Jim Finnel
Fallen Cannabis Warrior & Ex News Moderator
November 2, 1951: The Boggs Act nearly quadruples penalties for all narcotics offenses and unscientifically lumps marijuana in with narcotic drugs. (Narcotics are by definition a class of drugs derived from the opium poppy plant, containing opium, or produced synthetically and to have opium-like effects. Opioid drugs relieve pain, dull the senses and induce sleep.)
The Boggs Act
The beginning of the 1950s set the start for the harsh drug laws we have today. This time also saw cannabis being categorized with cocaine and heroin. In order to change the future we must understand the past.
The increased hysteria of cannabis use leading to the use of opiates during the 1950s led to legislation whose goal was to expand penalties regarding cannabis. The 1950s can best be characterized as a time in which the punitive approach to the use of cannabis dominated. Two key pieces of legislation passed through Congress during this time, the Boggs Act of 1951 and the Narcotics Control Act of 1956. Although numerous other bills were introduced in Congress to expand the penalties regarding cannabis these are the two that passed and outlined the new sentences that would be imposed.
The Boggs Act of 1951 represented the most punitive approach to cannabis to this point in the plants history. Most importantly this piece of legislation was the first time that cannabis was lumped together with other drugs. This meant that according to the Boggs Act sentences for her*in, coc*ine, cannabis, etc… offenses would be identical.
Today we can now see that this legislation was a prelude to cannabis being together with her*in under Schedule 1. This placement is a key turning point in the legal status of cannabis, because the time of being separate from other narcotics had ended.
The other significant turning point that the Boggs Act introduced into the history of cannabis was the mandatory minimum sentence. Because Anslinger and many members of Congress wished to limit the discretion available to judges mandatory minimum sentences were introduced. The new penalties for cannabis under the Boggs Act read as follows:
1st offense: 2-5 years $2000 fine
2nd offense: 5-10 years $2000 fine
3rd offense: 10-20 years $2000 fine
It is important to note that the new penalties introduced under the Boggs Act made no distinction between the user and the peddler, or between the person who possessed a joint and the person who had a garage full of heroin (Bonnie and Whitebread 210). Therefore a first time offender convicted of smoking one cannabis cigarette would be sentenced to a minimum of two years in prison and a $2000 fine as would the first time offender who was convicted of selling massive amounts of heroin.
After the passage of the Boggs Act in 1951 the FBN convinced many of the states to follow suit and expand their cannabis penalties. In fact between 1953 and 1956 twenty-six states passed legislation raising penalties for cannabis offenses. Some states becoming so caught up in the expanding of penalties that they soon had penalties stiffer than that passed by the Boggs Act. By 1956 Louisiana had the harshest drug penalties in the country calling for a 5 – 99 year sentence without the possibility of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for the sale, possession, or administering of any drug. Again it is important to note that no distinction was made between the peddler and the user.
Although the Boggs Act was passed and penalties were expanded to their greatest, considerable dissent did indeed exist. Although this dissent was not powerful enough to block this critical piece of legislation it is still important to note of its presence, because during the time of the Marihuana Tax Act (the last piece of important cannabis legislation) virtually no dissent existed, outside of Dr. Woodward of the AMA.
Congressman Cellar speaking at the hearings consistently stated that he believed the introducing of mandatory minimum sentences would be unjust to addicts. The director of the United States Bureau of Prisons James V Bennett stated, “The Boggs Bill was passed due to hysteria”, after the passage of the act.
Most importantly science finally entered the legal history of cannabis. The Boggs Act hearings marked the first occurrence of a scientific paper being filed as an exhibit into cannabis related legislative hearings, this paper was by Dr. Harry Isbell the director of research at the public health service hospital in Lexington, Kentucky. Dr. Isbell’s research showed that cannabis was not physically addictive. Furthermore Dr. Isbell went on to testify before the Kefauver committee in the Senate stating:
“Marihuana smokers generally are mildly intoxicated, giggle, laugh, bother no one, and have a good time… ordinarily will not attempt to harm anyone. It has not been proven that smoking marihuana leads to crimes of violence or to crimes of a sexual nature. Smoking marihuana has no unpleasant after-effects, no dependence is developed on the drug, and the practice can be stopped at any time”.
