Barrettes Esophagus" a cancer, slowly causing death .rcw 69.51A.010 (6)(a) with no restrictions as the condition' are life long digressive disease' with no expiration date or cure expected. One can only mitigate it's symptoms at best. As no known cure to the human race exists. Only mitigation exists for these serious debilitating conditions and ultimately terminal for some sooner than others. Which is way different than other sections (6)(b)-(f) requiring a qualifying patient try other mitigating standards before cannabis use is authorized.

The alleged valid informed consent of september 2006 with an expired informed consent date of september 2007 [was not derived in the normal course of Doctor Orvalds lawful Business in Bellevue, wa. THCF medical clinic. ] It was derived obviously from the Normal unlawful course of business of foreign corporation [unlicensed] in any KNOWN arts of a learned profession [Douglas Paul Stanford dba THCF medical clinics ]which is not authorized to transact business in the state of Wa. as [ no certificate exists with the Wa. secretary of state] which is a mandate by the legislature to render or advertise or hire licensed learned professional lawful services for medical purposes, nor does Douglas Paul Stanford have a medical license required to form a business which offers lawful medical informed consent., nor could Paul Standford and/or thcf anything lawfully qualify See;

RCW 18.100.050Organization of professional service corporations authorized generally – Architects, engineers, and health care professionals – Nonprofit corporations.

(1)An individual or group of individuals duly licensed or otherwise legally authorized to render the same professional services within this state may organize and become a shareholder or shareholders of a professional corporation for pecuniary profit under the provisions of Title 23B RCW for the purpose of rendering professional service. One or more of the legally authorized individuals shall be the incorporators of the professional corporation.
Rcw 18.100.065 states in pertinent part: Except as otherwise provided in RCW 18.100.118, all DIRECTORS of a corporation organized under this chapter and all other officers other than the secretary and the treasurer shall be duly licensed or otherwise legally authorized to render "the same specific professional services" within this or any other state as those "for which the corporation was incorporated".. THCF was not an incorporated medical business.
THCF was incorporated by Douglas Paul Stanford as a non-profit ,IN RE SMITH 236 P.3d 137 (2010)(which in 2010 was revoked by the I.R.S.) whom is not a legally duly licensed authorized individual as sole shareholder of THCF medical clinics in Bellevue, wa. or any other state to be transacting medical service informed consent contracts, as they do not qualify as informed consent when signed by a medical professional whom is an employee. This is a direct prohibition of corporate practice of medicine doctrine the trial court, superior court and this court commissioner sees as inapplicable for some unknown reason,.
Is it this courts commissioner contention in the normal course of the courts business that allowing Dr. Orvald in aiding and abetting Paul Stanford dba thcf medical clinics in money laundering is a valid reason to convict an already qualifying patient ?
Is it this courts commissioner contention in the normal course of the courts business it is part of a scheme and artifice to defraud the appellant and public as complained about in his 1st and 2nd motion to disqualify Judge Thomas Copland ?
Is it this courts commissioner contention in the normal course of the courts business it can author other's and itself to violate rico for profit with impunity considering the illegalities and prohibitions clearly delineated by the legislature, and courts controlling rulings affirming such ?
If the answer to any of the above questions is yes. The Appellant has more to worry about than a simple misdemeanor case and trying to overcome the corruption is a higher burden than a SIMPLE medical marijuana case. I do believe ONLY a Justice of this court may affirm such contentions or make a ruling and order the commissioner has made a clear mistake in judgment which actually puts this court in disrepute affirming such criminal activity are authorized. Such an authorization crosses into public corruption. Appellant is unaware of any law or case law affirming public corruption intertwined with money laundering is authorized. Maybe the Appellant is not up on new 21st century way of business . Not in the normal lawful course is just fine as long as someone personally gains.

(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, registered architects and registered engineers may own stock in and render their individual professional services through one professional service corporation.

(3) Licensed health care professionals, providing services to enrolled participants either directly or through arrangements with a health maintenance organization registered under chapter 48.46 RCW or federally qualified health maintenance organization, may own stock in and render their individual professional services through one professional service corporation.

(4) Professionals may organize a nonprofit nonstock corporation under this chapter and chapter 24.03 RCW to provide professional services, and the provisions of this chapter relating to stock and referring to Title 23B RCW shall not apply to any such corporation.

(5)(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, health care professionals who are licensed or certified pursuant to chapters 18.06, 18.225, 18.22, 18.25, 18.29, 18.34, 18.35, 18.36A, 18.50, 18.53, 18.55, 18.57, 18.57A, 18.64, 18.71, 18.71A, 18.79, 18.83, 18.89, 18.108, and 18.138 RCW may own stock in and render their individual professional services through one professional service corporation and are to be considered, for the purpose of forming a professional service corporation, as rendering the "same specific professional services" or "same professional services" or similar terms.

Dr. Orvald can not lawfully own stock in and/or render his lawful individual professional services through a corporation which doesn't lawfully exist, now, in 2006 or anytime after that or before that time period, nor launder for a profit.. He can on the other hand offer his lawful professional services via proprietary, his proper registered corp. and/or group ONLY.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, health care professionals who are regulated under chapters 18.59 and 18.74 RCW may own stock in and render their individual professional services through one professional service corporation formed for the sole purpose of providing professional services within their respective scope of practice.
© Formation of a professional service corporation under this subsection does not restrict the application of the uniform disciplinary act under chapter 18.130 RCW, or applicable health care professional statutes under Title 18 RCW, including but not limited to restrictions on persons practicing a health profession without being appropriately credentialed and persons practicing beyond the scope of their credential. [2001 c 251 § 29; 1999 c 128 § 1; 1997 c 390 § 3; 1996 c 22 § 1; 1991 c 72 § 3; 1986 c 261 § 1; 1983 c 100 § 1; 1969 c 122 § 5.]

The legislative intent is properly delineated in rcw 23B.15.010 which states:

Authority to transact business required

(1)[Unless otherwise authorized] to transact business pursuant to a state or federal statute, a foreign corporation [may not transact business in this state until it obtains a certificate of authority from the secretary of state].

(2)The following activities, among others, do not constitute transacting business within the meaning of subsection (1) of this section :

(a) Maintaining or defending any action or suit or any administrative or arbitration proceeding, or effecting the settlement thereof or the settlement of claims or disputes;

(b) Holding meetings of the board of directors or shareholders or carrying on other activities concerning internal corporate affairs;

© Maintaining bank accounts, share accounts in savings and loan associations, custodian or agency arrangements with a bank or trust company, or stock or bond brokerage accounts;

(d) Maintaining offices or agencies for the transfer, exchange, and registration of the corporation's own securities or maintaining trustees or depositaries with respect to those securities;

(e) Selling through independent contractors;

(f) Soliciting or procuring orders, whether by mail or through employees or agents or otherwise, where the orders require acceptance outside this state before becoming binding contracts and where the contracts do not involve any local performance other than delivery and installation;

(g) Making loans or creating or acquiring evidences of debt, mortgages, or liens on real or personal property, or recording same;

(h) Securing or collecting debts or enforcing mortgages and security interests in property securing the debts;

(i)Owning, without more, real or personal property;

(j) Conducting an isolated transaction that is completed within thirty days and that is not one in the course of repeated transactions of a like nature;

(k) Transacting business in interstate commerce;

(l) Owning and controlling a subsidiary corporation incorporated in or transacting business within this state; or

(m) Operating an approved branch campus of a foreign degree-granting institution in compliance with chapter 28B.90 RCW and in accordance with RCW 23B.15.015.