Unfortunately the statements by Dr. Isbell were disregarded by the majority in Congress, as were the statements of Dr. Woodward at the Marihuana Tax Act hearings, and the Boggs Act of 1951 was passed.
The American Medical Association remained an important voice of dissent during the period that the Boggs Act was passed, much like it was at the time of the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act. Between 1951 and 1955 the AMA was joined by the American Bar Association (ABA) in calling for a reexamination of the legislative approach to stopping drugs.
This is crucial because it represents two powerful entities standing together against the punitive approach that was pushed through the legislature in the Boggs Act. Further calls by the AMA and ABA came in 1955 when the coalition called for a Congressional investigation of the FBN. By calling for such an investigation of the force that pushed the crime, sexual excess, insanity, stepping stone to her*in, and communist hysteria movements this represented the first real threat to the power that the FBN had undoubtedly held since 1937.
In 1955 the joint ABA / AMA investigation of the FBN began. Later upon publication of the findings the committee asked Anslinger if he would meet in order to talk about what was found. Anslinger angrily refused any such meeting and disregarded and discredited the findings of the committee by stating it was “incredible that so many glaring inaccuracies, manifest inconsistencies, apparent ambiguities, important omissions, and even false statements could be found in one report”. Although Anslinger followed his usual plan of ignoring any dissent and did not meet with this joint committee it was becoming nonetheless apparent that his reasoning was that he was afraid of the possible effects any credible dissent could have on his campaign against cannabis.
Parallel to the pushing of the Boggs Act there existed a considerable voice in the United States that wished to move even farther with the punitive approach. At this time another bill regarding penalties for cannabis offenses existed in Congress, this was the Dirksen Bill.
The Dirksen Bill suggested going above and beyond what was being considered under the Boggs Act and called for a possibility of the death penalty for certain offenders. In writing to a Oregon State Senator in 1951 Anslinger stated, “You no doubt know that Senator Dirksen has introduced a bill in the US Congress which could provide the death penalty for peddling narcotics to minors. This has our complete endorsement”.
Although the Dirksen Bill was never passed it is nonetheless still a significant force in the history of the prohibition of cannabis. The Dirksen Bill allows us to see early, before the passing of the Boggs Act, that Anslinger and some members of Congress were not satisfied with the already heavy penalties proposed in the Boggs Act. This bill shows that many in power at this time were ready to test the extremes of the punitive approach.
Outside of the happenings of the Dirksen Bill there were many other occurrences of persons calling for penalties far more extreme than that contained in the Boggs Act. Congressman Edwin Arthur Hall of New York called for a minimum sentence of no less than 100 years for anyone who peddles cannabis. A Californian writing to Commissioner Anslinger wrote, “I strongly support your request for legislation to impose life sentences on narcotics peddlers. In fact I would go further and urge nothing less than death sentences for these viscous enemies of society”.. The mass media also joined in this campaign, on August 12 1951 the Washington Post wrote, “these are criminals of the ugliest and most dangerous type…” speaking of drug dealers.
From this we can note that in 1951 this national hysteria created an extreme of the punitive approach. For the mass media, regular citizens, the FBN, and members of Congress were all asking for the most severe penalties, many of which would have made cannabis offenses more punishable than murder in some cases.
Works Cited:
Bonnie, Richard J and Charles H Whitebread. The Marihuana Conviction.
Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1974.
Mcwilliams, John C. The Protectors: Harry J Anslinger and the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics 1930-1962. Newark, NJ: University of Deleware Press, 1990.
Source
November 1, 1968: The UK's Advisory Committee on Drug Dependence releases the Wootton Report, recommending that marijuana possession not be a criminal offense.
The Wootton Report was the report of a committee under the chairmanship of Lord Wootton of Clapton.
The committee was set up by the British government in 1967 to examine the laws regulating narcotic drugs, and released its report on November 1, 1968. While it accepted that cannabis was not risk-free, and the report said that its wider use "should not be encouraged", the Committee declared:
"The dangers of its use as commonly accepted in the past and the risk of its progression to opiates have been overstated, and the existing criminal sanctions intended to curb its use are unjustifiably severe."
Its recommendations included;
no prison sentences for possession of small quantities of cannabis,
no legal penalties for allowing private premises to be used for consumption and
the separation of the legal status of cannabis from that of her*in
November 6, 1984: The DEA and Mexican officials raid a large marijuana cultivation and processing complex in the Chihuahua desert owned by kingpin Rafael Caro Quintero. Seven thousand campesinos work at the complex, where between 5,000-10,000 tons of high-grade marijuana worth $2.5 billion is found and destroyed. Time magazine calls this "the bust of the century," and it reveals the existence of Mexico's sophisticated marijuana smuggling industry.
November 5, 1987: Nina Totenberg of National Public Radio breaks the story that Reagan Supreme Court nominee Douglas Ginsburg admitted to having smoked marijuana with his students "on a few occasions in the '70s" while he was a professor at Harvard. Two days later, President Reagan asks Ginsburg to withdraw his nomination.
November 6, 1989: Former President Ronald Reagan's Secretary of State George Shultz is quoted by the Associated Press: "We need at least to consider and examine forms of controlled legalization of drugs."
November 5, 1996:California's Proposition 215 (The Compassionate Use Act) passes with 56% of the voting public in favor. Proposition 200 (The Drug Medicalization, Prevention, and Control Act) in Arizona passes with 65% of the vote.
Provides that patients or defined caregivers, who possess or cultivate marijuana for medical treatment recommended by a physician, are exempt from general provisions of law which otherwise prohibit possession or cultivation of marijuana. Provides physicians shall not be punished or denied any right or privilege for recommending marijuana to a patient for medical purposes. Declares that the measure not be construed to supersede prohibitions of conduct endangering others nor to condone diversion of marijuana for nonmedical purposes. Contains severability clause. Summary of estimate by Legislative Analyst and Director of Finance of fiscal impact on state and local government: Because this measure restricts the use of marijuana to only those persons for whom it is prescribed by a licensed physician, it would probably have no significant state or local fiscal impact.
To The Honorable Secretary Of State Of California:
We, the undersigned, registered, qualified voters of California, residents of __________________________County (or City and County), hereby propose an addition to the Health and Safety Code, relating to the compassionate use of marijuana, and petition the Secretary of State to submit the same to the voters of California for their adoption or rejection at the next succeeding general election or at any special statewide election held prior to that general election or otherwise provided by law. The proposed addition to the Health and Safety code shall read as follows:
Section 1. Section 11362.5 is added to the Health and Safety Code, to read:
11362.5. (a) This section shall be known and may be cited as the Compassionate Use Act of 1996.
(b) (l) The people of the State of California hereby find and declare that the purposes of the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 are as follows:
(A) To ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes where that medical use is deemed appropriate and has been recommended by a physician who has determined that the person's health would benefit from the use of marijuana in the treatment of cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any other illness for which marijuana provides relief.
(B) To ensure that patients and their primary caregivers who obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes upon the recommendation of a physician are not subject to criminal prosecution or sanction.
(C) To encourage the federal and state governments to implement a plan to provide for the safe and affordable distribution of marijuana to all patients in medical need of marijuana.
(2) Nothing in this act shall be construed to supersede legislation prohibiting persons from engaging in conduct that endangers others, nor to condone the diversion of marijuana for nonmedical purposes.
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no physician in this state shall be punished, or denied any right or privilege, for having recommended marijuana to a patient for medical purposes.
(d) Section 11357, relating to the possession of marijuana, and Section 11358, relating to the cultivation of marijuana, shall not apply to a patient, or to a patient's primary caregiver, who possesses or cultivates marijuana for the personal medical purposes of the patient upon the written or oral recommendation or approval of a physician.
(e) For the purposes of this section, "primary caregiver" means the individual designated by the person exempted under this act who has consistently assumed responsibility for the housing, health, or safety of that person.
Sec. 2. If any provision of this measure or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the measure which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this measure are severable.
November 4, 1998: Voters in seven states overwhelmingly approve nine medical marijuana and larger drug policy reform initiatives.
November 3, 1999: The Criminal Justice Policy Foundation (CJPF) cosponsors a press conference and releases a letter to Drug Czar Gen. Barry McCaffrey from distinguished American and Latin American leaders who reject the US export of the failed "war on drugs" to Latin America.
A Message to the Hemisphere's Drug Policy Makers
This letter was released at a press conference on November 3, 1999.