(3) The list of activities in subsection (2) of this section is not exhaustive.

Thcf , nor Dr. Orvald, nor Douglas Paul Stanford qualify under any of the above
exempted activities list exhaustive or not. Under the facts of this case.

In WASH. EQUIP. MFG. v. CONCRETE PLACING CO. , 931 P.2d 170 (1997) Div. III of this court posed The question which was presented is one of first impression. Does a foreign corporation consent to general personal jurisdiction by securing a certificate of authority to do business and appointing a registered agent? We conclude it does not. Because of that conclusion, we must then decide whether Concrete Placing's contacts with Washington were sufficient to support long-arm jurisdiction. See RCW 4.28.185. Again, we conclude they were not. A foreign corporation must obtain a certificate of authority to do business in this state. RCW 23B.15.010. It "may not transact business" until it does so. RCW 23B.15.010.

THCF medical clinics does not have any such certificate from the secretary of the state of washington to transact lawful business in relations to the practice of medicine which is a learned profession [requiring a license and certificate]. Nor can it. Nor can the state claim probable cause exists for irrelevant paper claiming it is [medical records]derived in the normal course of lawful health care. For the state and/or court to claim so would be to admit they participated in a clear text book [criminal conspiracy to defraud it's citizens for personal gain and profit ], violating their [fiduciary duties] and since they are the [gatekeepers], they are all immune from our criminal laws. As the saying goes, " They are declared [sua sponte] ALL above the law."

Douglas Paul Stanford whom is the sole proprietor of thcf medical clinics does not have a license to practice medicine to own a clinic which offers transaction of lawfully rendered medical services for profit by licensed learned medical professionals in offering to the general public informed consent of medical marijuana , NOW or EVER. He has no first amendment rights involved in health care whereas the Appellant does have a first amendment right in the informed consent document of 2004 . Dr. Orvald has no professional opinion rights in aiding and abetting and then to have the trial court claiming he has authority to offer lawful informed consent to supersede and expire such informed consent derived from such legal activity in 2004, just because he is the same doctor. The same doctor doesn't have a right to commit a lawful act and then commit an unlawful act canceling out the appellants rights which are lawful to begin with. That is punishing the patient: 1.)for a doctors illegal conduct in which the patient didn't partake; 2. )Nor proffer such a record to be accepted as valid documentation; 3.) the state did that act as an offer of proof to overcome the Appellants SOLID proffered burden of proof under a motion of in limine with fraudulent documents to have them accepted as valid.

RCW 18.71.011
Definition of practice of medicine – Engaging in practice of chiropractic prohibited, when.


A person is practicing medicine if he or she does one or more of the following:

(1) Offers or undertakes to diagnose, cure, advise, or prescribe for any human disease, ailment, injury, infirmity, deformity, pain or other condition, physical or mental, real or imaginary, by any means or instrumentality;

(2) Administers or prescribes drugs or medicinal preparations to be used by any other person;

(3) Severs or penetrates the tissues of human beings;

(4) Uses on cards, books, papers, signs, or other written or printed means of giving information to the public, in the conduct of any occupation or profession pertaining to the diagnosis or treatment of human disease or conditions the designation "doctor of medicine," "physician," "surgeon," "m.d.," or any combination thereof unless such designation additionally contains the description of another branch of the healing arts for which a person has a license: PROVIDED HOWEVER, That a person licensed under this chapter shall not engage in the practice of chiropractic as defined in RCW 18.25.005.

[2011 c 336 § 496; 1975 1st ex.s. C 171 § 15.]

Div. 1 of this court in WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH UNLICENSED PRACTICE PROGRAM, case against Dirk yow noted a person practice medicine if, among other things, he or she ;

Offers, to diagnose, advise, proscribe for any human disease by any means . This includes Uses on cards, books, papers, signs or other written or printed means of giving information to the public, in the conduct of any occupation or profession pertaining to the diagnosis or treatment of human disease .

https://www.thc-foundation.org/

The Hemp and Cannabis Foundation
Mission

The Hemp & Cannabis Foundation [is working to] end adult marijuana prohibition, restore industrial hemp and help medical marijuana patients. Our goal [is to] educate people about the medicinal, social and industrial uses for cannabis [in order to] restore hemp cultivation and end adult cannabis prohibition.

Programs

THCF has a variety of programs [to educate and assist the community].

History

The Hemp & Cannabis Foundation [was founded by Douglas Paul Stanford] in August 1999.

THCF [has an affiliated political committee] that was founded in 1990, CRRH or the Campaign for the Restoration and Regulation of Hemp.

CRRH has developed a legislative model [to legally regulate] marijuana production and [sales to adults] called the Cannabis Tax Act.

THCF [has helped 100,000 patients obtain] their state's [permit to legally possess, use and grow marijuana] THCF [has produced] 500 episodes of our TV program, Cannabis Common Sense. THCF's Hemp News is the oldest on-line ezine, since 1991.


The Hemp & Cannabis Foundation [is working to educate the public] [about the truth] concerning hemp and cannabis as well as helping medical marijuana patients. [We have several clinics where our doctors] help patients [obtain a permit for medical marijuana.]


THCF TRIFOLD BROCHURE 2009 You can now download and [print] [our] 2009 [Trifold Brochure] containing valuable information that can help you or a loved one take the [first step in becoming a qualified] medical marijuana patient.

Div. 1 of this court held in Dirk Yow in a case for the unlicensed practice of medicine .

  We hold that the imposition of the $444,000 fine was not arbitrary and capricious.

UNLICENSED PRACTICE OF MEDICINE

No person may practice or represent himself or herself as practicing medicine [without first having a license to do so]. Marley v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 125 Wash.2d 533, 539, 886 P.2d 189 (1994). A person practices medicine if, [among other things], he or she:

(1)  Offers or undertakes to diagnose, cure, advise or prescribe for any human disease, ailment, injury, infirmity, deformity, pain or other condition, physical or mental, real or imaginary, by any means or instrumentality;

(4) Uses on cards, books, papers, signs or other written or printed means of giving information to the public, in the conduct of any occupation or profession pertaining to the diagnosis or treatment of human disease or conditions the designation "doctor of medicine", "physician", "surgeon", "m.d." or any combination thereof unless such designation additionally contains the description of another branch of the healing arts for which a person has a license․ 

 Whether actions constitute the practice of medicine "is dependent upon the facts and not upon the name of the procedure, its origins, or legislative lack of clairvoyance." 