As you meet to develop a hemispheric drug strategy, it is time to admit that after two decades the U.S. war on drugs -- both in Latin America and in the United States -- is a failure. Despite a 17-fold increase in U.S. drug war spending since 1980, record seizures, arrests, and incarcerations at home, and destruction abroad of hundreds of drug labs and coca and poppy crops, today in the U.S., illicit drugs are cheaper, more potent, and more easily available than two decades ago.
Under the banner of fighting drugs, U.S. military aid to Colombia has skyrocketed: today Colombia is by far the largest recipient of U.S. military aid in the hemisphere -- and the third largest in the world after Israel and Egypt. Yet, over the last decade, total drug production in Colombia has risen 260 percent. The escalation of a militarized drug war in Colombia and elsewhere in the Americas threatens regional stability, undermines efforts towards demilitarization and democracy, and has put U.S. arms and money into the hands of corrupt officials and military, police and intelligence units involved in human rights abuses.
Before escalating the war on drugs even further, an honest evaluation of the strategy is needed. Drug problems have not been solved because the approach taken -- prohibition enforced by a militarized drug war -- is fundamentally flawed:
U.S. drug policy disproportionately targets peasant farmers and fails to address the poverty and inequality, widespread throughout the Americas, which are at the root of drug cultivation.
The U.N. estimates that at least 75% of international drug shipments would need to be intercepted to substantially reduce the profitability of drug trafficking. Yet interdiction efforts intercept only 10-15% of the her*n and 30% of the coc*ine, according to the most optimistic estimates.
Continued demand in the U.S. ensures that even if drug cultivation, processing and shipment are controlled in one area, they emerge in another.
U.S. prisons are overflowing with more than 400,000 drug offenders. The vast majority of those behind bars are low-level dealers; for example, only 5 percent of those jailed for cr*ck are high-level dealers.
Current drug strategy can never work given the magnitude of profits from illicit drugs -- according to the U.S. government, $57 billion annually in the U.S. alone. According to the United Nations, drug trafficking is a $400 billion per year industry, equaling 8% of the world's trade.
Has the policy of doing more of the same produced a better result? Clearly the answer is no.
The problem is not insufficient funds, firepower or prisons. Rather, a totally new approach is needed. To be effective, U.S. drug control strategy must shift from militarized eradication and interdiction in Latin America and a law-enforcement dominated approach at home. As you meet to discuss the future direction of drug control, we urge you to consider the following points:
When it comes to reducing coc*ine consumption, drug treatment is 7 times more cost effective than domestic law enforcement, 10 times more effective than interdiction and 23 times more effective than eradication, according to a RAND Corporation study.
Expanding the U.S. drug war to other countries will merely further expand the failure of drug control throughout the hemisphere while escalating killings and environmental destruction.
Emphasis should be placed on public health, economic development, protecting human rights and pragmatic approaches to reducing drug-related problems.
A long-term solution to the drug market needs to be developed by engaging in a dialogue with the countries and non-governmental organizations in this hemisphere that examines all options to the drug war.
Signed:
Antonio Aranibar, Former Foreign Minister of Bolivia
Oscar Arias, Former President of Costa Rica and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate
Harry Belafonte, Entertainer and Activist
Belisario Betancur, Former President of Colombia
Rev. Dr. Joan Brown Campbell, General Secretary, National Council of Churches
Jorge Castaneda, Professor of Politics, New York University
Violeta Chamorro, Former President of Nicaragua
Adolfo Perez Esquivel, Argentine Nobel Peace Prize Laureate
Shirley Fingerhood, Former Justice of the New York State Supreme Court
James P. Gray, Judge of the Superior Court, Orange County, California
Dr. Howard Hiatt, Former Dean, Harvard School of Public Health
Cruz Reynoso, Former Justice of the California State Supreme Court
Mario Vargas Llosa, Peruvian writer and Politician
Robert E. White, President, Center for International Policy (former Ambassador to El Salvador and Paraguay)
November 3, 2001: DEA raids the Los Angeles Cannabis Resource Center, a medical marijuana distribution facility, arresting its president, Scott Imler. City officials condemn the raid at a press conference attended by more than 100 center members.
November 1, 2002: Every prosecutor in the United States is sent a letter from the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and the National District Attorneys Association (NDAA), urging them to make prosecution of cannabis crimes a high priority and to fight efforts to ease drug laws.
The Boggs Act
The beginning of the 1950s set the start for the harsh drug laws we have today. This time also saw cannabis being categorized with cocaine and heroin. In order to change the future we must understand the past.
The increased hysteria of cannabis use leading to the use of opiates during the 1950s led to legislation whose goal was to expand penalties regarding cannabis. The 1950s can best be characterized as a time in which the punitive approach to the use of cannabis dominated. Two key pieces of legislation passed through Congress during this time, the Boggs Act of 1951 and the Narcotics Control Act of 1956. Although numerous other bills were introduced in Congress to expand the penalties regarding cannabis these are the two that passed and outlined the new sentences that would be imposed.
The Boggs Act of 1951 represented the most punitive approach to cannabis to this point in the plants history. Most importantly this piece of legislation was the first time that cannabis was lumped together with other drugs. This meant that according to the Boggs Act sentences for her*in, coc*ine, cannabis, etc… offenses would be identical.
Today we can now see that this legislation was a prelude to cannabis being together with her*in under Schedule 1. This placement is a key turning point in the legal status of cannabis, because the time of being separate from other narcotics had ended.
The other significant turning point that the Boggs Act introduced into the history of cannabis was the mandatory minimum sentence. Because Anslinger and many members of Congress wished to limit the discretion available to judges mandatory minimum sentences were introduced. The new penalties for cannabis under the Boggs Act read as follows:
1st offense: 2-5 years $2000 fine
2nd offense: 5-10 years $2000 fine
3rd offense: 10-20 years $2000 fine
It is important to note that the new penalties introduced under the Boggs Act made no distinction between the user and the peddler, or between the person who possessed a joint and the person who had a garage full of heroin (Bonnie and Whitebread 210). Therefore a first time offender convicted of smoking one cannabis cigarette would be sentenced to a minimum of two years in prison and a $2000 fine as would the first time offender who was convicted of selling massive amounts of heroin.
After the passage of the Boggs Act in 1951 the FBN convinced many of the states to follow suit and expand their cannabis penalties. In fact between 1953 and 1956 twenty-six states passed legislation raising penalties for cannabis offenses. Some states becoming so caught up in the expanding of penalties that they soon had penalties stiffer than that passed by the Boggs Act. By 1956 Louisiana had the harshest drug penalties in the country calling for a 5 – 99 year sentence without the possibility of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for the sale, possession, or administering of any drug. Again it is important to note that no distinction was made between the peddler and the user.
Although the Boggs Act was passed and penalties were expanded to their greatest, considerable dissent did indeed exist. Although this dissent was not powerful enough to block this critical piece of legislation it is still important to note of its presence, because during the time of the Marihuana Tax Act (the last piece of important cannabis legislation) virtually no dissent existed, outside of Dr. Woodward of the AMA.
Congressman Cellar speaking at the hearings consistently stated that he believed the introducing of mandatory minimum sentences would be unjust to addicts. The director of the United States Bureau of Prisons James V Bennett stated, “The Boggs Bill was passed due to hysteria”, after the passage of the act.
Most importantly science finally entered the legal history of cannabis. The Boggs Act hearings marked the first occurrence of a scientific paper being filed as an exhibit into cannabis related legislative hearings, this paper was by Dr. Harry Isbell the director of research at the public health service hospital in Lexington, Kentucky. Dr. Isbell’s research showed that cannabis was not physically addictive. Furthermore Dr. Isbell went on to testify before the Kefauver committee in the Senate stating:
“Marihuana smokers generally are mildly intoxicated, giggle, laugh, bother no one, and have a good time… ordinarily will not attempt to harm anyone. It has not been proven that smoking marihuana leads to crimes of violence or to crimes of a sexual nature. Smoking marihuana has no unpleasant after-effects, no dependence is developed on the drug, and the practice can be stopped at any time”.
Unfortunately the statements by Dr. Isbell were disregarded by the majority in Congress, as were the statements of Dr. Woodward at the Marihuana Tax Act hearings, and the Boggs Act of 1951 was passed.
The American Medical Association remained an important voice of dissent during the period that the Boggs Act was passed, much like it was at the time of the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act. Between 1951 and 1955 the AMA was joined by the American Bar Association (ABA) in calling for a reexamination of the legislative approach to stopping drugs.