RCW 18.120 created a legislative scheme under which an individual, such as Yow, or any health professional group or organization, can propose a bill to substantially increase the scope of their practice.   But the fact that "colonic hydrotherapy" is not licensed or regulated as a  health profession has no bearing on the Department's authority to regulate the unlicensed practice of medicine. [Such statutory authority is clear.]  RCW 18.120 does not apply here and does not preclude the Department from taking action against the unlicensed practice of medicine. Thcf would be prohibited from rcw18.120.

Also see, State v. Pacific Health Center, Inc., 135 Wash.App. 149, 166-67, 143 P.3d 618 (2006) (quoting People v. Amber, 76 Misc.2d 267, 273, 349 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1973)) (holding that a health center's practice of using electrodermal testing as an instrumentality to determine or [diagnose] medical conditions in a patient and[ recommending] and selling specific remedies to that person [to address those conditions] are practices that unquestionably fall within the [valid police power the legislature exercised] when it regulated the practice of medicine").

Therefore, under the doctrine corporate practice of medicine any and all contracts rendered as informed consent by thcf medical clinics are invalid as to come within the definition of "valid documentation" regardless of what licensed practitioner signed the alleged informed consent.

Washington has a strict statutory and common law prohibition against the corporate practice of medicine [with the sole exception] being professional service corporations.

See: RCW 18.71.011; Morelli v. Ehsan, 110 Wn.2d 555, 756 P.2d 129 (1988), ("a corporation cannot engage in the practice of a learned profession through licensed employees."); State ex rel Standard Optical Co. v. Superior Court, 17 Wn.2d 323, 135 P.2d 839 (1943), ("neither a corporation nor any unlicensed person or entity may engage, through licensed employees, in the practice of learned professions."); RCW 18.100 et seq.

Therefore, the alleged expired medical authorization the court has authorized to supersede the Appellants 2004 already validated informed consent with no expiration date is the only medical marijuana authorization which is valid informed consent consistent within the conforms of the defined valid documentation in the statute. ?? Appellant disagrees!

This is a case such as found in Everett v. State,99 Wn.2d 264, 661 P.2d 588 (1983), wherein the practitioners of a medical specialty are attempting to expand their license authority beyond statutory bounds. Dr. Orvald has no authority of law in Washington state to offer any professional medical opinion of informed consent through unlawful services for profit or non profit rendered through thcf medical clinics a non certified corporation with no delineated legislative authorization allowed in the state of Washington to transact medical business for profit or non profit for that matter, nor is there any other state or federal statute which would allow thcf medical clinics to operate lawfully in the state being allowed to hire any medical professionals offering medical services to the public. ESPECIALLY INFORMED CONSENT FOR "PERSONAL" GAIN AND/OR PROFIT !

Dr. Orvald can only offer informed consent i.e. authorize the use of medical marijuana through his sole owned and operated business located in, wa. and/or PSC group . Any Doctor licensed in the state of Washington is prohibited from engaging in the practice of medicine not specifically delineated by statute in the the professional services corporation act.

This would be aiding and abetting one not licensed in the activities authorized. rcw 18.130.180

(10) Aiding or abetting an unlicensed person to practice when a license is required

(16) Promotion for personal gain of any unnecessary or inefficacious drug, device, treatment, procedure, or service;

RCW 9A.28.040 Criminal conspiracy.
(1)A person is guilty of criminal conspiracy when, with intent that conduct constituting a crime be performed, he or she agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct, and any one of them takes a substantial step in pursuance of such agreement.
(2) It shall not be a defense to criminal conspiracy that the person or persons with whom the accused is alleged to have conspired:
(e) Lacked the capacity to commit an offense;
(f) Is a law enforcement officer or other government agent who did not intend that a
crime be committed.

RCW 9A.08.030 Corporate and personal liability.

(2) A corporation is guilty of an offense when:
(a) The conduct constituting the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of performance [imposed on corporations by law]; or

(b) [The conduct constituting the offense is] engaged in, authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, or tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of his or her employment and on behalf of the corporation; or

(3) [A person is criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense] which he or she performs or causes to be performed in the name of or on behalf of a corporation [to the same extent] as if such conduct were performed in his or her own name or behalf.

(4) Whenever a duty to act is imposed by law upon a corporation, [any agent of the corporation] who knows he or she has or shares primary responsibility for the discharge of the duty is criminally liable for a reckless or, if a high managerial agent, criminally negligent omission to perform the required act to the same extent as if the duty were by law imposed directly upon such agent.

(5) Every corporation, whether foreign or domestic, [which shall violate any provision] of RCW 9A.28.040,[ shall forfeit every right and franchise to do business in this state]. The attorney general shall begin and conduct all actions and proceedings necessary to enforce the provisions of this subsection.
[2011 c 336 § 352; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.08.030.]

RCW 9A.68.050 Trading in special influence.

(1)A [person is guilty] of trading in special influence [if]:

(a) He or she offers, confers, or agrees to confer any pecuniary benefit upon another person pursuant to an agreement or understanding that such other person will offer or confer a benefit upon a public servant or procure another to do so with intent thereby to secure or attempt to secure a particular result in a particular matter; or

(b) He or she requests, accepts, or agrees to accept any pecuniary benefit pursuant to an agreement or understanding that he or she will offer or confer a benefit upon a public servant or procure another to do so with intent thereby to secure or attempt to secure a particular result in a particular matter.
(2) Trading in special influence is a class C felony.
[2011 c 336 § 390; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.68.050.]

This court nor any other court can not honestly hold the Appellant is to be:

1.)Held convicted for the SERIOUS crimes and illegal conduct committed by other's;

2.)Nor claim the [irrelevant] non medical records of 2006 expiring on september 15, 2007 signed by any medical professional with a license to practice medicine in wa. state is a crime to be held against the Appellant in which he [never relied upon] or [presented the trooper with] or the prosecutor with [when charged]or hold Appellant criminally liable for the declaration from THCF medical clinics Executive Director Paul Stanford are [business records/medical records under ER 803/rcw 5.45.020],since they obviously being prepared for litigation , and [are not in the regular course of business as defined by law] and the declaration would also not likely qualify as a business record because it obviously contains [speculative opinion]; not an objective record of an [act], [condition] or [event]; and would be considered [inadmissible hearsay].

3.)The [purported authorization] of 2006 with expiration date of september15, 2007 would also not be lawful rendered services by thcf employing anyone in the learned professions to author a professional medical opinion because they have no certificate from the state of Washington secretary of state to transact business in the state of Washington and [proffer letterhead business informed consent. ]

THCF medical Clinic dor ubi # is 602616670

This above clearly shows they are registered with the Washington State department of Revenue
conducting a [unlawful medical practice business], [charging a profit] which is not lawful and is
nothing more than [offering illegal contracts which are null and void on there face]. And laundering
millions with [impunity and complicity] from the Washington State Supreme Court dba The State of
Washington .