This is crucial because it represents two powerful entities standing together against the punitive approach that was pushed through the legislature in the Boggs Act. Further calls by the AMA and ABA came in 1955 when the coalition called for a Congressional investigation of the FBN. By calling for such an investigation of the force that pushed the crime, sexual excess, insanity, stepping stone to her*in, and communist hysteria movements this represented the first real threat to the power that the FBN had undoubtedly held since 1937.
In 1955 the joint ABA / AMA investigation of the FBN began. Later upon publication of the findings the committee asked Anslinger if he would meet in order to talk about what was found. Anslinger angrily refused any such meeting and disregarded and discredited the findings of the committee by stating it was “incredible that so many glaring inaccuracies, manifest inconsistencies, apparent ambiguities, important omissions, and even false statements could be found in one report”. Although Anslinger followed his usual plan of ignoring any dissent and did not meet with this joint committee it was becoming nonetheless apparent that his reasoning was that he was afraid of the possible effects any credible dissent could have on his campaign against cannabis.
Parallel to the pushing of the Boggs Act there existed a considerable voice in the United States that wished to move even farther with the punitive approach. At this time another bill regarding penalties for cannabis offenses existed in Congress, this was the Dirksen Bill.
The Dirksen Bill suggested going above and beyond what was being considered under the Boggs Act and called for a possibility of the death penalty for certain offenders. In writing to a Oregon State Senator in 1951 Anslinger stated, “You no doubt know that Senator Dirksen has introduced a bill in the US Congress which could provide the death penalty for peddling narcotics to minors. This has our complete endorsement”.
Although the Dirksen Bill was never passed it is nonetheless still a significant force in the history of the prohibition of cannabis. The Dirksen Bill allows us to see early, before the passing of the Boggs Act, that Anslinger and some members of Congress were not satisfied with the already heavy penalties proposed in the Boggs Act. This bill shows that many in power at this time were ready to test the extremes of the punitive approach.
Outside of the happenings of the Dirksen Bill there were many other occurrences of persons calling for penalties far more extreme than that contained in the Boggs Act. Congressman Edwin Arthur Hall of New York called for a minimum sentence of no less than 100 years for anyone who peddles cannabis. A Californian writing to Commissioner Anslinger wrote, “I strongly support your request for legislation to impose life sentences on narcotics peddlers. In fact I would go further and urge nothing less than death sentences for these viscous enemies of society”.. The mass media also joined in this campaign, on August 12 1951 the Washington Post wrote, “these are criminals of the ugliest and most dangerous type…” speaking of drug dealers.
From this we can note that in 1951 this national hysteria created an extreme of the punitive approach. For the mass media, regular citizens, the FBN, and members of Congress were all asking for the most severe penalties, many of which would have made cannabis offenses more punishable than murder in some cases.
Works Cited:
Bonnie, Richard J and Charles H Whitebread. The Marihuana Conviction.
Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1974.
Mcwilliams, John C. The Protectors: Harry J Anslinger and the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics 1930-1962. Newark, NJ: University of Deleware Press, 1990.
Source
November 1, 1968: The UK's Advisory Committee on Drug Dependence releases the Wootton Report, recommending that marijuana possession not be a criminal offense.
The Wootton Report was the report of a committee under the chairmanship of Lord Wootton of Clapton.
The committee was set up by the British government in 1967 to examine the laws regulating narcotic drugs, and released its report on November 1, 1968. While it accepted that cannabis was not risk-free, and the report said that its wider use "should not be encouraged", the Committee declared:
"The dangers of its use as commonly accepted in the past and the risk of its progression to opiates have been overstated, and the existing criminal sanctions intended to curb its use are unjustifiably severe."
Its recommendations included;
no prison sentences for possession of small quantities of cannabis,
no legal penalties for allowing private premises to be used for consumption and
the separation of the legal status of cannabis from that of her*in
November 6, 1984: The DEA and Mexican officials raid a large marijuana cultivation and processing complex in the Chihuahua desert owned by kingpin Rafael Caro Quintero. Seven thousand campesinos work at the complex, where between 5,000-10,000 tons of high-grade marijuana worth $2.5 billion is found and destroyed. Time magazine calls this "the bust of the century," and it reveals the existence of Mexico's sophisticated marijuana smuggling industry.
November 5, 1987: Nina Totenberg of National Public Radio breaks the story that Reagan Supreme Court nominee Douglas Ginsburg admitted to having smoked marijuana with his students "on a few occasions in the '70s" while he was a professor at Harvard. Two days later, President Reagan asks Ginsburg to withdraw his nomination.
November 6, 1989: Former President Ronald Reagan's Secretary of State George Shultz is quoted by the Associated Press: "We need at least to consider and examine forms of controlled legalization of drugs."
November 5, 1996:California's Proposition 215 (The Compassionate Use Act) passes with 56% of the voting public in favor. Proposition 200 (The Drug Medicalization, Prevention, and Control Act) in Arizona passes with 65% of the vote.
The Compassionate Use Act of 1996
INITIATIVE MEASURE TO BE SUBMITTED DIRECTLY TO THE VOTERS
MEDICAL USE OF MARIJUANA. INITIATIVE STATUTE.
INITIATIVE MEASURE TO BE SUBMITTED DIRECTLY TO THE VOTERS
MEDICAL USE OF MARIJUANA. INITIATIVE STATUTE.
Provides that patients or defined caregivers, who possess or cultivate marijuana for medical treatment recommended by a physician, are exempt from general provisions of law which otherwise prohibit possession or cultivation of marijuana. Provides physicians shall not be punished or denied any right or privilege for recommending marijuana to a patient for medical purposes. Declares that the measure not be construed to supersede prohibitions of conduct endangering others nor to condone diversion of marijuana for nonmedical purposes. Contains severability clause. Summary of estimate by Legislative Analyst and Director of Finance of fiscal impact on state and local government: Because this measure restricts the use of marijuana to only those persons for whom it is prescribed by a licensed physician, it would probably have no significant state or local fiscal impact.
To The Honorable Secretary Of State Of California:
We, the undersigned, registered, qualified voters of California, residents of __________________________County (or City and County), hereby propose an addition to the Health and Safety Code, relating to the compassionate use of marijuana, and petition the Secretary of State to submit the same to the voters of California for their adoption or rejection at the next succeeding general election or at any special statewide election held prior to that general election or otherwise provided by law. The proposed addition to the Health and Safety code shall read as follows:
Section 1. Section 11362.5 is added to the Health and Safety Code, to read:
11362.5. (a) This section shall be known and may be cited as the Compassionate Use Act of 1996.
(b) (l) The people of the State of California hereby find and declare that the purposes of the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 are as follows:
(A) To ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes where that medical use is deemed appropriate and has been recommended by a physician who has determined that the person's health would benefit from the use of marijuana in the treatment of cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any other illness for which marijuana provides relief.
(B) To ensure that patients and their primary caregivers who obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes upon the recommendation of a physician are not subject to criminal prosecution or sanction.
(C) To encourage the federal and state governments to implement a plan to provide for the safe and affordable distribution of marijuana to all patients in medical need of marijuana.
(2) Nothing in this act shall be construed to supersede legislation prohibiting persons from engaging in conduct that endangers others, nor to condone the diversion of marijuana for nonmedical purposes.
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no physician in this state shall be punished, or denied any right or privilege, for having recommended marijuana to a patient for medical purposes.
(d) Section 11357, relating to the possession of marijuana, and Section 11358, relating to the cultivation of marijuana, shall not apply to a patient, or to a patient's primary caregiver, who possesses or cultivates marijuana for the personal medical purposes of the patient upon the written or oral recommendation or approval of a physician.
(e) For the purposes of this section, "primary caregiver" means the individual designated by the person exempted under this act who has consistently assumed responsibility for the housing, health, or safety of that person.
Sec. 2. If any provision of this measure or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the measure which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this measure are severable.
November 4, 1998: Voters in seven states overwhelmingly approve nine medical marijuana and larger drug policy reform initiatives.
November 3, 1999: The Criminal Justice Policy Foundation (CJPF) cosponsors a press conference and releases a letter to Drug Czar Gen. Barry McCaffrey from distinguished American and Latin American leaders who reject the US export of the failed "war on drugs" to Latin America.
A Message to the Hemisphere's Drug Policy Makers
This letter was released at a press conference on November 3, 1999.