Foreign (non-Washington) Profit Corporations
The following links will take you to the available paper form. Online registrations and online
annual reports may be found to the right of this page. Foreign (non-Washington) Profit
Corporations (Title 23B RCW)

THCF has no PSC ubi # or certificate to transact a lawful medical health care business
in the state of Washington using licensed professionals as employees to proffer a
professional medical opinion within the definition of [valid documentation] acting in the
usual course of a professional practice under the statutes plain language.
4.)Neither of the court rulings should be allowed to quash the Appellants 2004 lawful informed consent [found valid by another court whom have ruled on the specific subject matter].`The legislature may go a good way in raising [a presumption] or in changing the [burden of proof], but there are limits.' McFarland v. American Sugar Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86 [36 S.Ct. 498, 501, 60 L.Ed. 899]. What is proved must be so related to what is inferred in the case of a true presumption as to be at least a warning signal according to the teachings of experience. `It is not within the province of a legislature to declare an individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime.' McFarland v. American Sugar Co., supra; Bailey v. Alabama [219 U.S. 219, 31 S.Ct. 145, 55 L.Ed. 191], supra; Manley v. Georgia [279 U.S. 1, 49 S.Ct. 215, 73 L.Ed. 575], supra. There are, indeed, `presumptions that are not evidence in a proper sense but simply regulations of the burden of proof.' Casey v. United States [276 U.S. 413, 48 S.Ct. 373, 72 L.Ed. 632], supra. Even so, the occasions that justify regulations of the one order have a kinship, if nothing more, to those that justify the others. For a transfer of the burden, experience must teach that the evidence held to be inculpatory has at least a sinister significance (Yee Hem v. United States [268 U.S. 178, 45 S.Ct. 470, 69 L.Ed. 904], supra; Casey v. United States, supra), or if this at times be lacking, there must be in any event a manifest disparity in convenience of proof and opportunity for knowledge, as, for instance, where a general prohibition is applicable to every one who is unable to bring himself within the range of an exception. Greenleaf, Evidence, vol. 1, § 79." 291 U.S. at 90-91, 54 S.Ct. At 285. See Wigmore, supra, at 865 n. 15.

The courts rulings are inconsistent with United States v. Black, 512 F.2d 864 (1975)

A prescription for a controlled substance to be effective must be issued for a legitimate medical purpose
by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional practice. . . . An order purporting
to be a prescription issued not in the usual course of professional treatment or in legitimate and
authorized research is not a prescription within the meaning and intent of section 309 of the Act (21
U.S.C. § 829) . . . ." . [The court confused burden of proof with burden of going forward].

21 U.S.C. § 829 is the states statute equivalent of rcw 69.50.308(e) .

The Appellant hereby claims "illegality" . The court, by finding appellant guilty on alleged proof that DR. Orvald authorized the use of controlled substances in 2006 , treated the presumption of non-exception created by rcw 69.50.308(e) as conclusive, at least until some quantum of evidence raises the issue –i. e., until the issue is raised, the presumption precludes presentation of the issue to the fact finder and compels a finding of non-authorization.

A party may not waive his right to plead the defense of illegality, and if the evidence of the cause of action establishes the illegality of the transaction, it should be considered by the court, even thought the defense of illegality was not pleaded. The record shows the Appellants counsel in both cases in trial and on appeal did not use acceptable due diligence in investigating any of the appellants issues on the merits first raised at all. And one can not say it is a "trail" strategy tactic to not claim or make motion for "illegality". That is a skill used by due diligence on a test when passing the basic bar examination. Common sense applies, that is, prejudicial. Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel not once but, twice for profit.

The concept underlying the theory of illegality is that the contract is not enforceable on the grounds it is against public policy. In Sinner v. Leroy , 270 P.2d 800 the court thrusting foundation for it ruling was the person was required to get a beer license from a state agency empowered to author the transactions of the sale of beer. Such a license might have been secured was from the Washington state liquor control board. Laws of 1937, chapter 217, § 1, § 23-U, p. 1066 (Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 7306-23U [cf. RCW 66.24.010]).

The court further rulings foundation :

The illegality, which is claimed and argued in the instant case, is of a serious nature. The situation involves a beer license, which can be secured only from an agency of the state]; it [purports to deal with a matter which is exclusively within the realm of public policy]. A party to such a situation [cannot waive his right to set up the defense of illegality], and, [if] the evidence produced in support of the cause of action also establishes the illegality of the transaction, [it should be considered] by the trier of the facts, even though illegality has not been pleaded as a defense. Rathke v. Yakima Valley Grape Growers Ass'n, 30 Wn.2d 486, 496 to 501, 192 P.2d 349 (1948), and cases cited.

This conclusion is not in conflict with our opinion in Hall v. Anderson, 18 Wn.2d 625, 140 P.2d 266, 148 A.L.R. 760 (1943). The Hall case was presented to this court after a demurrer had been sustained to the complaint – not after evidence had been submitted which would support a conclusion of illegality.

In principle, we cannot distinguish the instant case from;

Goodier v. Hamilton, 172 Wn. 60, 63, 19 P.2d 392 (1933), wherein we said:

"It is within the realm of contemplation that a contract of this nature would readily suggest to one desirous of securing a highly compensatory result, to employ means which the law, good morals and public policy do not sanction. To anticipate and prevent a subversion of a proper administration of justice, the law should make it impossible for any such temptation to be carried into fruition by condemning a contract that contains the germ of possible corruption."

The record not only discloses that this transaction [contains the germ of possible corruption], but the evidence, and all inferences which may be drawn, [lead us to conclude] that the parties contemplated [the use of means other than legal to accomplish the end desired].

A court [will not knowingly aid in the furtherance of an illegal transaction], [but] will leave the parties [where it finds them]. The judgment is reversed, with instructions to dismiss the action.

The trial court affirmed by the superior court affirmed by this court commissioner, [knowingly aided in the furtherance of an illegal transaction].

Yet, courts in this state have [constantly refused to enforce illegal contracts] State v. Northwest Magnesite Co., 182 P.2d 643 (1947) or contracts [which grow immediately out of and connected with an illegal act]. Waring v. Lobdell, 387 P.2d 979 (1964). malum in se.

In Quimby, the court [found no reason to distinguish] the legal practice from the medical practice for CPA claims. Quimby, 45 Wash.App. at 180, 724 P.2d 403. Other cases follow the same principles established in Short [to define the entrepreneurial aspects of learned professions], including medical professionals, as billing and obtaining and retaining patients. Ramos, 141 Wash.App. at 20, 169 P.3d 482; Jaramillo v. Morris,50 Wn.App. 822, 827, 750 P.2d 1301 (1988). [Entrepreneurial aspects do not include] a doctor's skills in examining, diagnosing, treating, or caring for a patient. Wright v. Jeckle,104 Wn.App. 478, 485, 16 P.3d 1268 (2001). It is exactly these public health and welfare concerns that were discussed in Standard Optical as the basis for invalidating the employment relationship. The ethics of any profession is based upon personal or individual responsibility. One who practices a profession is responsible directly to his patient or his client. Hence, he cannot properly act in the practice of his vocation as an agent of a corporation or business partnership whose interests in the very nature of the case are commercial in nature. Standard Optical, 17 Wash.2d at 332, 135 P.2d 839 (quoting Ezell v. Ritholz, 188 S.C. 39, 198 S.E. 419, 424 (1938).

Malum prohibitum
State v. Hazzard, 139 Wn. 487, 247 Pac. 957, 47 A.L.R. 538 (1926):
"There is a wide distinction between the right which one, whether felon or free, has to hold his own property against the world and deny even the state the right to take it from him without compensation therefor, and that other right to practice a profession which demands peculiar qualifications in order to protect the public, and requires a license. As to the latter, there can be, strictly speaking, no inherent right thereto, if considered apart from the question of qualifications. One qualified in all respects has a right to a license, but one unqualified has no right whatever."

It is not the role of the judiciary to second-guess the wisdom of the legislature, which enacted this ban. The court has no authority to conduct its own balancing of the pros and cons stemming from banning, regulating, or openly permitting the practice of medicine, the corporate practice of medicine, the professional services corporation act, and money laundering prohibitions. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,449 U.S. 456, 470, 101 S.Ct. 715, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) ("t is not the function of the courts to substitute their evaluation of legislative facts for that of the legislature."); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730, 83 S.Ct. 102, 10 L.Ed.2d 93 (1963).

("[C]ourts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.").2
2.Carroll v. United States,267 U.S. 132, Carroll did indeed hold that "contraband goods concealed and illegally transported in an automobile or other vehicle may be searched for without a warrant,"provided that "the seizing officer shall have reasonable or probable cause for believing that the automobile which he stops and seizes has contraband liquor therein which is being illegally transported. State v. Compton, 538 P.2d 861 (Wash. App. 1975) & rcw 10.31.100(1) cannabis Smell test is inapplicable under wac 246-75-010(3)(a)may possess ;rcw 69.51A.050 (1)The lawful possession..shall not result in..
Appellant is unaware of any case law in the united states or the state of washington which would allow for a search warrant issuance on less than probable cause of the facts known to the officer at the time . A search warrant may issue only upon a determination of probable cause, based on facts and circumstances sufficient to establish a reasonable inference that criminal activity is occurring or that contraband exists at a certain location. State v. Smith, 93 Wn.2d 329, 352, 610 P.2d 869, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 873 (1980). Facts that, standing alone, would not support probable cause can do so when viewed together with other facts. State v. Garcia, 63 Wn. App. 868, 875, 824 P.2d 1220 (1992). The application for a search warrant must be judged with common sense, resolving doubts in favor of the warrant. State v. Partin, 88 Wn.2d 899, 904, 567 P.2d 1136 (1977). Innocuous facts, such as the suspect's vehicle information, the suspect's physical description, the suspect's address and phone number, covered windows, frequent visitors who stay a short time, vacancy, and the use of fans or bright lights is insufficient to establish probable cause that a suspect is growing marijuana. State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 196, 867 P.2d 593 (1994); Huft, 106 Wn.2d at 210-11; State v. Rakosky, 79 Wn. App. 229, 239, 901 P.2d 364 (1995); State v. White, 44 Wn. App. 215, 217, 720 P.2d 873 (1986), review denied, 107 Wn.2d 1020 (1987); State v. McPherson, 40 Wn. App. 298, 300-01, 698 P.2d 563 (1985). The facts known to the officer at the time before the alleged application was; appellant had a valid 2004 authorization to possess marijuana for medical purposes signed by a washington state licensed practitioner named dr. orvald given to appellant for a valid medical purpose adjudicated by the battleground court system and appellants property was returned to him. And Appellant had his lawful medicine under appellants control in the glove box of the car. The document had the birthdate redacted by a clerk of the court in the normal course of business . It is customary to redact personal information from document requested under rcw 42.56 . The Appellant is unaware of any case law or statute which concludes or rules that a redacted document in the normal course of the courts business is a criminal activity, suspicious activity, or any illegal activity at all?? Nor any case law pointing to probable cause of reasonable suspicion exists when a person possesses this type of documentation. These facts are not indicative of "criminal activity, suspicious activity,or any illegal activity at all." McPherson, 40 Wn. App. at 301. Upon "showing" of probable cause, a search warrant for "medical records" may issue. State v. Hyder 244 P.3d 454 review denied 171 wn.2d 1024(2001). No search warrant issued for the Appellants [medical records] in the custody of Dr. Orvald at his normal place of business in yakima washington for Appellants 2004 medical authorization . The search warrant issued on less than probable cause for search of a business that under the statutes and case law of washington state, do not apply. The Appellants [medical record]consisted of one 2004 medical authorization presented to the prosecution [[if] charged] from one Dr. Thomas Orvald M.D. Place of business yakima, wa. . No other lawful [medical record] in Appellants name signed by the above named health care licensed practitioner recognized by the professional services corporation doctrine, the corporate practice of medicine and the standards of care, informed consent exists or any other laws, statutes or ordinance in the united states or the state of washington for that fact. The state nor courts have shown 1 statute which supports their contentions. Nor any case law but, Hyder which is inapplicable under the [materiality of the facts] of this case.. since thcf medical clinics do not have [medical records], using Hyder fails to establish much at all. Except judicial deception, criminal conspiracy, violations of fiduciary duties, personal gain/profit not entitled. rcw 9A.80.010; rcw 9A.60.030;rcw 9A.60.050; rcw 9A.83.020;rcw 9A.72.120,.090 rcw 9.A.72.150; rcw 9A.76.020(1);ABA Standard 3-1.3(f); 3-2.8(a);3-3.1©;3-3.9(a);3-5.6(a),(b);4-4.1(a)....

Can a search warrant be valid when [it] is based upon an affidavit which contained a relevant material omission of fact? Answer : NO