As you meet to develop a hemispheric drug strategy, it is time to admit that after two decades the U.S. war on drugs -- both in Latin America and in the United States -- is a failure. Despite a 17-fold increase in U.S. drug war spending since 1980, record seizures, arrests, and incarcerations at home, and destruction abroad of hundreds of drug labs and coca and poppy crops, today in the U.S., illicit drugs are cheaper, more potent, and more easily available than two decades ago.
Under the banner of fighting drugs, U.S. military aid to Colombia has skyrocketed: today Colombia is by far the largest recipient of U.S. military aid in the hemisphere -- and the third largest in the world after Israel and Egypt. Yet, over the last decade, total drug production in Colombia has risen 260 percent. The escalation of a militarized drug war in Colombia and elsewhere in the Americas threatens regional stability, undermines efforts towards demilitarization and democracy, and has put U.S. arms and money into the hands of corrupt officials and military, police and intelligence units involved in human rights abuses.
Before escalating the war on drugs even further, an honest evaluation of the strategy is needed. Drug problems have not been solved because the approach taken -- prohibition enforced by a militarized drug war -- is fundamentally flawed:
U.S. drug policy disproportionately targets peasant farmers and fails to address the poverty and inequality, widespread throughout the Americas, which are at the root of drug cultivation.
The U.N. estimates that at least 75% of international drug shipments would need to be intercepted to substantially reduce the profitability of drug trafficking. Yet interdiction efforts intercept only 10-15% of the her*n and 30% of the coc*ine, according to the most optimistic estimates.
Continued demand in the U.S. ensures that even if drug cultivation, processing and shipment are controlled in one area, they emerge in another.
U.S. prisons are overflowing with more than 400,000 drug offenders. The vast majority of those behind bars are low-level dealers; for example, only 5 percent of those jailed for cr*ck are high-level dealers.
Current drug strategy can never work given the magnitude of profits from illicit drugs -- according to the U.S. government, $57 billion annually in the U.S. alone. According to the United Nations, drug trafficking is a $400 billion per year industry, equaling 8% of the world's trade.
Has the policy of doing more of the same produced a better result? Clearly the answer is no.
The problem is not insufficient funds, firepower or prisons. Rather, a totally new approach is needed. To be effective, U.S. drug control strategy must shift from militarized eradication and interdiction in Latin America and a law-enforcement dominated approach at home. As you meet to discuss the future direction of drug control, we urge you to consider the following points:
When it comes to reducing coc*ine consumption, drug treatment is 7 times more cost effective than domestic law enforcement, 10 times more effective than interdiction and 23 times more effective than eradication, according to a RAND Corporation study.
Expanding the U.S. drug war to other countries will merely further expand the failure of drug control throughout the hemisphere while escalating killings and environmental destruction.
Emphasis should be placed on public health, economic development, protecting human rights and pragmatic approaches to reducing drug-related problems.
A long-term solution to the drug market needs to be developed by engaging in a dialogue with the countries and non-governmental organizations in this hemisphere that examines all options to the drug war.
Signed:
Antonio Aranibar, Former Foreign Minister of Bolivia
Oscar Arias, Former President of Costa Rica and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate
Harry Belafonte, Entertainer and Activist
Belisario Betancur, Former President of Colombia
Rev. Dr. Joan Brown Campbell, General Secretary, National Council of Churches
Jorge Castaneda, Professor of Politics, New York University
Violeta Chamorro, Former President of Nicaragua
Adolfo Perez Esquivel, Argentine Nobel Peace Prize Laureate
Shirley Fingerhood, Former Justice of the New York State Supreme Court
James P. Gray, Judge of the Superior Court, Orange County, California
Dr. Howard Hiatt, Former Dean, Harvard School of Public Health
Cruz Reynoso, Former Justice of the California State Supreme Court
Mario Vargas Llosa, Peruvian writer and Politician
Robert E. White, President, Center for International Policy (former Ambassador to El Salvador and Paraguay)
November 3, 2001: DEA raids the Los Angeles Cannabis Resource Center, a medical marijuana distribution facility, arresting its president, Scott Imler. City officials condemn the raid at a press conference attended by more than 100 center members.
November 1, 2002: Every prosecutor in the United States is sent a letter from the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and the National District Attorneys Association (NDAA), urging them to make prosecution of cannabis crimes a high priority and to fight efforts to ease drug laws.