[If] the warrant is facially valid and the omission neither intentional nor made with reckless disregard for the truth, such a warrant [may] be upheld. The Franks test for material misrepresentations has also been extended to material omissions of fact. United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Park, 531 F.2d 754, 758-59 (5th Cir. 1976); Cord, 103 Wash.2d at 367, 693 P.2d 81;  Garrison, 118 Wash.2d at 873, 827 P.2d 1388.
Appellant disputes the trial court's finding that the alleged affiant's omissions were neither intentional nor made with reckless disregard for the truth. The majority does not consider any of the above policy analysis, limiting its determination to finding that the omission was not done intentionally or with reckless disregard, following the Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667, 98 S. Ct. 2674 (1978) test for misrepresentations. "Reasonableness is the key ingredient in the test for issuance of a search warrant". That is precisely what the federal constitution says and our state constitution necessarily implies." State v. Patterson, 83 Wn.2d 49, 52, 515 P.2d 496 (1973). With misrepresentations, the question is whether enough accurate facts and circumstances give the neutral and detached magistrate good reason to issue the warrant. With omissions the question asked should be different; [If] all the material facts and circumstances known by the affiant officer had been presented to the magistrate, would there have been a finding of probable cause sufficient to issue a search warrant?
The materiality of the omission to the finding of probable cause is the threshold issue.
Non-material, peripheral omitted facts have no effect on the determination of probable cause and are not entitled to review. However, once a fact is determined to be material, it is very difficult to justify its absence. If inclusion would affect the probable cause determination, then it should be included. As noted in United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 329 (5th Cir. 1980):
it will often be difficult for an accused to prove that an omission was made intentionally or with reckless disregard rather than negligently unless he has somehow gained independent evidence that the affiant had acted from bad motive or recklessly in conducting his investigation and making the affidavit. Nevertheless, it follows from Franks that the accused bears the burden of showing [by a preponderance of the evidence] that the omission was more than a negligent act. It is possible that when the facts omitted from the affidavit are clearly critical to a finding of probable cause the fact of recklessness may be inferred from proof of the omission itself.
It is an [undisputed fact] trooper wilson did not participate in the application of the search warrant other than looking it over and that is about it. The actual affidavit was filed by chief deputy prosecutor Gerald Fuller as designated by his computer file signature at the bottom of the affidavit allegedly signed by trooper wilson but, as noted in the case records trooper wilson in fact did not participate in the signing of the affidavit submitted to the court, as he [just] looked it over and that was about it. The fact that the affidavit did not report important factual information that was within the troopers knowledge at the time of the pullover. In which Gerald Fuller prepared the affidavit signing trooper wilsons name claiming what was in the knowledge of trooper wilson which would have allowed a reasonable fact finder to conclude that the officer of the court acted with at least a reckless disregard for the truth. See Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 101 4, 1025-26 (9th. Cir. 2002) (per curiam); Stanert, 762 F.2d at 781; see also Liston, 120 F.3d at 975 (" Given the importance of the [omitted information] to the probable cause analysis... a jury could reasonably conclude that the [affiant's] failure to mention[that information] in his affidavit amounted to at least reckless disregard for the truth."). A reasonable finder of fact could also find that the officials acted recklessly and intentionally because of the false statements and [unauthored] signature of trooper wilson combined without omissions contained in the affidavit all boaster probable cause , which suggests that mistakes were not the product of mere negligence. It is conspicuous that, cumulatively, the omissions purge the affidavit of any reference to the possibility that the appellant was involved in criminal activity with a non redacted 2004 medical authorization offered to trooper wilson in which he declined and instead [demanded] he take the [redacted] document issued to Appellant from a court of record in the normal course of business as [instructed] by chief deputy prosecutor Gerald Fuller to [establish] probable cause. The omitted information given to trooper wilson relating to the CrRLJ 2.1 ( c) Probable cause case assigned already in another jurisdiction with an affidavit of probable cause submitted for a hearing in regards to finding an officer of the court committed a misdemeanor of theft of appellants property in which the same POM jar with the same marijuana in it, this would designate another court has jurisdiction over the same alleged marijuana evidence. The affidavit omitted the fact appellant did not show trooper wilson his drivers license for the mere fact it was in an envelope for evidential purposes against the officer in another county in which the same probable cause hearing was issued for. Nothing in the affidavit would allow issuance for [medical records] from thcf medical clinics as cited in State v. Hyder. As none existed in the listed place to be searched associated with any lawful transaction amounting to informed consent to medical treatment. i.e. an expired THCF medical clinic 2007 purported to be issued for a valid medical purpose in the normal course of business of selling informed consent medical marijuana document allegedly authored by one licensed to issue such illegal contract.

The search warrant affidavit written by chief deputy prosecutor does not establish probable cause known to the trooper at the time of the pullover as noted and shown above. It does establish Judicial Deception thought. See e.g. Smith v. Almada, 640 F.3d 931, 937 (9th cir. 2011) A judicial deception claim is different from a garden-variety claim that the warrant lacked probable cause on it's face. We have explained that a plaintiff bringing a judicial deception claim "argues that [an officer] misled the magistrate judge when applying for the warrant, and had the magistrate considered [all] of the facts that the magistrate would not have found probable cause". The [materiality element]- a question for the court, see id.-requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that "the magistrate would not have issued the warrant with false information redacted, or omitted information restored. It is proper to give great deference to the issuing magistrate's determination of probable cause. State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 907, 632 P.2d 44 (1981). But the affiant officer must also give proper deference to the role of the neutral and detached magistrate's function of determining the existence of probable cause. When critical information going to the heart of the determination is omitted, then the officer not the magistrate is making the determination. If the government had unfettered power to pick and choose which facts to present to the magistrate regardless of how misleading the presentations were, the magistrate's review of the affidavit would be rendered meaningless. The magistrate would not be provided with a fair opportunity to review the government's evidence in making the probable cause determination. He would perform his crucial role at the whim, caprice or duplicity of the governmental agents involved in the case.

Nothing in the affidavit for the search warrant designated the Appellant was involved in criminal activity described in the controlled substances act. There is no evidence of sales, controlled buy's, NO Complaints from C.I. Appellant sold them drugs, No evidence Appellant left a known drug house under surveillance , No evidence Appellant was driving a suspected car which was stolen or reported stolen. No evidence the Appellant possessed more cannabis than a reasonable amount related to his condition .The prior court found Appellant didn't commit the infraction issued by the trooper under the guise of State v. Ladson.(1) be "'justified at its inception,'" and (2) be "'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances [that] justified the interference in the first place.'" Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 350 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. At 20) The search warrant had no oath or affirmation, NATHANSON v. UNITED STATES 290 U.S. 41 (1933) . It should be noted for the record that on November 7, 2007 in cause # Y7-2-D2341 appendix D when appellant presented his 2004 authorization to judge copland as evidence Appellant had in fact been a lawful using cannabis patient since 2004 and was in fact one of the citizens as a witness in that specific case in which had also been harassed but, was denied access to the courts. Judge copland to this very day is denying the Appellant access to the courts with the decision handed down and affirmed by the superior court. A reasonable person whom is disinterested could conclude this judge is biased and has prejudiced Appellant before even being charged knowing the Judge would deny Appellant his Affirmative Defense which could be reasonably seen as already planned out by the court officers. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 US 278 (1936);The State may not permit an accused to be hurried to conviction under mob domination – where the whole proceeding is but a mask – without supplying corrective process. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91. The State may not deny to the accused the aid of counsel. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45. Nor may a State, through the action of its officers, contrive a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is "but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured." Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112. And the trial equally is a mere pretense where the state authorities have contrived a conviction resting solely upon confessions obtained by violence. (see e.g. rcw 9A.36.021(f) by design). The due process clause requires "that state action, whether through one agency or another, shall be consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions." Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316. It would be difficult to conceive of methods more revolting to the sense of justice than those taken to procure the confessions of these petitioners, and the use of the confessions thus obtained as the basis for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due process. Under Gaudin and Johnson, the provision of Washington's perjury statute requiring a judge to determine the materiality of a false statement as a matter of law is unconstitutional.

Appellant clearly claims and shows the pullover was a pretext under State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 349-51

Unreasonable Investigatory Stop

Although this trial court affirmed that the stop was lawful because the 2004 redacted birth date in the normal course of the courts business gave trooper wilson probable cause to arrest and seize Appellants property and cause an investigation,alleged lawful search warrant and subsequently criminal charges filed under state v. hanson,and then switched to state v. fry.The Appellant wholly must disagree.

"A seizure is reasonable if the state can point to 'specific and articulable facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.'" State v. Armenta, 134 Wn.2d 1, 10, 948 P.2d 1280 (1997) (quoting State v. Gleason,70 Wn. App. 13, 17, 851 P.2d 731 (1993) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 694,66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981); State v. Garcia, 125 Wn.2d 239, 242, 883 P.2d 1369 (1994)),overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 647 (1994)

A valid Terry stop must (1) be "'justified at its inception,'" and (2) be "'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances [that] justified the interference in the first place.'" Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 350 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. At 20). When evaluating a Terry stop, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances,including the purpose of the initial contact,the amount of physical intrusion upon the person's liberty,the officer's training and experience,and the length of the detention. The dispositive factors here are the purpose of the initial intrusion and the amount of physical intrusion on Appellants liberty.

The record contains no facts suggesting that,at the time of the stop,trooper wilson had any reason beyond mere conjecture to believe Appellant was committing a crime, or traffic infraction and such generalized suspicion alone is not sufficient to justify the stop of Appellant. The Appellant could been trying to pass on a 2 lane road.

See State v. Bliss, 153 Wn. App.197, 204, 222 P.3d 107 (2009) ("To justify a Terry stop under the state and federal constitutions,there must be some suspicion of a particular crime connected to this particular person, rather than a mere generalized suspicion that the person detained may have been up to no good.").

The decision of both courts are in conflict with State v. Eduardo Quezadas-Gomez, Div. II No. 40162-2 Because Demmon had preexisting probable cause to arrest Quezadas-Gomez, the court respectfully disagreed with the dissent's conclusion that the State also had to establish that Demmon suspected that Quezadas-Gomez was engaged in or about to be engaged in criminal activity when the stop occurred, particularly here, where the intrusion on Quezadas-Gomez's liberty was brief and minimal in comparison with the far more pervasive restraint on liberty that an arrest would have entailed. And ;
State v. Ladson , 138 Wn.2d 343, 979 P.2d 833 (1999).

A traffic stop is pretextual when an officer stops a vehicle, under the guise of enforcing the traffic code, to conduct an investigation unrelated to driving. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 349-51. Pretextual stops "generally take the form of police stopping a driver for a minor traffic offense to investigate more serious violations-violations for which the officer does not have probable cause." State v. Myers, 117 Wn. App. 93, 94-95, 69 P.3d 367 (2003),review denied, 150 Wn.2d 1027 (2004).Such stops violate article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution because "they are seizures absent the 'authority of law' which a warrant would bring." Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 358 (quoting Wash. Const. art. I, § 7).

Although the police may enforce the traffic code, "[t]hey may not . . use that authority as a pretext or justification to avoid the warrant requirement for an unrelated criminal investigation."
Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 357. To determine whether a stop is pretextual, courts consider the totality of the circumstances, including the officer's subjective intent and the objective reasonableness of the officer's conduct. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 358-59. Generally, if the trial court finds that the stop was pretextual, all subsequently obtained evidence from the stop must be suppressed. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 359.The trial court on February 26, 2008 correctly noted Ladson's rationale and ruled accordingly under the totality of the circumstances. The trail court in this specific case has sat in the position of the appellate court review on the same subject matter and quashed the original trail courts finding of fact and conclusions of law for it's finding not committed without just cause to do so. No criminal case should,nor,could have proceeded against the Appellant.

The Appellant has established all 4 prongs of review under rap 2.3 d ;

(1)Appellant Established the court erred in going forward and conflicts with other appellate decisions of the court of appeals does exist. cf. Ginn, 128 Wn. App. At 881;
Fry, 168 Wn.2d at 19 ; Fry, 168 Wn.2d at 14 ; Fry, 168 Wn.2d at 7;U.S. v. Black,
State v. Hanson; State v. Ladson; State v. Eduardo Quezadas-Gomez, Div. II No. 40162-2; Gaudin and Johnson; State v. Hyder

(2) Appellant Established no facts of reasonable suspicion to warrant any probable cause existed to warrant any issuance of a search warrant for a crime not committed by Appellant. Just the opposite, the court's did knowingly assist a business which does not lawfully qualify making claims it is [ Dr. Orvald's clinic offering informed consent which comports to rcw 69.50.308(e) read in harmony with rcw 69.51A.010(5) "valid documentation".] The Appellant has shown and established thcf medical clinic is not [ Dr. Orvald's or any other duly lawfully authorized licensed professionals Clinic]. Thcf medical clinic does not qualify and is a state created danger allowing this entity or any of it's document enter the judicial system as "valid documentation" . Was the court and/or state required to shut down thcf medical clinics and not allow any further money laundering to occur, thus not bring this court into further disrepute?This ruling against Appellant is clear text book disrepute upon the Washington State Supreme Court dba The State of Washington corporation.

The "substantial" facts in the record show beyond a reasonable doubt the crimes committed are by persons subverting the laws of the state of Washington in which the appellant was convicted of their criminal conduct with the assistance of all officers of the court and not the appellants conduct which was clearly, not criminal. The search warrant affidavit made it's threshold reasonable suspicion in form in front of the court on the grounds THCF medical clinics was and to this day IS a valid lawful foreign corporation business allowed to transact lawful business in Washington under the law's of the corporate practice of medicine , and the PSC act offering informed consent, and appellant had a subsequent expired authorization by the same doctor with authority to author such informed consent. The search warrant had no oath or affirmation, NATHANSON v. UNITED STATES 290 U.S. 41 (1933) .This raises a "significant" question of law under the Constitution of the State of Washington, and the United States Constitution.

(3)If the decision involves an issue of public interest which should be determined by an appellate court.

The Appellant has established a seriously significant public interest exists which should
be determined by this Appellate court as to allow the continued operation's of foreign
corporation's illegal transaction of informed consent, or not. To do so allow these types
of entities to exist which does not comport to Washington State public policy and is in
fact illegal to allow them to continue without legislative sanction. To convict a qualifying
patient under the guise of allowing informed consent in 2004 to be superseded by an
alleged claimed lawful derived contract which is nothing more than a layperson
collecting profits from the public he is not entitled too, nor are his contracts with
licensed medical professional lawful rendered services worthy of qualifying them as
medical records let alone, as defined valid documentation under the act.

The Appellant has established Paul Stanford is practicing medicine without a license
and also is using a foreign corporation not lawfully certified to hire learned professionals
to use their license to render informed consent for medical conditions listed in the act .

This court should affirm Appellant has proven a serious significant public policy issue
exists which this court must decide for the public good. As to not do so, would be a
state created danger with no remedy. As well, complicity with state created danger.


(4)If the superior court has so far departed from " accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings" , or "so far sanctioned such a departure" by the court of limited jurisdiction, as to call for review by the appellate court.

The Appellant has shown the superior court substantially has so far departed from
"accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings " in regards to knowingly allow a
non wa. secretary of state certified foreign corporation transacting non legislated
sanctioned profits by a unlicensed layperson practicing medicine as defined by the
legislature as one must be licensed to do so, and also hold a PSC certificate to have a
business in washington offering informed consent. Which effectively silences any health
care practitioners professional medical opinion whom is an employee of said illegal
contracts. They are ALL null and void, not to be used to supersede any valid informed
consent already derived from a valid transaction . Even from this same practitioner.

The Appellant has shown the superior court has effectively sanctioned an illegal entity
as if it had been certified by the secretary of state to transact business for profit lawfully
offering informed consent by anyone whom has a business license.. not a PSC.

Effectively this ruling is extinguishing to standards of care doctrine and medical
malpractice now does not exist with this ruling. This would be a separation of powers
violation allowing the courts to legislate informed consent laws and standard of care
laws for profit without a license to do so which common sense would dictate is, highly
PROHIBITED. One can not say as such a departure does not exist as to not call for
review by the appellate court. The Appellant has shown the superior court has so far
departed in issuing a valid search warrant under State v. Hyder, One can not say as
such a departure does not exist as to not call for review by the appellate court. The same
goes for the Appellants pretext, illegality, conspiracy, money laundering, fiduciary duty ,
ineffective assistance of counsel(s), personal gain and/or profit without authority and
Judicial deception claims, and all attached "fundamental" common sense constitutional
claims .

Conclusion

Appellant requests the Honorable Justices of this court to enter an order ruling accepting discretionary review on all four prongs under rap 2.3d or at least the one's this court is comfortable with in the further creating a state sanctioned danger with no remedy at law for those harmed.

The Appellant also requests an order waiving any and all fees associated with this and further allowed motion(s) as the court has one already on file due to the Appellant continuing SSDI indigent status.

Appellant request the Honorable Justices of this court file all appropriate complaint' to the proper ethics oversight agency/committee for the clear violations found in the record committed and/or omitted by officers of the court.

Appellant requests the Honorable Justices of this court to file a complaint with the Attorney General against those persons amenable by clear violations of law found in the record.

This Honorable court has the authority to reverse or modify the decision being reviewed and "take any other action as the merits of the case and the interest of justice may require". RAP 12.2.

Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of January 2012.

________________________
James E. Barber Sr.
In Propria Persona


Next thing I post here will be the 3 Judge Panel ruling.

Win, lose or draw..

I have a court date in march for imposition of sentence.. no telling how long till we get a ruling, so said the trial Judge whom I just had a hearing with last week.

My sentence was 90 days converted into 40 hr' community service with a non profit org. because I am a qualifying patient so said the state upon sentencing.. after they asked for full 90 days in jail.. I produced a document which clearly showed they could not put me in a jail facility which can not feed me or care for my serious debilitating condition(s). i.e. very qualifying ..
 
holy chit! why do they insist on doing this? because they dont understand! they want to flaunt their authority? why?
makes 0 sence to me, ive read many different cases and most seem frivilous at best, someone got excited ans over stepped their bounds. i guess they have a difficult time saying we (leos) were wrong.
i wonder where this will go. ive been a med patient for over 10 yrs, now i have terrible issues with money and can not afford the state license. i only have the 5 or so drs. in my corner. each one telling me do this! u need this! we as drs have nothing else to help with the neuroligical pain you suffer from. then they up the drs precsribed narcotics that really mess with my life!
i was injured at work, a city gov. job. electricuted due to someone elses negligence. the mayor of or town and his dope dealin son! now i am 100% disabled. emagine what the city did for the first 4 years after the injury! missing up to 900 hrs a year and getting full pay and insentive bonuses.
the public employees only care about their world and whats going to effect their $ habded to them. ive seen so much waste when it comes to city and their budget ways. talk about steppin over a dollar to pick up a nickle!
sad sad deal, a med like this and people that just dont want to understand! the are not paid to understand is the problem. they work off of laws implimented yrs ago. yea they have changed a bit but not enough! there will come a time when they do something terribly wrong and someone dies! you watch!
drs took and put me on marinol i stopped growing and now the pain is out of control. i did realise how well the cannabis plant worked till they took it away!
i do wish you all the best! i just wish there was more i could do. being a guy on disability with no money and so much pain there is little i can do.
the cannabis plant is a godsend to me and my way of life! without it ive entered into the seventh circle of hell! this is a mild discription of my circumstances.
peace and good luck!
 
I'd like to help, but I would not do it justice, so I am referring you to seek help from Luis Ewing.
I can send his info to those that ask.
I totally believe this guy can help and he is not a lawyer, but has beat the claim of him acting as a lawyer. Beat the pot issue, beat many many traffic violations, He just knows how to win court cases...
Just reading through his information and flyers will help you understand the rules they (the courts) will follow.
Please do yourself a favor and contact this guy especially if you live in Washington State and are having problems with the state of Washington. Two different birds...
 
I'd like to help, but I would not do it justice, so I am referring you to seek help from Luis Ewing.
I can send his info to those that ask.
I totally believe this guy can help and he is not a lawyer, but has beat the claim of him acting as a lawyer. Beat the pot issue, beat many many traffic violations, He just knows how to win court cases...
Just reading through his information and flyers will help you understand the rules they (the courts) will follow.
Please do yourself a favor and contact this guy especially if you live in Washington State and are having problems with the state of Washington. Two different birds...


?

Ripoff Report | Luis Ewing | Complaint Review: 323954
Luis Ewing agreed to take my cash in exchange for pre-trial motions - he wrote none!! Tacoma Washington

I CAN HELP YOU BEAT YOUR OWN MARIJUANA CASES
 
The simple fact is there is no rule of law any more. Have 12 judges hear the same case and you'll get 12 different decisions. Jury nullification is a perfect example. You are not allowed to make that arguement in the court room in front of a jury. Way too many both constitutional and unconstitutional laws and all so poorly written by attorneys who don't grasp the basic foundations of law anyways.
Crash the system. No matter what kind of a court case you have fight. Fight a jaywalking ticket. Take up the courts time with mindless inaine shit. Backup the courts so that they can't try any cases. And never sign away your right to a speedy trial. That is the first mistake virtually every defense attorney does. They do it because they are lazy and don't want to put in the ground work on your case, your case is not a priority to them. Golfing and fancy lunches are.
Game the system. Its how they do it and you must do it too if you hope to win in a corrupt legal system.
 
if your sick and a bonified dr writes a script for cannabis, this is a free country right? the script should be filled at the pharmacy just like all the other narcotics i have filled. the other meds. r much m ore potient than cannabis. life ruining nuf said!
blessing sent your way!
68

ps
i know this is quite old. you can have enough blessing though!
 
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